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Abstract 
This dissertation offers a critique of what scholars have called the ‘dominant climate 
imaginary:’ a way of thinking that animates mainstream climate politics. It proposes in 
turn a ‘democratic imaginary’ through which to respond to anthropogenic climate change. 
 
Through the lens of the dominant imaginary: 1) climate change appears as an essentially 
technical and scientific problem, 2) the impacts of climate change are presumed to be 
spatially and/or temporally distant, and 3) individuals and communities implicated in a 
changing climate are encouraged to accept that countering climate change is primarily the 
responsibility of distant organizations and institutions. As such, the dominant imaginary 
provides little room for centering and addressing everyday entanglements with climate 
change, even as it stymies opportunities for approaching climate change through bottom-
up, democratic politics. 
 
In response, this dissertation argues that concerned political theorists and activists ought 
resist the dominant climate imaginary, and proposes the concept of ‘climate violence’ as 
a means of doing so. Once climate change is understood as a problem of violence – and 
therefore not only a technical and scientific problem – questions about its political 
implications are more easily asked. Who is responsible for the problem? Who is most 
impacted? How should those who are implicated in one way or another think about 
responsibility for, and democratic responses to, climate change? 
 
Having critiqued the dominant imaginary and argued for the concept of climate violence, 
the dissertation ends with a turn to democratic and feminist political theorists. By putting 
such theorists into conversation with the problem of climate violence, I end by outlining 
‘greenhouse democracy’ a set of ecologically sensitive democratic commitments and 
provocations. According to greenhouse democracy the experience of living under the 
threat of climate violence, rather than any official citizenship granted by states, qualifies 
and invites one to participate in building bottom-up, collective responses to climate 
violence. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. Political Theory in the Greenhouse 
     Climate change is a tremendous problem, in ways known and yet to be understood. 
Testifying to the scope and historical novelty of the problem, recent academic treatments 
have tried to come to terms with a changing climate by, for example, rethinking the 
ontology of objects so as to be able to conceive of its spatial and temporal expansiveness; 
by turning to the literary and cinematic genre of horror in order to capture the 
fundamental unthinkability of a changing climate; and, most generally, by proposing a 
shift from the geological epoch of the Holocene to the Anthropocene – an epoch in which 
a dehistoricized and universal humanity is the prime mover of conditions on earth.1 
     While such attempts try to help us with come to terms with what we do not yet know, 
what we do know is that climate change makes storms worse while eroding shorelines, 
and that the hottest year (and decade) on record now occurs routinely because humans 
have collectively altered the earth’s atmospheric makeup. While we cannot be sure how 
right we are in attributing any given weather event to the climatic shift, we know that a 
significant connection is there.2 Per the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) report, some observed results of humanity’s power to alter the earth’s 
atmosphere include decade-by-decade successive warming over the last thirty years, 
                                                
1 For examples, see Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the 
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of This 
Planet: Horror of Philosophy, vol. 1 (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2011); and Will Steffen, Paul 
Crutzen, and John R. McNeill, “The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great 
Forces of Nature?” Ambio 36, no. 8 (2007): 614-21, respectively. 
2 Recent work weakens the longstanding truism that we cannot link particular weather events with 
a changed climate. See the Committee on Extreme Weather Events and Climate Change 
Attribution et al., Attribution of Extreme Weather Events in the Context of Climate Change 
(Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2016). 
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oceanic warming that accounts for 90% of the additional energy retained in the 
environment since 1971, much more rain in some areas along with longer and more 
severe droughts in others, a 26% increase in ocean acidification since the industrial era 
began, a decrease in the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, and a roughly six inch rise in 
sea levels.3 According to the same report, these changes have led to “extreme events,” 
such as a “decrease in cold temperature extremes,” “an increase in warm temperature 
extremes,” an “increase in extreme high sea levels,” and “an increase in the number of 
heavy precipitation events.”4 
     To put it more simply, this all adds up to the melting of ice banks that used to protect 
tiny island communities in the far north and elsewhere: such communities are now more 
vulnerable to the sublime and deadly encroachment of the rising seas.5 It produces towns 
in California that no longer have running water, where government employees and 
citizens must now scramble to piece together deliveries of water that was most likely 
bottled, of all places, in the perennially dry locale of southern California.6 It translates 
into mudslides that threaten villages, busy freeways, and cities alike. It threatens already-
                                                
3 R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer, eds, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of 
Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2015), 2-4. 
4 Ibid., 7. 
5 Renee Lewis, “Vote of a Lifetime: Alaskan Town Decides Whether to Stay or Go in Face of 
Climate Change,” Fusion, August 15, 2016, accessed August 31, 2016, http://fusion. net/ 
story/336452/alaskan-town-votes-on-relocating-because-of-climate-change/; Coral Davenport, 
“The Marshall Islands Are Disappearing,” New York Times, December 2, 2015, Accessed July 17, 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/02/world/The-Marshall-Islands-Are-
Disappearing.html. 
6 Julia Lurie, “Here’s What I Saw in a California Town Without Running Water,” Mother Jones, 
September 7, 2015, accessed September 23, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/ 
2015/08/drought-no-running-water-east-porterville. 
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vulnerable populations with increased flooding and erosion.7 In short, the “observed 
changes” and “extreme events” set into motion by anthropogenic climate change and 
described abstractly by the IPCC translate into very concrete violences – past, present, 
and pending – on a global scale.8 
     Yet in part because of the technical ways in which bodies like the IPCC – the world’s 
most authoritative adjudicator of climate science – narrate these kinds of findings, 
climate change is usually understood as a technical problem demanding advancements in 
management techniques, markets, and the theoretical and applied natural sciences. 
Reflecting the discourse presented by bodies like the IPCC, many politicians and publics 
alike demand such advancements in the form of new technologies to mitigate climate 
change – to reduce its sources – or in the form of new technologies that provide various 
human and nonhuman communities with the tools they need to adapt to its impacts – to 
live with the effects of climate change.9 Indeed much commentary is saturated with 
technical jargon: words like mitigation, adaptation, carbon trading, and geoengineering 
top the list. The goal of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, for example, is to supply 
the science needed to foster “mitigation and adaptation options within the framework of 
                                                
7 Gardiner Harris, “Borrowed Time on Disappearing Land: Facing Rising Seas, Bangladesh 
Confronts the Consequences of Climate Change,” New York Times, March 29, 2014, Accessed 
July 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/world/asia/facing-rising-seas-bangladesh-
confronts-the-consequences-of-climate-change.html. 
8 See Kevin O’Brien, The Violence of Climate Change: Lessons of Resistance from Nonviolent 
Activists (Washington, DC: Georgetown UP, 2017) for a discussion of climate violence that 
comes close to mine and draws on similar sources. As will become clear, the bulk of my project is 
to theorize climate violence as such, along with the implications thereof. While my project and 
O’Brien’s are largely complimentary, his specific focus is on how we might turn to thinkers of 
nonviolence in the Christian tradition for guidance. 
9 The language of mitigation and adaptation, and debates about the attention that each deserves, 
stem from the IPCC reports released between 1990 and 2014 (with the sixth round expected in 
2021-2022). 
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sustainable development.”10 If the lay reader fails to immediately grasp the meaning of 
this goal, they can take solace in the fact of being far from alone. 
     Alongside and often in tandem with a technocratic or technical framework, a second 
major way of situating climate change is as a problem for international institutions. The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), we often hear, 
will have to continue its global response to climate change: a Herculean task if ever there 
was one. Insofar as the two can be taken separately, the UNFCCC can best be thought of 
of as the political counterpart to the scientific body of the IPCC. Taken together, the 
IPCC and the UNFCCC simultaneously represent and reinforce the dominant ways in 
which climate change is conceptualized and mobilized: as a problem that demands 
technocratic, managerial, top-down solutions. What we need, the story goes, is to focus 
on developing new techniques, markets, and technologies while simultaneously 
bolstering regimes of international law and global governance. In this way, the physical 
effects and the social and political fallout of climate change might be managed. 
     Yet management always manages with some particular goal in mind. The first, 16th 
century target of ‘managing’ was equestrian, having to do with the measured act of using 
one’s hand – the word stems from the latin manus, or ‘hand’ – to guide a horse through 
the manège, or arena. Management, here, means using various visible hands to guide the 
outcomes of climate change in such a way that minimizes damage to the world as it 
currently exists in its hegemonic rational, political, and economic modes: technocratic, 
neoliberal, and capitalist, respectively. Throughout, I will use the formulation of the 
‘dominant climate imaginary’ along with the descriptors of the ‘hegemonic,’ ‘dominant,’ 
                                                
10 Pachauri and Meyer, Climate Change 2014, vii. 
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and ‘managerial’ approach to climate change more or less interchangeably.11 This 
‘imaginary’ or ‘approach’ is internally differentiated – there are, to be sure, 
disagreements within the dominant imaginary. Still, it makes sense to hold these elements 
together analytically insofar as they are part of a common endeavor and bound together 
by a faith in techno-optimism, neo- and often classical-liberalism, and capitalism. 
Simply, the dominant imaginary, despite internal differences, is marked by faith in the 
ability of existing institutions to respond to climate change adequately. 
     Institutions, in this sense, can be conceived quite broadly as encompassing 
international organizations like the UN and the World Bank as well as less formal 
‘institutions’ such as representative and electoral democracy, participation in markets, 
etc. In a talk given to the American Political Science Association, Robert Keohane 
recently displayed this instinct to turn to established and traditional ‘institutions’ broadly 
conceived: “When I selected climate change as my theme for the James Madison 
Lecture,” he tells, “my first impulse was to reread the Federalist Papers.”12 This 
reflexive reach far back into American history, to founders who never could have 
imagined global climate change might seem strange. But so too does reaching for other 
institutions tethered to the past and designed to confront past problems, if and when their 
logics could not have anticipated and are not designed to account for the human ability to 
wreak such havoc. 
     In other words, though given the prevalence of apocalyptic imagery it might seem odd 
                                                
11 I borrow the phrase ‘dominant climate imaginary’ from Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen 
Walker, “Weathering: Climate Change and the “Thick Time” of Transcorporality,” Hypatia 29, 
no. 3 (2014): 558-75; I discuss the phrase in detail below. 
12 Robert Keohane, “The Global Politics of Climate Change: Challenge for Political Science,” PS: 
Political Science and Politics 48, no. 1 (2015): 19. 
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to see it put this way, the dominant imaginary can actually be strangely optimistic. It 
seems strangely optimistic if, in the face of drastic climate change, we judge existing 
institutions alongside which climate change emerged capable of bringing about solutions. 
David Orr, an esteemed environmental thinker, makes a similar point about the dominant 
climate imaginary. In Down to the Wire, he notices that mainstream treatments often 
explicitly or implicitly presume that “by a combination of advanced technology and wise 
policy choices [based on old institutions like Madison’s federalism?], the world will 
quickly act to stabilize concentrations of greenhouse gases and reduce emissions to a 
level below that which would lead to runaway climate change.”13 Like Orr, I am 
skeptical. 
     In the last few years this might have even seemed realistically optimistic: December 
of 2015 showed that limited global cooperation is indeed possible, as over 190 countries 
came to an agreement in Paris. In the months leading up to Paris, then-President Barack 
Obama had directed American attention to the need for quick action with trips to the 
Arctic and to some of those tiny and imperiled island communities mentioned above. 
With characteristically urgent rhetorical force, and providing some reason (perhaps to 
those who would go on to negotiate in Paris) to hope that the US was finally if 
temporarily ready to take its role seriously, President Obama delivered the following 
confession: 
I’ve come here today, as the leader of the world’s largest economy and its second 
largest emitter, to say that the United States recognizes our role in creating this 
                                                
13 David W. Orr, Down to the Wire: Confronting Climate Collapse (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), 
xiii. 
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problem, and we embrace our responsibility to help solve it. And I believe we 
can solve it. That’s the good news. Even if we cannot reverse the damage that 
we’ve already caused, we have the means – the scientific imagination and 
technological innovation – to avoid irreparable harm.14 
Perhaps Obama’s remarks were in large part determined by his position as leader of the 
nation in which the world’s largest economy operates and his recent experience of 
helping navigate the US away from the Great Recession of 2008. In some sense, he may 
have been all but required to perform a faith in the kinds of managerial techno-optimism 
that characterize contemporary America more broadly. Or perhaps he authentically 
believed what he said. Whatever the case, note the quick move from admitting fault and 
embracing responsibility, to claiming that scientific imagination and technological 
innovation – under the aegis of US leadership – will solve the climate problem without 
disrupting other parts of contemporary life. This latter claim captures the spirit of the 
dominant climate imaginary quite succinctly. 
     Throughout the speech, Obama also took caution to emphasize that climate solutions 
can be 1) pro-growth (“last year, for the first time in our history, the global economy 
grew and global carbon emissions stayed flat;” “technology has now advanced to the 
point where any economic disruption from transitioning to a cleaner, more efficient 
economy is shrinking by the day,”) that 2) climate change can indeed be an opportunity 
for business (“many of America’s biggest businesses recognize the opportunities and are 
seizing them,”) and that 3) the other part of the puzzle has to do with states taking action 
                                                
14 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the GLACIER Conference,” speech, Anchorage, 
AK, August 31, 2015, accessed September 1, 2016, Whitehouse.gov, https://www.whitehouse.gov 
/the-press-office/2015/09/01/remarks-president-glacier-conference-anchorage-ak. Italics added. 
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on the global stage (“the United States will double the pace at which we cut our 
emissions, and China committed, for the first time, to limiting its emissions. Because the 
world’s two largest economies and two largest emitters came together, we’re now seeing 
other nations stepping up aggressively as well”).15 Obama’s late turn to climate change 
seemed designed not only to confess the need for action, but perhaps more importantly to 
assure us that the solutions we need are already largely in our possession, that they are 
technologically oriented, and that their implementation need neither disrupt economic 
trends nor hinder economic growth. By embracing and doubling down on the managerial, 
neoliberal, and capitalist institutions out of which climate change emerged, his speech 
implied, we might still avoid its worst impacts. So whether or not Obama authentically 
meant what he said in Anchorage, the framework he provided set climate change up as 
one kind of problem rather than another, thus limiting rather than expanding the kinds of 
responses that can be demanded. In turn, the act of calling for such responses shores up 
and marshals a specific and often uncritical optimism common in the dominant approach 
– optimism about the ability of existing institutions to take care of the problem. 
     Likewise, grassroots organizations such as 350.org (associated with writer-activist Bill 
McKibben and, less directly, Naomi Klein) sounded uncharacteristically optimistic 
rhetorical tones leading up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (CoP) meeting in Paris, 
and ultimately gave cautious yet optimistic endorsements of the agreement that was 
ultimately reached.16 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Peter Thomson, “The Paris Climate Deal won’t Save the World, but it Does Give Us a 
Chance,” PRI, December 14, 2015, accessed August 31, 2016, http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-
12-14/paris-climate-deal-wont-save-world-it-does-give-us-chance. 
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     Yet as Lauren Berlant has shown, optimism as an “affective form” or psychic 
engagement with the world can indeed be cruel.17 In Berlant’s thinking, our optimism can 
betray us whether or not an outcome we have become attached to comes to fruition. Take 
the case of food, which Berlant mentions early and in which our attachment is to the 
satisfaction of having eaten a meal. Perhaps we desire the food we have decided to 
prepare for dinner, only to find the key ingredients absent from our pantry, or perhaps we 
desire the food we have prepared for dinner, only to find the taste much more bland than 
the recipe suggested. In each case we have become attached to an outcome – we have 
come to desire it – and optimistically believe said outcome will come about. In Berlant’s 
thinking, “all attachments are optimistic,” because “when we talk about an object of 
desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something 
to make to us and make possible for us.”18 In the case of food, our desire brings with it 
the assumption that our dinner promises to exist and/or to taste delicious. Because our 
desires more generally rest on the optimistic assumption that the promises we want to see 
fulfilled will be fulfilled, and because such fulfillment often never arrives or is directly 
contravened, we face the probability that optimism is itself cruel. 
     Coming back to the issue, Berlant’s analysis helps us understand the mechanics of the 
dominant climate imaginary’s surprising optimism. While the dominant imaginary often 
presents climate change as a bleak and dangerous problem, it operates through the form 
                                                
17 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2011), 24. Note that such 
attachments “do not all feel optimistic” (24). Even as news media and cultural commentary on 
climate change rarely feels optimistic, we can understand it as taking the form of optimism 
insofar as it implicitly accepts the promise that those apocalyptic scenarios will be overcome 
relatively easily. 
18 Ibid., 23. 
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of optimism insofar as it accepts the promise that existing institutions can solve that 
problem. Likewise, Berlant helps us understand why the dominant imaginary’s operations 
– when they fail but also when they succeed as they did in Paris – often disappoint. 
Because we optimistically expect such operations to solve our climate woes we feel 
betrayed both when the operations ‘fail,’ as was the assessment of CoP15 in Copenhagen 
and when they ‘succeed,’ as was the case with CoP21 in Paris. In both cases, widespread 
if only occasionally spoken optimism had led us to believe the improbable promise that 
the damage of climate change would be significantly repaired. In each case, such 
optimism was indeed revealed to be cruel. For Berlant most simply, “a relation of cruel 
optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing.”19 
Insofar as the desire of the climate imaginary – for a world almost exactly as it is but 
without climate change – is indeed impossible, the optimism it requires is cruel. 
     So, what might take the place of the dominant imaginary’s cruel optimism? Implicitly 
countering the optimism shared by the dominant imaginary, President Obama, and Bill 
McKibben alike, Orr suggests a more honest reckoning with what humans have 
collectively done and what the now-inevitable results of those actions will be. Orr 
proposes we start with the fact that “the consequences of what we have already ‘bought’ 
will still cause great hardship everywhere” and again reiterates that it is misleadingly 
optimistic to hold that “climate is merely a problem that can be quickly solved by 
technological fixes without addressing the larger structure of ideas, philosophies, 
                                                
19 Ibid., 1. 
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assumptions, and paradigms that have brought us to the brink of irreversible 
disaster.”20 Orr’s point – that the problem is too significant to be solved by managerial 
fixes alone – is not novel in terms of environmental thought. Yet its application to the 
problem of climate change remains an unfinished and necessary project. 
     Of course, the story doesn’t end with Obama’s tenure. Where the optimism he sought 
to foster and shared with many activists, world leaders, and other concerned parties was 
initially attractive, President Trump’s rhetoric and early actions have sown significant 
doubts.21 My point is not to highlight one or the other approach as the one that a US 
president ought to take, though I obviously have a preference in the former. Instead, the 
point is that both operate in a dominant climate discourse that focuses on existing 
institutions and is at best ambivalent about and at worst derisive toward everyday 
engagement, participation, imagination, and critique. 
     In referring to ‘everyday engagement’ I am relying on John Meyer’s important book 
Engaging the Everyday.22 There, Meyer proposes that engaged academic 
environmentalists start from the level of “everyday concerns,” concerns that are “resonant 
with the lives of those of us who–in one way or another, and not just economically–
‘struggle to get by.’”23 A turn to the everyday reminds us that whatever the result of top-
down, managerial decisions like those central to the dominant imaginary, an everyday 
need to make practical and political judgments endures. Here, Meyer insists that actions 
                                                
20 Orr, Down to the Wire, xiii-xiv. We might add institutions to his list without breaking with its 
spirit. 
21 Elizabeth Bomberg, “Environmental Politics in the Trump Era: An Early Assessment,” 
Environmental Politics, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1332543 (2017): 1-7. 
22 John Meyer, Engaging the Everyday: Environmental Social Criticism and the Resonance 
Dilemma (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015). 
23 Ibid., 5. 
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taken at levels above that of the everyday “cannot resolve differences in how to act or 
in the distribution of consequences from a given act. The urgent demand to act cannot 
erase–and should not occlude–the inescapably political judgments that shape what action 
is deemed fitting, feasible, or fair in a given context.”24 A turn to everyday concerns of 
ordinary people – those of us who ‘struggle to get by’ in various ways – shifts attention to 
political questions that are not asked by the dominant imaginary and its level of analysis.   
     Instead of pursuing answers to the standard questions of how we can think about 
climate change as a primarily market, technological, or global governance issue, this 
dissertation instead asks how political theory broadly, and some currents in democratic 
and feminist theory specifically, can help us think about climate change as existing in, 
coming out of, and disrupting a series of everyday relations between different peoples, 
places, classes, species, and so on. Addressing climate change through the dominant 
imaginary and its attempt to solve the climate problem is at best a task for which the 
planet has little time and uneven concern – and at worst a case of cruel optimism, bound 
to disappoint. Drawing on enduring and more recent currents in political theory allows 
me, over the course of the dissertation, to develop an approach that turns partially away 
from the pursuit of climate solutions and instead aims at fostering, encouraging, and 
investigating questions about the political responsibility – what Meyer describes as 
inescapable political judgments – that we bear in and through our relationships to climate 
change and to one another in light of climate change. Across the dissertation I find that, 
given my proposed shift from a quest for climate solutions to an exploration of political 
responsibility, political theory is useful in at least four ways. 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
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     First, I find that political theory offers resources with which to conceptualize 
climate change in a way that is more directly political than the dominant approaches 
glossed above. Against cruel or managed optimism, turning directly to politics means 
decentering solutions (as the promise that our desire will be satisfied) as a starting point. 
Instead, a political approach starts from an analysis of the problem, and highlights the 
fact that the impact of climate change arrives unevenly across not only time and space, 
but also across lines of race, gender, and preexisting economic inequalities. I contend that 
the dominant imaginary, in reaching quickly for solutions, tends to be overly infused with 
the ideological and material logics of managerialism, neoliberalism, and capitalism out of 
which climate change first emerged and continues to unfold.25 As such the dominant 
imaginary is overly optimistic about the ability of (certain) existing and emerging 
technologies to solve the problem of climate change even as it is not concerned to open 
up theoretical and conceptual space for developing democratic analysis and 
responsiveness.  
     As an alternative, I put forward the idea of climate violence as a better way of 
conceptualizing climate change; better insofar as it helps us ask questions about the way 
our everyday experiences intersect with and are situated within broader contexts and 
scales. Put differently, the lens of violence allows us to see that climate change is at once 
a structural problem and a problem of everyday life. As such, the concept of climate 
violence helps us to grasp the social, political, and ontological relations that are so often 
hidden behind a monolithic conception of climate change as a problem “out there” and 
                                                
25 For a longue-durée assessment of this process, see Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of 
Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming (London: Verso, 2016). 
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caused by “humanity.” Conceptualizing climate change as violence offers a way of 
thinking politically about it, insofar as the concept shifts our attention away from abstract 
and overly broad characterizations (‘we humans caused climate change and we humans 
are now in danger’) to more concrete ones, in which we notice first and foremost that the 
violence of climate change is unevenly distributed across – again – geography, time, 
class, race, and gender. In this way, my conceptual approach is more directly political 
than those framed by the dominant imaginary.26 
     Second and relatedly, my dissertation also finds that political theory can help 
dramatize climate change in such a way as to bring it to life, and closer to the concerns of 
everyday life, than can other social scientific approaches (especially those found in in the 
IPCC and the UNFCCC, the contours of which are familiar to many people whether or 
not they are ‘interested’ in climate change or know themselves to be ‘well informed’ 
about related issues). This is because political theory has embraced lessons from 
theater,27 narrative theory,28 and other dramaturgical endeavors.29 Throughout, I suggest 
                                                
26 It is important to note that there are other ways of politicizing the question of climate change. 
The most prevalent way this has been done is through the lens of justice. Thinkers like Henry 
Shue and Steve Vanderheiden are among the most prominent and sophisticated thinkers in this 
line of research; I address their work below and again in Chapter 4. 
27 Iain Mackenzie and Robert Porter exemplify this move in their “Dramatization as Method in 
Political Theory,” Contemporary Political Theory 10, no. 4 (2011): 482-501. I return to their 
work in Chapter 2 
28 See, for example, Joshua Foa Dienstag, Dancing in Chains: Narrative and Memory in Political 
Theory (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997). 
29 While these endeavors are not central to my dissertation for reasons of space and staying on 
topic, it is important to recognize their occasional influence on my thinking throughout. This 
influence is most evident in Chapter 2. It is also worth noting that such efforts build on a longer 
history of attention to presentation in political and democratic theory. Take John Dewey as an 
example, who wrote that “poetry, the drama, the novel, are proofs that the problem of 
presentation is not insoluble … artists have always been the real purveyors of news, for it is not 
the outward happening in itself which is new, but the kindling by it of emotion, perception, and 
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that it matters how an issue like climate change is framed and presented because the 
way people experience the problem plays a part in conditioning whether and how they 
respond to it. 
     When climate change is presented in a way that is too overwhelming for people to 
confront, we might expect disengagement rather than action.30 Without carefully 
attending to how we present and communicate, attempts to spread information or raise 
consciousness can overwhelm and lead to something akin to “psychic numbing,” wherein 
people fall into “states of shock, unable to respond rationally to the world around 
them.”31 I suspect this is a fairly widespread affliction, if somewhat low-grade, in relation 
to climate change. The slower, steadier pace of political theory (as compared with 
presentations in the nightly news, viral videos, and so on) might present the problem in 
such a way so as to invite attention rather than overwhelm potentially attentive subjects. 
Where projects of information distribution or consciousness-raising associated with the 
news cycle and viral videos might suppose that a singular and transcendent truth need 
                                                                                                                                            
appreciation.” John Dewey, The Public and its Problems: An Essay in Political Inquiry, ed. 
Melvin Rogers (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 2012), 141. 
30 For a psychoanalytic explanation of such disengagement written by a practicing analyst who 
has also long worked in environmental communications, see Renee Lertzman, Environmental 
Melancholia: Psychoanalytic Dimensions of Engagement (New York: Routledge, 2015). For a 
critique of the role media plays in fostering disengagement, see Anabela Carvalho, “Media(ted) 
Discourses and Climate Change: A Focus on Political Subjectivity and (Dis)engagement,” 
WIREs: Climate Change 1, no. 2 (2010): 172-9. For an argument against a particular 
dramatization - Showtime’s Years of Living Dangerously, see Ted Nordhaus and Michael 
Schellenberger, “Global Warming Scare Tactics,” New York Times (April 8, 2014), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/04/09/opinion/global-warming-scare-tactics.html. To make their point, 
Nordhaus and Schellenberger draw on an oft-cited empirical study: Saffron O’Neill and Sophie 
Nicholson-Cole’s “‘Fear Wont’ Do It:’ Promoting Positive Engagement with Climate Change 
through Visual and Iconic Representations,” Science Communication 30, no. 3 (2009): 355-79. 
31 Kari Mari Norgaard, Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday Life 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 4. As Norgaard notes, gesturing toward its scope and 
impact, “psychic numbing” is a term originally developed by Robert J. Lifton in describing 
Hiroshima survivors. 
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only be spread widely, focusing on different ways of dramatically presenting the issue 
(including by reconceptualizing it as violence) assumes a more complex approach to truth 
and its reception, one in which the audience must necessarily participate. Throughout, I 
suggest that political theory and its attention to dramatization, presentation, and narrative 
instead of more straightforward transmission of knowledge provides better tactics for 
concerned parties to dramatize climate change in ways that invite engagement rather than 
despair – or cruel optimism – alone. 
     Third, I suggest that democratic and feminist political theory, especially when they 
overlap, offer invaluable insights through which to approach the ethics and politics of 
climate change in ways both novel and needed. Where the dominant imaginary locates 
responsibility for climate change in liberal individuals or nation-states, or where it limits 
the role of democracy to the election of leaders who will send the right delegates to the 
right international institutions, democratic and feminist theorists provide us with the 
means to push back. In place of strictly individual responsibility, for example, political 
theory offers resources for thinking about collective responsibility, and about a 
potentially prior project of fostering responsiveness, questions to which I turn in Chapter 
4. In place of purely formal democracy, radical democrats point to the importance of 
everyday contestation while (especially feminist) political theory directs our attention to 
the unavoidable democratic task of allocating responsibility, to name a few examples.32 
     Finally, and underwriting the previous three claims, political theory provides a license, 
or an intellectual space from which, to leverage a broad critique of the kinds of 
                                                
32 On this last point, see Joan Tronto, Caring Democracy: Markets, Justice and Equality (New 
York: New York University Press, 2013). 
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managerial, neoliberal, and capitalist approaches mentioned above. Michael Walzer 
posits this license as the idea that political theorists can and ought study big things and 
move between the academy and the greater world.33 A similar idea is expressed in 
Melissa Lane’s exhortation that: 
Political theory’s characteristically greater capacity for openness to the empirical 
and to the interdisciplinary is a strength on which the subfield’s engagement with 
climate change should continue to build. At its best, political theory is, in Michael 
Rosen’s lovely phrase … “the oasis where the caravans meet”–caravans of the 
social and political sciences, moral philosophy, and history, at the very least.34 
Throughout, I rely on such a license – or meeting of caravans – to maintain that political 
theory (and the ability to move between and beyond various stripes of political theory, 
when relevant and complimentary enough) allows for the kind of big, broad study needed 
to think and rethink a problem as pressing as climate change. 
     As such, my Chapter 2 draws on methods of conceptualization and dramatization in 
order to re-think climate change as a form of violence. In Chapter 3 I turn directly to a 
critique of the managerialism and neoliberalism that animates existing climate change 
politics and the dominant imaginary alike. In Chapters 4 and 5 I turn to democratic and 
feminist theory in order to think through the question of responsibility for climate 
violence and to ask how democracy might respond to climate violence, even as it might 
be reshaped, or its emphases shifted, in light of climate change. 
                                                
33 Michael Walzer, “The Political Theory License,” Annual Review of Political Science 16, no. 1 
(2013). See also John Meyer’s discussion of Walzer’s license in Engaging the Everyday, 12. 
34 Melissa Lane, “Political Theory of Climate Change,” Annual Review of Political Science 19 
(2016): 110. 
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     What follows from all of this, to rehearse my subtitle, is a political theory for 
climate change. In line with much contemporary political theory this dissertation starts 
with the idea that political theory simultaneously speaks to thought and action; analysis 
and activism; to ideas about the world and to that world itself. When Marx wrote his 
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, he sought not only to point out the importance of changing 
the world instead of ‘merely’ interpreting it but also, insofar as he did not denounce 
interpretation outright, to suggest that contemplation and change, theoria and praxis, 
were indeed tightly bound. To say that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, 
in various ways; the point is to change it” is perhaps to say that interpreting a 
phenomenon is a necessary but not sufficient condition for altering it.35 
     In this context, the central question of my dissertation is this: how might we 
conceptualize climate change in such a way that allows us to theorize and respond to it 
on democratic grounds?36 Contemporary political theory, and the kind embraced by 
many of us who think and write in the tradition of environmental political theory, is 
committed to deemphasizing if not denying the gap between theory and practice or text 
and world, and actively seeks to reduce the perceived gap between thinking and acting 
politically. My central argument is that we must conceptualize climate change first and 
foremost as a form of violence, because doing so will allow us new perspectives through 
which to approach questions of responsibility and democratic action with fresh eyes. 
                                                
35 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings 2nd ed., ed. David 
McLellan (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 173. 
36 As I show in my Chapter 3, dominant approaches that decline to foster democratic engagement 
often wrongly assume that top-down political power and decision-making can counter climate 
change effectively. Democracy here – the idea that people deserve some say over that which 
affects them – is necessary insofar as the climate problem is too complex for any one top-down 
solution.  
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     Still, I hope that my dissertation would interest thinkers outside of EPT, 
(contemporary) political theory, and indeed outside of political science, were they to 
come across it. A broader task of my dissertation, raised in the title, is to think through 
some of the implications that living on an interconnected planet, the greenhouse, has for 
democracy, justice, and so on.37 My use of “greenhouse” here is deliberate, and is 
selected for two related reasons. First, I use greenhouse as a not-necessarily mutually 
exclusive alternative to the now-widespread “Anthropocene.” The Anthropocene is a 
provocative idea, which as noted above holds humanity responsible for ending the 
Holocene, the earth’s previous geologic epoch. The Anthropocene, proposed by Nobel 
Prize winner Paul Crutzen, would mean that “humans–thanks to our numbers, the burning 
of fossil fuel, and other related activities–have become a geological agent on the 
planet.”38 My first reason for using greenhouse, then, is to avoid a political abstraction 
that arises when we run too eagerly with the idea of the Anthropocene. In short, we risk 
universalizing responsibility for climate change and distributing it rather evenly to all 
people and peoples.39 Andreas Malm puts the problem this way: “blaming all of humanity 
for climate change lets capitalism off the hook.” To drive home the point, Malm tells us 
that “a single average US citizen emits more than 500 citizens of Ethiopia, Chad, 
                                                
37 On shifting back to the older language of the greenhouse, I am inspired by Andrew Biro’s “The 
Good Life in the Greenhouse? Autonomy, Democracy, and Citizenship in the Anthropocene,” 
Telos 172 (2015): 15-37. Others have also continued to find the term useful. See, e.g., Barry 
Rabe, ed., Greenhouse Governance: Addressing Climate Change in America (Washington, DC: 
The Brookings Institution, 2010) and Chris Methmann et al., eds., Interpretive Approaches to 
Global Climate Governance: (De)constructing the Greenhouse (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
38 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35 (Winter 
2009): 209. 
39 For a nice overview that points to some similar critiques, see Fredrik Jonsson, “Anthropocene 
Blues: Abundance, Energy, Limits,” in The Imagination of Limits: Exploring Scarcity and 
Abundance, eds. Frederick Felcht and Katie Ritson, RCC Perspectives 2015, no. 2 (2015): 55-63. 
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Afghanistan, Mali, or Burundi” and concludes that “humanity, as a result, is far too 
slender an abstraction to carry the burden of culpability.”40 In order to understand and 
respond to climate change in its concrete unfolding, any temptation to move toward 
“slender abstractions” (and they are often tempting!) should be seen as suspect. 
     My second and related reason for referring in the title and throughout to the 
greenhouse and to greenhouse democracy mirrors Dipesh Chakrabarty’s point that 
climate change does nonetheless bring up the “question of a human collectivity.”41 As a 
question, Chakrabarty’s more nuanced view invites further debate and contestation 
around the possibility of a human collectivity, rather than delivering it as a statement or 
an answer beyond discussion, as do more blunt forms of Anthropocene thought. More 
precisely, Chakrabarty’s view allows us to deconstruct the sentiment that all humans are 
to blame and to instead point out that, within the human collectivity, an inequality of 
blame rests alongside an equality of implication.42 Whether one is implicated in the 
project of changing the climate, implicated by the violent process of its unfolding or, 
perhaps most likely, implicated by some combination of the two, climate change 
                                                
40 Andreas Malm, “The Anthropocene Myth,” Jacobin (March 30, 2015), accessed June 24, 2015, 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/03/anthropocene-capitalism-climate-change/. While I accept 
the bulk of Malm’s critique, I do see value in the more refined statement that climate change “is 
not a Hegelian universal arising directly out of the movement of history, or a universal of capital 
brought forth by the present crisis …. Yet climate change poses for us a question of a human 
collectivity, an us, pointing to a figure of the universal that escapes our capacity to experience the 
world” found in Chakrabarty, “Climate of History,” 222. 
41 Ibid. Emphasis added. In a lecture reproduced by the Media Education Foundation, Edward 
Said once expressed a similarly nuanced parsing-out of the tensions between universalism and 
difference: “I think there are indications as I suggested at the end of my talk in movements of 
what might be called a benign global consciousness in for example the environmental movement 
where environments differ but they are all threatened and they differ in different ways and have to 
be preserved and studied according to those differences, not according to some universal model.” 
See Edward Said, “The Myth of ‘The Clash of Civilizations,’” Lecture, Media Education 
Foundation, (Amherst, MA, 1998). 
42 Thanks to Nancy Luxon for giving me this formulation. 
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implicates humanity as such, even as causal blame cannot be applied in the same way. 
     In a different language, the image of the greenhouse implies a relational ontology (as I 
will discuss more in Chapter 5) that allows us to appreciate how particular humans come 
to be what they are in and through their relationships with other humans, nonhumans, 
environments, and so on. It recognizes that at a fundamental level we are all dependent 
on similar, interlinked, and fragile biological processes, carbon cycles, human relatives, 
friends, strangers, economies, and so on. Per Rachel Carson, “here again we are reminded 
that in nature nothing exists alone.”43 Greenhouse, to my mind, captures some of the 
urgency and historical novelty associated with the Anthropocene, without collapsing all 
of humanity into a single, abstract, and corporate agent. We all inhabit the greenhouse, 
but we live in different parts of it, with different identities and positions. We contribute 
unevenly to its ill condition, and are impacted to different degrees when its condition is 
indeed one of illness. The greenhouse, too, raises the “question” of human collectivity, 
even as it declines to answer that question in an overly simplified way. The subjects of 
greenhouse democracy are concrete and particular humans, not an abstract and 
universalized humanity.44 
                                                
43 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, Fortieth Anniversary Edition (New York: Mariner Books, 2002 
[1962]), 51. Thanks to Lida Maxwell for directing my attention to this passage. See Maxwell, 
“Queer/Love/Bird Extinction: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring as a Work of Love,” Political 
Theory (2017): 10.1177/0090591717712024. 
44 Throughout my focus is primarily on humans rather than the environment, nonhuman species, 
nature, and so on. While the latter can certainly be the recipient of climate and other 
environmental violence, the scope of this dissertation would be too large were I to focus on them 
in a sustained way. I hope to engage some of these issues in the future. In this regard, the 
conceptual apparatus I develop (climate violence, greenhouse democracy, etc.) is a framework 
that can be applied broadly. To be sure, a complete view could portray climate change as a 
transhuman problem: a problem that crosses between humans but also beyond them, threatening 
and problematizing nature, environments, animals ecosystems, etc. It would also be too much to 
cover in one dissertation. 
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     The rest of this introduction unfolds as such. First I look more closely at the 
UNFCCC in order to pin down the contours of the dominant imaginary in more detail. 
Next, I locate my project amidst the work that has already been done in political science 
and political theory. Finding such work useful but ultimately limited – like the dominant 
climate imaginary itself – I then suggest that the problem of climate change disrupts and 
inverts many of our long held assumptions about politics in the world and in theory alike, 
and show how different approaches to narrating and/or dramatizing climate change can 
help reorient our assumptions. A final section foreshadows my arguments, my chapters, 
and my methods in greater detail. 
II. The Dominant Climate Change Imaginary 
    Throughout, this dissertation responds critically to dominant ways of thinking about 
the climate and proposes we think otherwise. Yet before getting to such alternatives, 
preliminary questions abound. How can we characterize the dominant approach to the 
problem of climate change? What is missing from or misguided in that approach? A turn 
to the UNFCCC, a founding document and consistent referent in international climate 
change politics, helps answer these questions. The point here is to flesh out and give 
definition to the “dominant climate imaginary,” a term that Astrida Neimanis and Rachel 
Loewen Walker use to connote a view of climate change as something “distant and 
abstracted from our experiences of weather and the environment in the privileged West 
… saturated mostly in either neoliberal progress narratives of controlling the future or 
sustainability narratives of saving the past.”45 In borrowing the term, I mean to endorse 
Neimanis and Walker’s claim that we in the West (and especially the US) think 
                                                
45 Neimanis and Walker, “Weathering,” 567. 
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abstractly, are overly invested in progress narratives, and center our demands on vague 
notions of sustainability. I find these insights important and sufficient for their purposes. 
Yet because I will refer to the term throughout my dissertation, it is necessary to say a bit 
more about how I understand the components and impacts of the dominant imaginary. 
     In Climate Justice, Henry Shue highlights three additional and overlapping elements 
of the dominant imaginary deserving of mention, writing that the “dominant approach to 
climate change … has been to rely on political leaders to design institutions that will 
prohibit or discourage the use of fossil fuels by politically raising their prices–by ‘putting 
a price on carbon.’”46 Extrapolating, Shue is suggesting that the dominant approach is 
built on 1) an ideological commitment to market mechanisms, 2) existing institutions of 
states, markets, and their respective leaders, and 3) containing politics to such institutions 
by declining to explore additional ways of thinking or acting.  
     The UNFCCC can be read as a founding document of international climate politics. 
Negotiated at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 and entered into force in 
March 1994, the UNFCCC laid the groundwork – and set the tone and the terms – for 
later agreements by the Conferences of the Parties in places like Kyoto and Paris. In this 
way it simultaneously captures and produces the dominant imaginary. As such, I now 
turn to the UNFCCC in order to parse out each element of the dominant imaginary in 
more detail. 
Ideology      
     Despite the occasional nod toward issues pertaining to justice and uneven 
                                                
46 Henry Shue, Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014), 2. 
Emphasis added. 
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development, the UNFCCC ultimately presents climate change as a technical problem 
to be managed. With regard to justice, Article 3 Section 1 notably suggests that member 
parties “should protect the climate system … on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”47 
Likewise, in an acknowledgement of uneven development, the member parties are 
grouped into three categories, each of which is subject to slightly different requirements 
and treatment: Annex I, which includes developed countries and countries transitioning to 
market economies; Annex II, which includes all Annex I countries the economies of 
which are not in transition but solidly developed; and non-Annex I countries, made up of 
the developing world.48 
     Yet more commonly, the UNFCCC is guided by neoliberal market logics – of cost-
effectiveness, for example – over and above just outcomes. Article 3 Section 3 holds that 
“the Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the 
causes of climate change … taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest 
possible costs.”49 Note that the language at play here suggests an economics-oriented 
prioritization of ‘cost-effectiveness’ over and above justice: not “global benefits” but 
“global benefits at the lowest possible costs” are to be secured. In sum, the document 
                                                
47 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
1994: http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/ application/ 
pdf/conveng.pdf, 9. 
48 For example, Annex I countries must provided detailed descriptions of the policies it will 
implement and an estimate of the effects thereof, whereas “developing country Parties may … 
propose projects for financing, including specific technologies, materials, equipment, techniques 
or practices that would be needed to implement such projects.” Ibid., 23-4. 
49 Ibid., 9. 
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uses the word “economic” 43 times, the word “technological” 7 times, and the word 
“scientific” 21 times. “Justice” is used three times, but all three of those mentions simply 
refer to the International Court of Justice. The word “political” is never used. 
Existing Institutions 
     Second, the dominant imaginary embraces a politics of working through existing 
institutions. In addition to markets, the main relevant institution is the state. One of the 
first acts of the document is that of “reaffirming the principle of sovereignty of States in 
international cooperation to address climate change,” immediately followed by that of 
“recognizing that States should enact effective environmental legislation.”50 Here, the 
institution of sovereignty is defended along with the institution of the modern nation-
state. While this is unsurprising insofar as these are foundational components of the UN 
project, it is worth noting as it points toward one of the ways in which the dominant 
imaginary reinforces existing institutions rather than beckoning for new lines of focus. 
While NGOs like the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change can be 
granted observer status and, as such, engage in negotiations, it is clear that the impact of 
such groups is far less significant than the influence enjoyed by official state Parties to 
the Convention.  
Containment of Politics 
     The first and second elements of the dominant imaginary support the third: the 
containment of politics to actions and actors that flow logically from the ideological and 
institutional tendencies just discussed. Given the focus on neoliberal discourses and the 
state-based organization of global politics, the dominant imaginary encourages the 
                                                
50 Ibid., 2. 
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political use of markets rather than experiments with direct democracy; partnerships 
with NGOs or representatives from the private sector rather than the strengthening of 
local communities; and the measurement and enforcement of emissions by reference to 
the sovereign state rather than across other global units. Of the 11 uses of the word 
“action” in the document, the state was the agent 7 times, the Conference of the Parties 
twice. The tenth use was vague, and intended to highlight “that various actions to address 
climate change can be justified economically in their own right.”51 The eleventh use was 
part of a passing reference to the “implementation of the Plan of Action to Combat 
Desertification.” In a quite literal sense, then, the only actors here are states, in isolation 
or through cooperation with other states.52 
     As in other areas of political life, this routinized, bureaucratic combination directs 
attention toward ‘practical’ solutions to climate change – where ‘practical’ might just 
mean ‘status quo’ – over and above more critical attempts to think through the problem. 
Stated critically, the dominant imaginary culminates, as John Bellamy Foster suggested 
of mainstream environmentalism in the 1990s, in “calls for new international agreements, 
for personal restraint with regard to the growth of both population and consumption, and 
the adoption of a handful of so-called environmentally friendly technologies.”53 By 
failing to reflect the vast, perhaps existential threat that a destabilized climate presents, 
                                                
51 Ibid., 4. 
52 I do not wish to make the arguments that no state action is needed, that the state form must 
somehow be abolished before climate action can take place, or that states can never be made use 
of in order to advance alternative forms of action and encourage alternative forms of politics. 
Instead, I am suggesting that if states are to be used for more democratic ends, they must indeed 
be made to do so by citizens and others who may be able to influence what states do. Needless to 
say, this is itself no small task. 
53 John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment, 
new ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), 12. 
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the dominant imaginary continues to walk us down the path of relatively minor 
adjustments around the edges rather than transformative change.  
     So while the above elements are unavoidably important components from a global 
governance perspective, focusing exclusively on them risks limiting the attention given to 
everyday political actions capable of fostering, supporting, demanding, legitimating, or 
going beyond the governance needed to end the fossil fuel era. As such, the dominant 
imaginary presents a fairly narrow conceptual and theoretical space in which to ask 
questions, one that largely excludes questions of how we might approach climate change 
differently, or about the role we might have if we do not have access to the above forms 
of politics, or about what we might do politically when the impacts of climate change 
really start to materialize for greater numbers of people. 
Climate Protection from Above or Below? 
      In other words, this way of imagining approaches climate change as a problem to be 
solved largely ‘from above.’ Jeremy Brecher nicely summarizes two kinds of “climate 
protection” from above (roughly, governmental and nongovernmental attempts at climate 
governance) and from below (roughly, grassroots action and pressure on governments, 
nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and so on). While in practice the two are 
not as clearly separable as this analytic divide suggests, I find Brecher’s distinction to be 
important and helpful. I critique some forms of climate protection ‘from above’ in 
Chapter 3 insofar as they often curtail democratic political conceptualizations of the 
problem, and I discuss the opportunities that political theory provides for edging toward 
climate protection from below in Chapters 4 and 5. Condensing the vast network of 
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climate action from above and demonstrating how it comes back to the UN-style 
global governance, Brecher offers the following illustrative anecdote: 
In 1988, as climate scientists became more certain about carbon-induced global 
warming and the global public grew more alarmed by extreme weather, the 
United Nations General Assembly designated the UN Environmental Program 
(UNEP) as the UN’s venue for climate issues; UNEP, working with the UN’s 
World Meteorological Organization, established the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), whose First Assessment Report rapidly established that 
global warming was real and probably caused at least in part by human release of 
greenhouse gases.54 
From there, the UNFCCC, the political counterpart to the IPCC’s scientific body, was 
established in 1992 and remains the most influential international venue for responding to 
climate change, given its nearly universal membership of states. 
     Predictably, many political and other social scientists pick up the work of the IPCC 
and the UNFCCC – and inherit the framework – insofar as such scholars engage climate 
change through the lens of global governance. A telling work of this sort is Anthony 
Giddens’s The Politics of Climate Change.55 There, Giddens frames the problem as 
essentially one of and for institutions of global governance. Per Giddens, having passed 
the “first wave” of climate politics, “the bringing of the issue onto the political agenda,” 
we must now turn to a “second wave” which requires “embedding it in our institutions 
                                                
54 Jeremy Brecher, Climate Insurgency: A Strategy for Survival (Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2015), 18. More generally, see the second chapter of Climate Insurgency, “Climate 
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55 Anthony Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011). 
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and in the everyday concerns of citizens.”56 Once the second wave is accomplished, we 
will only need to work out the details of issues like “technologies and taxes” (Chapter 6) 
and “the politics of adaptation” (Chapter 7): chapter headings that could be section 
headings of any number of IPCC and UNFCCC related documents. To do this, Giddens 
concludes that “we still need the UN” to coordinate the actions of states, businesses, and 
civil society and to leverage such actions into binding global agreements.57 
     Given the goal of slowing and potentially reversing GHG emissions, it reasonable that 
Giddens and others attempt to work through the lens of the UN. Indeed my argument in 
this dissertation is neither to suggest that the UN is a wrong turn in toto, nor that global 
governance and any other action “from above” ought be wholly abandoned. 
     Instead, I want to suggest that too little has been done to theorize the conditions for 
and impediments to the kind of “civil society” actions “from below” that Brecher, and at 
times even Giddens, celebrate. More so, too little has been done to ask what people who 
experience climate change can or should do. The dominant climate imaginary doesn’t 
encourage us to think about people and their lived experiences. As such, the resources 
marshaled by thinkers who take a more embodied approach to political matters have been 
thought of as secondary to the institutional politics of global governance that engages 
climate change along the lines drawn by the UNFCCC. My dissertation aims to correct 
this, and suggests that engagement with responsibility and democratic politics emerge as 
necessary projects once the violence and hence fundamentally political nature of climate 
change is placed front and center. I now situate this project in relation to work done by 
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political scientists of various stripes, from whom I have learned much and with whom I 
nonetheless have significant disagreements. 
III. Political Science and Political Theory on Climate Change 
     In 2014, Debra Javeline asked the field of political science an important question. 
Why, she asked, are so few political scientists studying adaptation to climate change? 
Providing sample research questions for twenty one (!) subfields of political science, 
Javeline expressed a conviction that thinking through adaptation should be “a large and 
growing super field that connects almost all existing fields of political science.”58 This 
question is notable for two reasons. First, the choice, whether intentional or reflexive, to 
imply that political scientists should approach climate change through the language of 
adaptation is itself shaped by the dominant climate imaginary. Adaptation, given its 
original context of the UNFCCC, is itself a highly technical and managerial starting 
point. 
     The second reason the language is notable is that it eclipses a bigger question: why 
aren’t political scientists studying climate change? To be sure, some are, primarily but 
not exclusively those who work in international relations and political theory.59 Yet given 
Henry Shue’s insistence that climate change is an “unavoidable issue,” we should expect 
more focus than we see currently see.60 
     We do see some such work when we seek it out, though it remains somewhat limited 
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in scope. Political scientists have primarily addressed climate change from within the 
dominant imaginary by relying on, responding to, or extending work done by the IPCC 
and the UNFCCC. As such, they have approached climate change as a problem of global 
governance, and attempted to think through some of the knotty problems involved with 
regulating global GHG emissions accordingly. Political theorists on the other hand have 
shown slightly more variation in their approach. One camp approaches climate change 
through the lens of justice, attempting to design ideal or non-ideal theories capable of 
guiding global action. Shue got this approach off the ground. More recently, Steve 
Vanderheiden has continued it, while Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach have critiqued 
it. Along the lines discussed in the previous section, approaches by political scientists and 
political theorists largely work from within the dominant imaginary rather than 
attempting to conceptualize the problem in novel and useful ways. In the sections that 
immediately follow I turn to authors representing each of these approaches to make this 
case. 
Global Governance 
     David Victor is perhaps the most active political scientist publishing on the topic. 
Writing with Robert Keohane, Victor’s well known article “The Regime Complex for 
Climate Change,” argues that climate change is so complex and multifaceted that the 
global governance response to it should come in the form of a regime complex: “a series 
of narrowly focused regulatory regimes.”61 In their reading, attempts to formulate a 
global regime (the UNFCCC and Kyoto more specifically) have instead produced a series 
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of autonomous and overlapping regimes that focus on particular aspects of dangerous 
climate change such as sea level rise or industrial GHG emissions. Likewise, their regime 
complex approach recognizes that there are different kinds of agreements and actions 
taken to respond to climate change: UN legal regimes that attempt universality yet often 
remain nonbonding, “clubs” such as the G20 and G8 that have their own sets of 
responses, subnational institutions like the emission granting system attempted by 
California that try to address climate change from a more local or provincial position. 
After describing a segmented and multifaceted set of regimes, Keohane and Victor 
endorse this unintended effect of the efforts of the UNFCCC, and argue that a regime 
complex may more effectively manage the myriad extensions of climate change than 
could a single global regime focused on climate change as a unified phenomenon. 
     While Victor’s analysis may or may not be correct, it does not reflect the complexity 
of climate change that I am proposing. As mentioned, my claim about the complexity of 
climate change is a conceptual one; complexity means we must strive to think through 
climate change as such. Authors like Keohane and Victor, risk underemphasizing the 
weight of climate change by suggesting that we can only focus on individual effects 
thereof. In doing so, they imply that technocratic, top-down solutions are appropriate to 
solving split-up aspects of climate change.62 This, in turn, obscures the issue as such, 
along with its political, economic, and social causes and effects, rather than clarifying 
it.63 
                                                
62 In a sense I am proposing the inverse: bottom-up approaches to the totality of climate change. 
63 See also Victor’s policy-oriented works, a good example of which is Global Warming 
Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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     Yet a formal focus on regimes is not the only way of approaching climate change as 
an issue of global governance. Anthony Giddens’s work mentioned before is worth 
discussing here as well. Adopting what he calls a “realist” view in which “we have to 
work with the institutions that already exist and in ways that respect democracy,” 
Giddens outlines a view in which state, market, and international institutions of global 
governance combine to counter climate change.64 Accordingly, Giddens sees the potential 
for solutions to climate change to emerge from any of these “institutions that already 
exist:” 
They could happen at the international level … there might be breakthroughs in 
the economic conditions affecting low-carbon technologies …there could be 
breakthrough innovations in various areas of technology … [or] there could be an 
event, or set of events, clearly attributable to climate change, that cause a surge in 
activism around the world.65 
Yet the analysis does not focus much on this last possibility. Instead, The Politics of 
Climate Change ends with a chapter on “The Geopolitics of Climate Change” which 
itself concludes with a section on “why we still need the UN.” Ultimately, and partially 
contra Victor and Keohane, Giddens suggests that the UN must remain at the center of 
climate politics, and that “the action of states,” “the responses of business, large and 
small,” and “the emergence of a diverse and fizzling global civil society” ought to seek to 
                                                                                                                                            
advocates instead for ecomodernist technologies which would allow for the sanitization of 
consuming fossil fuels. See also his The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow 
Global Warming (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001). 
64 Giddens, Politics of Climate Change, 6. Where Giddens’s realism directs him toward existing 
institutions, my own realism leads me to question their potentials, as I previously discussed. From 
my perspective, then, Giddens’s realism is yet another cruel optimism. 
65 Ibid., 9-10. 
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bolster the UN as “an instrument of global governance.”66 
     Common to both of these approaches is the conviction discussed above that, while 
ordinary political and democratic action might be useful, its use ultimately lies in its 
ability to bolster institutions of global governance. Yet presently, as David Keith reminds 
us, “we lack the social tools to make sound collective decisions about planetary 
management.”67 In other words, we might be tempted to agree with Giddens’s “realistic” 
amenability to working through existing institutions in order to design and implement 
regimes of global climate governance. Yet we should not forget that at present such 
institutions have not proved effective, even on their own terms. Likewise, it is doubtful 
that those invested in linking democracy and climate change together would be 
comfortable waiting for an “event, or set of events,” presumably catastrophic, to lead to 
an increase of (again, presumably) democratic activism around the world.  
Justice  
     Where the global governance approach meshes well with the dominant climate 
imaginary, thinkers who start from the paradigm of justice have moved partially away 
from it. Approaching climate change through the lens of justice, some environmental 
political theorists have instead come to see climate change as a distributive problem, 
where the target of distribution is not necessarily wealth or capital, but environmental 
‘goods,’ ‘bads,’ and responsibilities. Though such debates are multifaceted and complex, 
different ‘camps’ have taken form around two central questions: how to distribute such 
goods, bads, and responsibilities, on the one hand, and whether to take historical 
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emissions and inequalities into account when doing so, on the other. 
     Steve Vanderheiden’s work exemplifies the first line of questioning. Vanderheiden’s 
task is to take seriously the UNFCCC language of “common but differentiated 
responsibility” for climate change as a guideline by which to fairly distribute 
responsibility across the international Westphalian system of states.68 As such it shares 
some basic elements with the dominant imaginary, even as it places concerns about 
distributive justice front and center. Discounting early Rawlsian critiques of 
cosmopolitan justice (that is, justice as an idea that reaches beyond particular nation 
states) and moving toward the international political theory of justice developed by 
Charles Beitz,69 Vanderheiden ultimately argues that political, economic, and natural 
costs, benefits, and capacities, such as the atmosphere’s ability to absorb GHGs, ought be 
divided according to principles found in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. With 
regard to natural resources like carbon sinks, Vanderheiden suggests we see these as 
“morally arbitrary” in the Rawlsian sense (mirroring the way Rawls treats the distribution 
of natural talents intranationally), and concludes that “principles of distributive justice 
must guide the allocation of shares of the atmosphere’s absorptive capacity [for example] 
in the form of national emissions caps.”70 The takeaway from Atmospheric Justice, 
however, is more elegant, and consists in the idea that the Kyoto protocol is enough, or a 
good enough starting point, for distributing the costs and burdens of climate change 
mitigation. 
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     Though Vanderheiden’s book is not explicitly mentioned in its pages, Eric Posner 
and David Weisbach’s Climate Change Justice can be read as a response to the former’s 
attempt to bring global political theory and global justice to the center of the UN response 
to climate change. In doing so, Posner and Weisbach demonstrate the second question 
around which differing sides form, that of whether or not historical emissions should be 
taken into account when considering just distribution. As if responding to Vanderheiden, 
Posner and Weisbach opine that: 
The Kyoto Protocol had serious, even fatal problems. It imposed no restrictions 
on developing nations such as China and India, where emissions are increasing 
dramatically; for this reason, it could not reduce greenhouse gases to tolerable 
levels. Further, the Kyoto Protocol imposed an extremely severe burden on the 
United States, which therefore refused to join the treaty regime.71 
     In other words, Kyoto was dead on arrival to these authors insofar as it wasn’t harsh 
enough on developing economies and, mirroring George W. Bush’s rhetoric, was unfair 
to the United States. From this starting point, Posner and Weisbach argue that climate 
“justice” ought to be conceived as distributing all costs more or less equally 
internationally (as measured in the contemporary moment), and that the pursuit of climate 
justice ought not entail any sort of redistributive effort. In other words, climate justice 
would mean ignoring historical contributions to the problem, and embracing a forward-
looking view that fully acquiesces to the common sense and status-quo preserving 
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sentiment that if we “demand too much from the rich world, the rich world will drag its 
feet.”72 Rather than an invitation for political struggle, Posner and Weisbach see this as 
an acceptable or at least unalterable limit on climate justice.  
     I would critique Vanderheiden from a different angle than do Posner and Weisbach. 
Rather than arguing that justice and the response to climate change ought be kept 
separate, I suggest that a careful consideration of climate violence and of the histories out 
of which that violence emerged recommends a different approach to justice, one at once 
less tied to ideal and non-ideal theorizing about justice alike and more closely related to 
the tradition of environmental justice, with its emphasis on paying attention to particular 
wrongs, and to how such wrongs are patterned across intersecting identities and positions. 
Rather than trying to keep justice out of an expert-based approach to fixing climate 
change – as do Posner and Weisbach – or trying to theorize how justice might be meted 
out by international institutions – following Vanderheiden – we ought turn to those 
impacted by climate change for guidance on what democratic environmental justice 
might look like. Responses to climate change that do not take seriously the experience of 
those who cannot avoid making political judgments and everyday choices about how to 
survive raise the paradoxical prospect of ‘solving’ the problem without improving the lot 
of those who are impacted by it. 
Questions of Democracy in the Greenhouse 
     I largely depart from these approaches, instead contributing to three others (which I do 
not exhaust here, but engage throughout the remainder of the dissertation). First, I 
contribute to an approach that offers a critique of mainstream climate politics as it has 
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developed.73 Second, I contribute to an approach that asks about the relationship 
among democracy, democratic theory, and the politics of climate change.74 Finally, my 
dissertation contributes to an approach that looks at the relationship between 
environmental harm and violence.75 
     My central questions, about how we might reconceptualize the problem of climate 
change and present it in ways that depend on and support specifically democratic political 
action, is informed by and speaks to these latter approaches, even as it is not directly 
addressed in any of them. Anyone who takes climate change seriously will tell you that a 
key problem is the continued and increasing need to develop non carbon-based energy 
capable of powering some semblance of contemporary ways of living. I do not disagree, 
but I do draw attention to the need for a different kind of energy: a specifically 
democratic one. As Giddens began to imply above (but ultimately left aside), without 
such energy to fuel movements, make demands, and so on, little of the work of 
democracy gets done.76 If we are to address climate change in such a way as to foster 
democracy and to distribute responsibility, environmental goods, and environmental bads 
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in a democratic way, we have to think about this kind of energy: not as a solution in 
and of itself, but as a way of focusing on expanding the possible. As such my dissertation 
is an attempt to think through how we might generate more of this democratic energy, in 
light of a dominant (climate) imaginary that makes it look unlikely. Essential here is a 
conviction that runs throughout: that people can act and be democratic without having a 
formal democracy, even as people can have a formal democracy without acting or being 
democratic. Democratic things, simply, are things that are available to most, if not all.77 
Asking into the grounds of possibility for acting democratically and being democratic 
and thereby generating democratic energy to be wielded against the myriad forces 
changing the climate is the ultimate focus of this dissertation. 
IV. Climatic Inversions: Violence, Responsibility, and Democracy in the Greenhouse 
     But how would we ever get there? First, we need new ways of analyzing or 
conceptualizing climate change in a way that moves beyond the limitations of the 
dominant imaginary, and that culminate in a conceptualization of climate change as a 
technological problem requiring (managerial and neoliberal) depoliticized solutions. 
Consider, for example, the opening narration of climate change taken from the EPA’s 
Climate Change Indicators in the United States, 2016: 
The Earth’s climate is changing. Temperatures are rising, snow and rainfall 
patterns are shifting, and more extreme climate events—like heavy rainstorms and 
record-high temperatures—are already taking place. Scientists are highly 
confident that many of these observed changes can be linked to the levels of 
                                                
77 I borrow this idea from Dean Mathiowetz, who in turn develops it in relation to Aristotle’s 
concern with that which is available to the many. See Mathiowetz “‘Meditation is Good for 
Nothing:’ Leisure as a Democratic Practice,” New Political Science 38, no. 2 (2016). 
  
40 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in our atmosphere, which have 
increased because of human activities.78 
To be sure, this excerpt presents the basics of climate change accurately: the climate is 
changing; ill effects are already here; scientists are sure that humans are the cause. Yet in 
using wholly dispassionate language, appealing only to scientific confidence, and 
referring generically to human activities such a framework already, if subtly, starts to 
imply a scientific and technological solution that in its purest form would be devoid of 
politics. To invite lively democratic engagements, the language we use and the stories 
will tell will first need to be significantly closer to life. 
     New conceptualizations would also do well to avoid a second prevalent way of 
approaching climate change – depoliticizing in its own right – which figures it as such a 
large, abstract, or “apocalyptic” problem that those confronted by it retreat into 
hopelessness or escape into denial.79 Here we might turn to Erik Swyngedouw’s portrayal 
of an apocalyptic imaginary in which climate change signals: 
A world without water, or at least with endemic water shortages, ravaged by 
hurricanes whose intensity is amplified by climate change’s pictures of scorched 
land as global warming shifts the geopluvial regime and the spatial variability of 
droughts and floods; icebergs that disintegrate around the poles as ice melts into 
the sea, causing the sea level to rise; alarming reductions in biodiversity as species 
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disappear or are threatened by extinction ….80 
And on, and on, and on. Swyngedouw’s point is that left unchecked, lively descriptions 
can be pacifying in their own right. According to this too-lively description, “our 
ecological predicament is sutured by millennial fears, sustained by an apocalyptic 
rhetoric … signaling an overwhelming, mind boggling danger” that threatens to 
undermine everything.81 Instead of rousing citizens and denizens to action, such 
frameworks constitute “an apocalypse without the promise of redemption,” thus 
encouraging a turn away from the problem toward apathy, denial, or unworldliness. 
     This dissertation, in distinction to the approaches just discussed, starts from the 
premise that climate change is more recalcitrant than the (sometimes concealed) 
optimism of technocratic approaches would suggest. Yet I also want to show that even if 
the problem of climate change is apocalyptic, and perhaps especially if it is, the need for 
democratic responsibility, engagement, and care will remain. If, in Naomi Klein’s words, 
climate change “changes everything,” then academics and other thinkers have to think 
beyond dominant approaches so often content to treat climate change as a crisis requiring 
our politics to “change radically, but within the contours of the existing state of the 
situation … so that nothing really has to change.”82 
     Against this changeless change I take it as a starting point, and also a partial 
explanation for the popularity of the turn to the Anthropocene, that climate change is not 
just another problem and that the environment is not just another issue-area. Instead, the 
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impact of climate change is such that it inverts much of the content of traditional views 
and long-held assumptions. It inverts assumptions about the desirability of growth 
economies, Biblical, Augustinian, Baconian, and broader masculinist Enlightenment 
convictions that humans rightly dominate nature,83 and most simply, our collective ability 
to power our lifestyles using primarily fossil fuels. In at least one case, climate change 
might invert the very foundations of scientific work, where “global warming could make 
carbon dating impossible.”84 
     Whereas the dominant climate imaginary figures climate change as another problem 
among many (even if the most staunch), beckoning for technical solutions, I take 
seriously the idea that climate change is unique, and that it changes – if not everything – a 
great many of our theoretical and practical assumptions. My starting point, from which I 
conceptualize climate change in Chapter 2, is that the presence of human-induced climate 
change inverts our understanding of violence itself. As I argue in detail in the next 
chapter, climate change is not a form of direct violence: there is no subject directly 
harming an object: no citizen directly diminishing the wellbeing of another citizen, 
foreign national, or future generation. Rather, climate change inverts our understanding 
of environmental violence from direct to indirect. As indirect violence, climate change is 
not easily confronted by the managerial and neoliberal approaches introduced here and 
further specified in Chapter 3: it is a concrete rather than abstract problem demanding 
that political responsibility and democratic engagement rush to the fore of our analyses. 
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Parsing out how we might go about thinking through such inversions is the task of the 
remainder of this dissertation, as intimated in the roadmap below. 
V. Roadmap: Arguments, Chapters, Methods 
     Chapter 2, “Political Theory and Climate Violence,” provides a conceptualization (or 
per Robert Porter and Iain MacKenzie, a dramatization) of climate change-as-violence 
that works as the basis for the remainder of my dissertation. There, I argue that we can 
and should conceptualize climate change as a problem of violence and that doing so casts 
doubt on the all-too-easy solutions proposed by techno-optimists without spilling over 
into apocalyptic depoliticization. Instead, I explore the term “indirect violence” as a 
broad conceptual apparatus through which to approach climate change politically. The 
chapter ends with the suggestion that, once thus conceptualized, we are better able to re-
think the ethics and politics of climate change in novel ways (the subjects of Chapters 4 
and 5, respectively). 
     Where the former is a conceptual chapter, Chapter 3 is more straightforwardly critical. 
“The Dominant Climate Imaginary” critiques the materially and ideologically dominant 
alternatives to thinking climate change democratically in the ways outlined in the 
conclusion of Chapter 2 and the bulk of Chapters 4 and 5. Here, I take a more sustained 
look (intimated in this introduction) at the problems with conceiving of climate change as 
primarily a technical problem and therefore focusing overwhelmingly on neoliberal and 
managerial solutions to it. Theoretical and practical techno-optimism pervades such 
approaches, depoliticizing climate change and allowing otherwise concerned subjects to 
self-abdicate any sense of responsibility for climate change and any drive to theorize it. 
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Going back to earlier critiques of technology (Martin Heidegger, Hans Jonas, Langdon 
Winner), I argue for a techno-realism that approaches new technologies as necessary but 
subordinate to a broader political response to climate change. Techno-realism, I suggest, 
accepts Timothy Mitchell’s closing advice in Carbon Democracy, that ending the fossil 
fuel era depends on re-forming material conditions in order to support post fossil-fuel 
democracy less subservient to managerial and neoliberal logics. 
     Chapters 4 and 5 switch methodical gears from negative to positive critique with the 
goal of exploring how conversations about the political questions of responsibility and 
democracy are inverted by the indirect violence of climate change.  
     In Chapter 4, “Situating Responsibility,” I look at contending views of what it would 
mean to take responsibility for climate change seriously. If a solution to climate change 
does not come entirely from technological advancements (or, I would suggest, even if it 
does), then climate change necessarily raises questions about responsibility. I argue here 
that two somewhat contradictory views of responsibility remain the most prevalent 
among those who think about climate change: individual and international responsibility. 
That is, when we think of who is responsible for stopping climate change, we usually 
locate answers in individual (and consumerist) behaviors, or in the global climate regime 
(i.e. states acting together in the model of the UNFCCC). I do not think these views are 
enough (again, given that climate change is a historical, structural, slow kind of 
violence). Instead I turn to various thinkers of responsiveness and relational 
responsibility. The chapter concludes that responsibility is always a relational concept, 
and that the indirect violence of climate change brings many relations into relief that 
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might serve as good starting points for both admitting responsibility for (past) climate 
change and accepting responsibility to prevent further (future) damage. 
     Finally, I look at the political question of democracy in relation to climate change. 
“Greenhouse Democracy,” my 5th Chapter, asks what roles the idea and practice of 
democracy might have in the fight against climate change, as well as what kind of 
democracy might be useful. Here I look at recent conversations about democracy and 
climate change, and suggest that the focus on electoral, deliberative, and even radical 
views of democracy restrain its potential by excluding some of its important tasks. 
Greenhouse democracy, instead, starts from local resistances, everyday engagement with 
one’s experiences, and enactments of responsibility even as it might ultimately seek to 
build horizontal, transnational forms of power and to expand democratic potentials in a 
climate-changed world.
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Chapter 2: Political Theory and Climate Violence 
I. Introduction 
So if we want to talk about violence and climate change – and we are talking 
about it … then let’s talk about climate change as violence. Rather than worrying 
about whether ordinary human beings will react turbulently to the destruction of 
the very means of their survival, let’s worry about that destruction – and their 
survival.1 
 
     In this chapter my primary goal is to provide a conceptual framework for thinking 
about climate change as violence, a framework that will underwrite each of the following 
chapters. Along the way, a secondary goal is to nudge an existing conversation about the 
relationship between climate change and violence from one in which climate change 
simply leads to increases in violence, to one wherein climate change is itself a form of 
violence, as Rebecca Solnit suggests. I am convinced that the latter is a better way to 
think about climate change in itself, but I also do this to get toward the third goal of the 
chapter: to open the possibility of bringing the often abstract and overwhelming 
phenomena of climate change ‘out there’ closer to everyday concerns or, in other words, 
closer to ethical and political considerations (topics of focus in Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively). The bulk of the chapter is thus devoted to my primary and secondary goals, 
whereas the conclusion takes up the third. 
     A few political scenes might help to dramatize the distinction between the claim that 
climate change leads to violence and the claim I develop here, that climate change is 
itself violence. As I detail in Chapter 3, a prominent response to climate change at the 
international level has been to view the problem as demanding technological solutions, 
                                                
1 Rebecca Solnit, “Call Climate Change What it is: Violence,” The Guardian, April 7, 2014, 
accessed April 9, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/07/climate-change-
violence-occupy-earth. 
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such as instituting carbon offset markets in order to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs).2 
One such plan involved the FACE Foundation, a Dutch organization, which planned to 
plant twenty-five thousand hectares of trees in a forest in Uganda. Once complete, this 
forest was to constitute a significant new carbon sink: as Mt. Elgon’s newly planted trees 
would absorb GHGs from the atmosphere, so too would overall concentrations be 
brought down. Concerned states and consumers, furthermore, would offset their own 
emissions by supporting the management of the Ugandan forest. Specifically, a second 
Dutch company GreenSeat was to sell “carbon credits from Mount Elgon to people 
wanting to offset the emissions caused by flying.”3 Through the creation of this carbon-
offset market, and through the proper technological management of these trees, global 
GHG concentrations would be reduced. 
     In preparing to convert Mount Elgon National Park into a more efficient carbon sink, 
the project waded into a long-standing conflict between the Uganda Wildlife Authority 
(UWA, who had partnered with FACE) and the Benet people. The Benet, an indigenous 
group, had depended on the forest for their survival since 1956, and had regarded the area 
as sacred for much longer. Despite ongoing land contestations between the Benet and the 
UWA, the project began as planned, leading to the forced removal of the Benet people 
from Mount Elgon. With regard to the Benet and other local groups, Chris Lang and 
Timothy Byakola report that: 
In order to keep villagers out of the national park, UWA’s park rangers maintain a 
                                                
2 I borrow and extend the following case, of Mount Elgon, from Adrian Parr, The Wrath of 
Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change (New York: Columbia UP, 2013): 31-3. 
3 Chris Lang and Timothy Byakola, “A Funny Place to Store Carbon”: UWA-FACE 
Foundations’s Tree Planting Project in Mount Elgon National Park, Uganda (Montevideo, 
Uruguay: World Rainforest Movement, 2006), 8. 
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brutal regime at Mount Elgon. In 1993 and 2002, villagers were violently 
evicted from the national park. Since the evictions … UWA’s rangers have hit 
them, tortured them, humiliated them, shot at them, threatened them and uprooted 
their crops.4 
The UN-inspired attempt to reduce GHG emissions went forward without much tangible 
concern for, and indeed with violence directly applied to, the people most immediately 
impacted. 
     On the other hand, we might witness the plight of Kivalina, a small island off of 
Alaska’s northwestern coast. In 2008 the City of Kivalina and the Iñupiat Native Village 
of Kivalina filed a lawsuit alleging that, inter alia, BP, Chevron, and the ExxonMobil 
Corporation should be held legally responsible for damaging the climate. In Kivalina in 
2008, destruction stemming from climate change had begun to force the 400 inhabitants 
of Kivalina to consider relocation.5 Rising sea levels and increased erosion from more 
frequent and drastic storms had helped forge agreement among local leaders and 
inhabitants that it would soon no longer be possible to remain. The damages from the 
lawsuit, if won, would have been put toward the relocation of all persons living on the 
island. 
     Following writers like Christian Parenti, we might be tempted to locate Mount Elgon 
                                                
4 Ibid., 11. 
5 For a case study see Christine Shearer, Kivalina: A Climate Change Story (Chicago: Haymarket 
Books, 2011). See also the ultimately failed appeal at Native Village of Kivalina; City of Kivalina 
v. ExxonMobil et al., No. 09-17490 11641 (9th cir. 2011) http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/ 
datastore/opinions/2012/09/25/09-17490.pdf. For similarly positioned struggles, see Stay and 
Defend (http://aksik.org/content/stay-and-defend) and The Island President, dir. John Shenk 
(2011; New York: First Run Features, 2012), DVD. 
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National Forest, Uganda in the “tropic of chaos,” that “new geography of violence”6 
produced by climate change. Throughout Tropic of Chaos, Parenti shows the ways in 
which “the social impacts of climate change are already upon us, articulating themselves 
through the preexisting crises of poverty and violence, which are the legacies of Cold 
War militarism and neoliberal economics.”7 Climate change intersects with the problems 
left in the wake of the cold war and its aftermath. In this way, Parenti demonstrates the 
virtues of approaching climate change as a problem that augments existing violence or, 
less often, introduces new violent conflicts. Along the way Parenti touches on the subject 
of Uganda, although his concern is to stress situations of violence there that are unrelated 
to Mount Elgon. After running through the colonial history of Uganda and its following 
period of brutal rule under Idi Amin Dada,8 Parenti suggests that environmental and 
weather conditions intersected with these colonial histories and repressive political 
regimes to worsen violence that would have taken place regardless. In a context in which 
“from 1980 to 1982 the weather got even more intense [prior years had already brought 
increasing drought] as one of the two worst El Niño events of the century occurred,”9 the 
violence of colonial histories and repressive political regimes came to the fore. Parenti 
thus forges a broader claim, that histories of changing weather and futures of changing 
climates augment[ed] direct eruptions of violence, such as when “two thousand hungry 
and often armed Ugandans crossed into the Turkana region of Kenya in search of food 
                                                
6 Christian Parenti, Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence (New 
York: Nation Books, 2011). 
7 Ibid., 225. 
8 Ibid., 72-6. 
9 Ibid, 76. 
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and cattle.”10 Along with writers like Parenti who see in climate change a risk that 
already existing violences and tensions will be augmented, we might be tempted to read 
the situation in Mount Elgon National Park as one in which violences on the ground are 
made worse in light of a degraded climate. 
     Yet I think this reading, even or especially if it is right, misses a chance to see climate 
change as a form of violence in itself, along the lines that Rebecca Solnit’s epigraph to 
this chapter asks us to do. This view is perhaps more clearly illustrated by the case of 
Kivalina. There climate change itself, rather than a constellation of groups attempting to 
construct a new market and thereby dispossessing the Benet of their land (or resource-
scarce Ugandans rushing across the border to look for any available sources of 
livelihood), is the violent force that pushes the Iñupiat away from their home.  
Putting these two scenes together to form a backdrop helps bring into relief the ways in 
which many studies, bordering on determinist frameworks of climatological or 
geographical varieties, propose that climate change (and more specifically climate 
warming) leads to or exacerbates eruptions of direct violence.11 It also allows us to see 
                                                
10 Ibid., 77. 
11 The idea that climate shapes or determines human possibilities is an old one in Western 
thought. Foundational thinkers in this vein, who make stronger cases than do more recent thinkers 
like Parenti, stretch back at least as far as Montesquieu, onward through Alfred Crosby, up to 
Jared Diamond. Montesquieu was of course concerned not with the link between climate and 
violence per se, but with climate and its propensity to determine the kind of law a people will 
tolerate. This tolerance, furthermore, is physically determined for Montesquieu: 
Cold air contracts the extremities of the body’s surface fibers … therefore, men are more 
vigorous in cold climates” (231); “Hot air, by contrast, relaxes these extremities of the 
fibers and lengthens them … put a man in a hot, enclosed spot, and he will suffer … a 
It is not difficult to see how Montesquieu thus provides a springboard for racialized and racist 
claims about the superiority of cold, hardened Europeans, but this strays from my point in this 
chapter. See Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, eds. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, 
and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), part 3. For the other works 
mentioned see Alfred Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-
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how such studies miss an opportunity to make a stronger argument, one more useful 
for bringing the problem of climate change under democratic consideration. 
     My argument in this chapter is that climate change can be faithfully and fruitfully 
conceptualized as a form of indirect violence that is at once structural and slow. To get 
there, I first describe ways that political theorists have treated the concept of violence in 
order to describe political life or prescribe actions aimed at its smooth functioning. 
Conceptualizing climate change as violence, in this light, is also of intellectual interest to 
political theorists who are concerned to theorize violence more generally. Historically, 
Western political theories of violence have tended to focus on violence that is direct and 
intentional, and that is ultimately capable of being understood either as a political means 
or end. I show this by looking at several ways (in roughly historical order) of 
understanding violence politically: as a tool of the prince or state; as it relates to 
revolutionary actions; as it is recast by 20th century liberalism and its ideology of human 
                                                                                                                                            
1900 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004) and Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: 
The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997). 
     It is worth noting that Montesquieu’s views on the relationship between “nature,” broadly, and 
politics can be read in a more sympathetic way. Crina Archer, Laura Ephraim, and Lida Maxwell 
tell us that “unlike thinkers like Locke and Hobbes, who attribute a law like status to nature and 
ask that it both form and stand outside of politics, thinkers like Vico and Montesquieu portray 
nature and politics as mutually constituted and affirm the confluence of political activities with 
natural forces as the necessary condition for both law and projects to resist and transform it.” I 
agree up to a point, that Montesquieu avoids the trap of deriving politics from a broad, even 
metaphysical conception of “nature” or “natural law” as do Hobbes and Locke, yet I think this 
starts to break down in cases like that mentioned above, wherein Montesquieu does suggest that 
particular instantiations of what we might call nature, such as climate, does determine politics to a 
great degree. In sum, while we might turn to Montesquieu for inspiration on how to edge away 
from designing politics in the shadow of what we take to be nature, he does not give us much 
reason to doubt that climate must necessarily shape politics. On this latter point I am in partial 
agreement with Montesquieu, so long as we downgrade “determine” to “potentially influence” 
which only requires us to acknowledge the commonsensical point that our environments and 
contexts more generally influence our lives, political and otherwise. See Archer, Ephraim, and 
Maxwell, “Introduction” in Second Nature: Rethinking the Natural through Politics, eds. Archer, 
Ephraim, and Maxwell (New York: Fordham UP, 2013), 11 and throughout. 
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rights, and, finally, as it is figured by thinkers (like Parenti) of environmental scarcity.  
     The problem of climate change inverts these received ways of thinking about violence 
as a direct and intentional phenomenon, even as reconceptualizing violence can help us 
think more critically about climate change. Rather than (only) suggesting that a warmer 
climate might lead to more direct violence, I suggest that an expanded theorization of 
violence reveals climate change as itself, at root, a form of violence. To this end I put 
Johan Galtung, Iris Marion Young, and Rob Nixon into conversation in order to draw out 
a concept of climate-change-as-indirect-violence. I end with an introduction of the ethical 
and political openings that this reconceptualization provides, a discussion that paves the 
way for the following chapters. 
     Before continuing, a brief mention of my approach in this chapter is useful. My use of 
“concept” and “conceptualization” here owes much to Cesare Casarino. As Casarino 
notes, “the function of a concept becomes intelligible in terms of this triangulation: 
concept, problem, solution … a concept may help at once a) in posing a problem 
adequately and b) in articulating a solution distinctly.”12 The creation of a concept or way 
of conceptualizing is of course only possible insofar as the material conditions for that 
concept exist. Yet the work of conceptualization also brings us some way toward 
theorizing solutions to the material problem that forms the ground from which the 
concept emerges. The rest of this chapter is, then, an attempt to conceptualize the 
materially emerging problem of climate change in a way that might help edge closer to, if 
not a “solution” that the dominant imaginary would recognize, a way of thinking of 
climate change as an everyday problem that requires response. 
                                                
12 Cesare Casarino, “Universalism of the Common,” Diacritics 39, no. 4 (2009): 164. 
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     Yet my method, evinced by my invocation of the struggles in Mount Elgon and 
Kivalina, also involves dramatization. In addition to an ordinary term, dramatization is a 
method recently expounded by Iain MacKenzie and Robert Porter. It is especially 
applicable to a study that seeks to show the politicalness of climate change insofar as it 
seeks to bring non- or de-politicized realms of life into politics or, rather, to show how 
such things are indeed already political despite going unrecognized as such. In 
developing the concept of climate violence I am also dramatizing the problem of climate 
change in order to politicize it and, ultimately, democratize it. As MacKenzie and Porter 
describe it, dramatization is a method which implies theorists “need to start thinking like 
artists or, better still, along with artists, in bringing to life concepts that provoke, 
resonate, and allow us to meaningfully access the domain of the political.”13 In the 
remainder of this chapter my aim is to dramatize and conceptualize climate change in 
such a way as to make it an obvious locus of democratic contestation and address. 
II. Political Theory and its Approaches to Violence 
     The history of political thought has generated many ways of thinking about violence. 
My purpose here is neither to thoroughly interrogate any one thinker, nor to offer a 
comprehensive catalog of political theories of violence. Rather than offer an exhaustive 
account (which would include, for example, Foucauldian accounts which see violence as 
                                                
13 Iain MacKenzie and Robert Porter, Dramatizing the Political: Deleuze and Guattari (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 8. MacKenzie and Porter develop their claims through 
readings of Deleuze and Guattari. Yet as intellectually important as their claims are, I do not find 
it useful to delve into their specific explorations insofar as MacKenzie and Porter’s basic point – 
that theorists ought to devote more attention to bringing concepts to life – stands alone. 
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constitutive or Bourdieuian ones which see it as symbolic),14 I assess a few of the most 
prominent accounts that reflect our dominant views of political violence. Together, such 
accounts form a background against which to conceptualize and dramatize the ways that 
climate change requires a theorization of a different sort of violence than we are 
accustomed to thinking about ethically or politically. My claim here is that our received 
ways of thinking violence figure it as an intentional means to an intended end: something 
we choose to do, or protest against, in the name of producing a politics. To this end, let us 
briefly think back to the conception of violence developed by theorists of the state and its 
predecessors, by thinkers who interrogate violence as it relates to revolutionary 
potentials, and by post World War Two liberalism, before turning directly to the violence 
of climate change. 
Violence and the State 
     The association of violence with the (eventually) sovereign state has a long history 
and remains, perhaps, our most influential way of thinking about violence. The reading of 
Niccolò Machiavelli that finds in his work the border between medieval and modern 
political thought insofar as he divorces (Christian) morality from the political use of 
violence by the prince offers an early iteration of this association.15 From this vantage 
point, Machiavelli appears as a thinker for whom violence is a useful tool. Judith Shklar 
                                                
14 See Saul Newman, “Terror, Sovereignty and Law: On the Politics of Violence,” German Law 
Journal 5, no. 5 (2004): 569-84 and Karen Houle, “The Manifolds of Violence,” Hypatia 21, no. 
2 (2006): 184-95 for the former. For the latter, see Elliot Weininger, “Foundations of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s Class Analysis,” in Approaches to Class Analysis, ed. Erik Olin Wright (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2005), 82-118; Daly, “Republican Deliberation and Symbolic Violence in 
Rousseau and Bourdieu,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 41, no. 6 (2015): 609-33. 
15 The classic and  still influential reading of Machiavelli along these lines is in Sheldon Wolin, 
“Machiavelli: Politics and the Economy of Violence,” in Politics and Vision: Continuity and 
Innovation in Western Political Thought, expanded ed. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004). 
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thus tells us that “Machiavelli had asked whether it was more efficient for a self-made 
ruler to govern cruelly or leniently, and had decided that, on the whole, cruelty worked 
best.”16 Shklar thus suggests that for the self-made leader, at least, cruelty and violence 
are indeed useful tools. Furthermore, even as this cruelty or violence is efficient for 
Machiavelli, it is also part and parcel of a wider political ethic, useful as well for 
bolstering the prince’s ability (virtù) over and against the vicissitudes of fortuna. As 
Wolin suggests: 
To possess power was to be able to control and manipulate the actions of others 
and thereby to make events conform to one’s wishes. But by mastery Machiavelli 
did not mean, as some commentators have implied, mere technical efficiency. The 
new science was intended as the basis for a new political ethic. Thus, to know the 
shape of events was to be in a position to exercise prudence or foresight; to select 
the type of action appropriate to a given situation was to possess a sensitive and 
discriminating intelligence which allowed for the weighing of several factors 
simultaneously, as well as a knack of imaginatively projecting possible 
consequences. The political condition demanded great resolution and 
decisiveness, because extreme and violent actions were often necessary. There 
was call, too, for courage in facing unexpected disasters brought by Fortuna.17 
                                                
16 Judith Shklar, “Putting Cruelty First,” Daedalus 111, no. 3 (1982), 18. Shklar points out that by 
the time we get to Montaigne and Montesquieu, in practice, Christian opposition to Machiavellian 
violence was less than robust: “for both Montesquieu and Montaigne, the Spaniards in the New 
World served as the ultimate example of public cruelty. It was the triumph of Machiavellism by 
those who claimed to be its chief opponents. Here, cruelty and pious pretense had joined to prove 
Machiavelli right” (19). Still the claims that Wolin makes about Machiavelli appear to hold true, 
and are useful in constructing ideal types of violence against which to theorize climatic violence. 
17 Wolin, “Machiavelli,” 194. 
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Though this passage is wide-ranging, it usefully locates the Machiavellian place for 
violence: a place of necessity given the political condition of the prince or, in an 
anticipatory mode, the state.18 Here the violence used is explicitly direct and intentional, a 
force used by the prince or his equivalent to prolong the life of the political unit for as 
long as possible in the face of near inevitable decay. 
     Though it depends on how one reads his work,19 it does not seem overly controversial 
to situate Thomas Hobbes as continuing the Machiavellian association of the proper use 
of violence with the (now theoretically sovereign) state. It is also fair to suggest that 
Hobbes’s conception of violence is again primarily direct and intentional. To be sure, 
citizens in the state of nature used violence because of, Hobbes famously stated, 
competition, diffidence, and glory: “The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for 
safety; and the third, for reputation.”20 Yet, of course, Hobbes reads these causes of the 
use of violence not as legitimate in themselves, but as legitimating a contract that 
institutes an absolute sovereign. They are found in Chapter XIII, titled “Of the Natural 
Condition of Mankind, As Concerning Their Felicity, and Misery,”21 suggesting that they 
are of a first nature to be moved away from rather than an artifice in which to rest. They 
also immediately precede another of Hobbes’s famous passages, in which he attributes to 
                                                
18 A second major take on Machiavelli reads a “democratic turn” in his work. I am sympathetic to 
this reading, although it leaves us some distance from Machiavelli as a thinker of violence as 
such. For a recent contribution to this work, see Boris Litvin, “Mapping Rule and Subversion: 
Perspective and the Democratic Turn in Machiavelli Scholarship,” European Journal of Political 
Theory (August 17, 2015): doi: 10.1177/1474885115599894. 
19 Mary Dietz, for example, reads Hobbes as a thinker of citizen virtue rather than primarily of 
sovereignty. See Dietz, “Hobbes’s Subject as Citizen” in Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, 
ed. Mary Dietz (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 91-119. 
20 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1994), 76. 
21 Ibid., 74. 
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these sources of violence the war of all against all that takes place in lieu of the “civil 
state” and, in turn, justifies the absolute sovereign. Recall that for Hobbes: 
It is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them 
all in awe, they are in that condition which is called War, and such a war as is of 
every man against every man. For War consisteth not in battle only, or the act of 
fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently 
known … so the nature of war consiteth not in actual fighting, but in the known 
disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All 
other time is Peace.22 
For Hobbes the use of violence by individuals amounts to evidence for the need of a 
sovereign power to pacify the people and thereby provide for peace.23 
     The true use of violence with regard to citizens is thus to “keep them all in awe.” 
Hobbesian political society is built on a contract through which the “natural” sovereignty 
of subjects is bound together and transferred to a sovereign representative who is not (or 
no longer, from that point onward) a part of the community. The ultimate role of 
violence, held by the post-contract sovereign, is to produce security and stability: “For 
the laws of nature … of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be 
observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, 
                                                
22 Ibid., 76. 
23 The exception is, of course, any case in which an individual’s life is threatened. In this case, 
resistance up to and including violent resistance is justified. To this end Hobbes writes that “a 
man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force, to take away his life, 
because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself” (82) and claims that “A 
covenant not to defend myself from force by force is always void. For … no man can transfer or 
lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment (the avoiding whereof 
is the only end of laying down any right), and therefore the promise of not resisting force in no 
convenient transferreth any right, nor is obliging” (87). 
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and the like. And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to 
secure a man at all.”24 
     The Hobbesian view of violence, then, which remains influential, is twofold. On the 
one hand, in the state of nature, violence is limited in scope and performed by 
individuals. After contracting out of the state of nature, violence is the domain of the 
sovereign, who offers security to the commonwealth, itself secured by its ability to use 
violence to punish and protect. In either case violence is direct; in the legitimate latter 
case, it is to be used only by the sovereign (again, with the rare exception of defending 
one’s life from termination). 
     If Machiavelli and Hobbes started modern political theory down the road of thinking 
about violence as belonging to the state, Max Weber makes this connection explicit in a 
time in which the modern state form had moved a long way toward maturity. Of interest 
here is the fact that each of these thinkers saw fit to express their proximity to “science,” 
Machiavelli by proposing a realism which divorced political violence from religious 
concern, Hobbes by turning to a geometric method, and Weber by delivering lectures 
explicitly structured around the vocation of science generally, with politics as one such 
science. While each author surely operates within a different and distinct historical 
contextualization of “science,”25 we might speculate that each use brings with it the idea 
that violence is a useful tool (at least if used in the right way, by the right people or 
                                                
24 Ibid., 106. 
25 For Machiavelli, the new science of politics suggested, following Wolin, the autonomy of the 
political. For Hobbes, the new science had at least partially to do with method, specifically the 
geometric method of proceeding from smaller to larger parts – from definitions to truths – 
through which Hobbes approached the world. For Weber, finally, science is located in the 
German concept of Wissenschaft which connotes the deep and sustained study of a subject less 
than it does one scientific method or another. 
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political office, in the right amount, and so on). Violence is used by the state to ensure 
that it is used properly and therefore scientifically: in the right proportion, with the right 
intentions, and, hopefully, attaining the right effect. To be sure, following Wolin, this is 
the case with Machiavelli, and in Hobbes this point is fairly explicit. In Weber it is once 
again clearly expressed in one of his most oft-noted ideas: that “the state is the form of 
human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical 
violence within a particular territory–and this idea of “territory” is an essential defining 
feature … the state is regarded as the sole source of the “right” to use violence.”26 Where 
Machiavelli and Hobbes focused on sciences of politics in which principalities and then 
commonwealths used violence to their own ends (which may or may not have overlapped 
with the ends of their subjects), Weber, lecturing in 1919, made explicit that it was the 
modern state as such to which the legitimate use of direct, physical violence belonged. 
     Thinkers in this lineage see violence as a means to be used by the state or its 
equivalent to achieve political ends. Violence here is direct, top-down, and calculated. 
More importantly, it is intentional. I like the language Didier Fassin uses to summarize 
Weber, language which also serves to summarize the state-centric theory of violence 
passed down by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Weber. “The state has a foundational relation 
with violence,” he writes. “In the ideal-typical social contract that links it to individuals, 
the state is supposed to protect society from violence through law and law enforcement, 
and in exchange it is granted the monopoly of legitimate violence.”27 Or bluntly and more 
                                                
26 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in The Vocation Lectures, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 33. 
27 Didier Fassin, “The Trace: Violence, Truth, and the Politics of the Body,” Social Research 78, 
no. 2 (2011): 281. 
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darkly, per Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings, “Machiavelli, Hobbes and 
Weber (and others) look at politics, more or less, from the point of view of the political 
dominator, the state organization.”28 This organization, in turn, intentionally makes use of 
violence, a point that dominates the state-centric view and precludes it from having to 
theorize violence in its other potential extensions. 
Revolutionary (Non)Violence 
     Hannah Arendt and Franz Fanon can be profitably put into conversation in order to 
start to move toward 20th century views of violence. Their views contain important 
differences, even as they coalesce around a set of questions from which we can read a 
common understanding of what violence is: is violence to be used or not? by whom? 
what are its effects? when or where does it take place? A passage from Arendt serves 
well as a window into these questions. Speaking of the first generation to mature under 
the shadow of the atomic bomb and in the aftermath of concentration camps and 
genocide, Arendt writes: 
Their first reaction was a revulsion against every form of violence, an almost 
matter-of-course espousal of a politics of nonviolence. The very great successes 
of this movement, especially in the field of civil rights, were followed by the 
resistance movement against the war in Vietnam, which has remained an 
important factor in determining the climate of opinion in this country. But it is no 
secret that things have changed since then, that the adherents of nonviolence are 
on the defensive, and it would be futile to say that only the “extremists” are 
                                                
28 Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings, “On Politics and Violence: Arendt Contra Fanon,” 
Contemporary Political Theory 7 (2008): 91. 
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yielding to a glorification of violence and have discovered–like Fanon’s 
Algerian peasants–that “only violence pays.”29 
Arendt’s words here portray an appreciation of nonviolence, foreshadowing her ultimate 
position in “On Violence,” that violence cannot heal the wounds it has created.30 As will 
be discussed below, they also anticipate the way in which nonviolence and, indeed, the 
liberal fixation on preventing certain kinds of violence, arose out of a “revulsion” against 
WWII. Third, this passage points to Arendt’s disagreement with Fanon, who sees a role 
for violence in the domestic, revolutionary setting. Regardless of these differences, a 
consideration of these thinkers will reveal the elements they share in their 
conceptualizations of violence: as directly applied and, much like the ethical new 
sciences of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Weber, as an intentioned means to an end. 
     Arendt herself, in “On Violence” and elsewhere, was concerned to separate the 
concept of violence from terms that philosophers and laypeople alike often use as 
                                                
29 Arendt, “On Violence,” in Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 
1972), 116. It is difficult to write about Arendt’s views of (student) militants without noting and 
disavowing her problematic double views on white and black militants. Many passages place 
these views into plain view; they can be found in appendices VI-VIII to “On Violence.” I quote 
another one to remind my reader of this element of Arendt’s thought: “It seems that the academic 
establishment, in its curious tendency to yield more to Negro demands, even if they are clearly 
silly and outrageous, than to the disinterested and usually highly moral claims of the white rebels, 
also thinks in these terms and feels more comfortable when confronted with interests plus 
violence than when it is a matter of nonviolent “participatory democracy” (121). Arendt here 
shames black militants for being violent, for making “silly outrageous demands,” while praising 
white militants for their disinterested and moral claims, which she seems to suggest are more 
universal and abstract, and therefore more valid. 
     On the general race problem in Arendt, see Kathryn Gines, Hannah Arendt and the Negro 
Question (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2014) and Jill Locke, “Little Rock’s Social Question: 
Reading Arendt on School Desegregation and Social Climbing,” Political Theory 41, no. 4 
(2013): 533-61. 
30 Arendt, “On Violence,” 122. 
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synonyms for it: power, strength, force, and authority.31 Her main concern is to 
distinguish violence, which requires technological implements and “is distinguished by 
its instrumental character,”32 from power, which “corresponds to the human ability not 
just to act but to act in concert” and is “never the property of an individual” but exists 
always in a collective or group.33 Violence here is as intentional as it is in the history of 
Western political thought on which Arendt builds (indeed, violence as intentional or as 
involving usefulness and planning sticks to almost every mention Arendt makes of the 
word), and as such does not get us to that of climate change. Indeed if we were to stick 
strictly to Arendt’s typology, we might read climate change as a force rather than as a 
violence: 
Force, which we often use in daily speech as a synonym for violence, especially if 
violence serves as a means of coercion, should be reserved, in terminological 
language, for the “forces of nature” or the “force of circumstances” (la force des 
choses), that is, to indicate the energy released by physical or social movements.34 
     Insofar, however, as climate change inverts and scatters our theoretical concepts, I 
here suggest that we retain “violence” when thinking about climate change in order to 
                                                
31 Ibid., 143-4. 
32 Ibid., 145. Witness as well Arendt’s statement that “Violence is by nature instrumental; like all 
means, it always stands in need of guidance and justification through the end it pursues” in ibid., 
150. 
33 Ibid., 143. 
34 Ibid., 143-4. Indeed Arendt consistently thinks about these natural or circumstantial “forces” in 
a somewhat surprisingly apolitical way. This extends to problems like climate change: “the 
disintegration processes which have become so manifest in recent years–the decay of public 
services … the pollution of air and water–are the automatic results of the needs of mass societies 
that have become unmanageable” (181). In an intuitive sense Arendt is right here. Yet she is too 
willing to give up on the promise that politics might have some ways of countering the 
‘automatic’ processes of mass society. 
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hold onto its urgency and the extent to which it actively harms human and nonhuman 
communities alike, even as we recognize that this particular instance of violence is no 
longer the direct, intentional phenomena that political theory has equipped us to consider. 
To be sure, Arendt’s context – a century of revolution and war – helps to explain her 
fixation on direct forms of violence and her will to define violence as such; it needn’t, 
however, determine that we do so as well. 
     To Arendt, Franz Fanon either “glorified violence for violence’s sake”35 or he thought 
that “only violence pays.”36 Commenting on Arendt and Fanon, Christopher Finlay writes 
that “instrumental justification … appears as a key criterion for Arendt in distinguishing 
her account of permissible violence from the theories of Sorel, Fanon and others.”37 If 
Arendt’s first reading is right, then there is little to say about Fanon other than that he, 
personally, was attracted to violence. Any reader of Fanon who pays attention, however, 
will recognize the weakness of this first reading.38 Instead, we should read Fanon along 
the lines of Arendt’s second reading of him, as someone who sees that violence pays: that 
it has concrete uses, that is is a useful, direct tool or phenomena.39 Like Arendt, then, and 
                                                
35 Ibid., 162. 
36 Franz Fanon, quoted in ibid., 116. 
37 Christopher J. Finlay, “Hannah Arendt’s Critique of Violence,” Thesis Eleven 97, no 1 (2009): 
29. 
38 Indeed even Arendt seems to suggest that this reading of Fanon wouldn’t hold up, and applies it 
instead to the student movements in the US that were associated with the Black Panthers and who 
were under the influence of Fanon’s writings. In reference to The Wretched of the Earth, Arendt 
writes “I am using this work because of its great influence on the present student generation. 
Fanon himself, however, is much more doubtful about violence than his admirers” (“On 
Violence” 116fn19). 
39 Though I will partially grant another of Arendt’s points about Fanon, that he was “motivated by 
a much deeper hatred of bourgeois society and [was] led to a much more radical break with its 
moral standards than the conventional Left, which was chiefly inspired by compassion and a 
burning desire for justice” (162). My only objection is that the “bourgeois society” about which 
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like Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Weber before them, Fanon sees an instrumentality in 
violence conceived as an intentional and direct, even instrumental, thing. Furthermore, 
each of these thinkers connects this instrumentality to broader ethical frameworks and 
uses and abuses of violence. Per Finlay, Fanon adds to his “legitimist and determinist 
lines of justification a further, instrumentalist line which, at least at first glance, seems to 
be consistent with Arendt’s view.”40 Despite disagreement, the two seem to hold in 
common the view that violence is at least primarily instrumental. For Arendt this comes 
in the form of its dependence on tools and technologies; for Fanon the instrumentality of 
violence has to do with broader postcolonial and anticolonial goals. 
     Fanon’s “On Violence,” the lead chapter in The Wretched of the Earth, is well known. 
There, Fanon argues for the usefulness of counter violence as a force against colonial 
violence, a usefulness that also includes an ethical injunction that the colonized world be 
free from the colonizer. Where Fanon differs from Arendt, and indeed goes beyond the 
other theorists of violence discussed in this section, is in his explicit recognition of the 
“atmospheric” or structural violence of the colonial setting.41 While one thread of 
Fanonian violence is the instrumental and direct form discussed above, a second form 
also inheres in his writings. Consider his description of the colonial setting: 
In the colonial world, the colonized’s affectivity is kept on edge like a running 
sore flinching from a caustic agent. And the psyche retracts, is obliterated, and 
finds an outlet through muscular spasms that have caused many an expert to 
                                                                                                                                            
Arendt speaks never seems to have been inspired by a “burning desire for justice,” at least not in 
the context of Fanon’s Algeria. 
40 Finlay, “Arendt’s Critique,” 30. 
41 Franz Fanon, “On Violence,” in The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: 
Grove Press, 2004), 31 and throughout. 
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classify the colonized as hysterical. This overexcited affectivity, spied on by 
invisible guardians who constantly communicate with the core of the personality, 
takes an erotic delight in the muscular deflation of the crisis.42 
Here Fanon draws on his psychoanalytic (“embodied and libidinal”)43 approach to the 
colony in order to connect a background atmosphere of violence to concrete and 
particular impacts on the colonized’s psyches, muscular systems, affect, and so on. In 
doing so he suggests that decolonial counter violence, intentional and direct, is closely 
bound to an atmosphere of violence imposed by the colonial administration and by the 
enactments of superiority on behalf of the colonizer (along with its flip side, which 
“dehumanizes the colonial subject”).44 In adding the atmospheric dimension, however, 
Fanon only starts to radically change the traditional view of violence. Rather, he makes a 
psychological and ethical case that counterviolence is defensible. He does so in order that 
counterviolence might be made intelligible to what Arendt would call the “conventional 
Left” and desirable to the decolonial left in Algeria. Violence in itself remains a direct 
and intentional tool. 
Liberal Violence 
     In late 20th century iterations of political thought, and in keeping with globally 
hegemonic norms, violence comes to be understood in a largely liberal vein. Just as 
Arendt wrote her reflections “against the background of the twentieth century … a 
century of wars and revolutions,”45 late 20th century liberalism is grounded in post WWII 
                                                
42 Ibid., 19. 
43 Frazer and Hutchings, “On Politics and Violence,” 93. 
44 Ibid., 7. 
45 Arendt, “On Violence,” 105. 
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and especially post-holocaust experience and ethics. Writing on the ways that liberal 
violence interacts with private military and security companies, Andrew Alexandra 
speaks matter of factly about “the emergence of a broadly liberal conception of justified 
political violence during the twentieth century and especially after World War II” 
according to which “an individual’s basic rights–such as the rights to bodily integrity and 
autonomy–entail that others are not justified in using violence either as an end in itself or 
as a means to the achievement of some pre-existing end, where doing so would violate 
the rights of the subject of violence.”46 Robert Meister writes, with more vivid language 
and taking human rights discourse to be a generalized and liberal response to past evils, 
that: 
Unlike earlier versions of human rights that sought to hasten the advance of social 
equality, today’s commitment to human rights often seeks to postpone large-scale 
redistribution. It is generally more defensive than utopian, standing for the 
avoidance of evil rather than a vision of the good …. By the time the cold war 
ended … references to the twentieth century as “a century of genocide” had 
become commonplace, and its atrocities were condemned as incontestable 
paradigms of evil that transcended cultural, religious, and ideological difference. 
The denunciation of physical atrocity as such became an essential element in the 
fin de siècle conception of what it means to be human, and the foundational 
premise of human rights advocacy.47 
     Inherent in this conception liberal violence, to Alexandra, and of human rights 
                                                
46 Andrew Alexandra, “Private Military and Security Companies and the Liberal Conception of 
Violence,” Criminal Justice Ethics 31, no. 3 (2012): 159-60. 
47 Robert Meister, After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (New York: Columbia UP, 2011), 1. 
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discourse, to Meister, is a picture of violence as almost exclusively physical and direct, 
and the parallel conceptualization of a response to such violence as being comprised of 
defensive (or in the neoconservative logic, preemptive) reactions rather the utopian 
yearnings that earlier (Marxist and non Marxist) political actors had envisioned. My 
purpose in this section is to show the ways in which liberal conceptions of violence more 
broadly see it as a physical problem, one applied to individual bodies or collections of 
individual bodies rather than, say, to communities, cultures, or even to contending visions 
of and ideologies for political life.48 As important as it is to reduce such instances of 
direct, physical violence, thinkers who decline to go beyond it miss much of what would 
otherwise concern them: instances of harm and deprivation that are only visible or 
intelligible once indirect violence against groups is considered. 
     Where Arendt was concerned to think through the violence of the 20th century in order 
to ultimately ask what a positive response to violence might look like in the time of 
student movements facing identity crises in the move from the late 1960s to early 1970s, 
as Meister suggests, postwar liberalism’s concerns with violence have been sounded in a 
primarily negative key. The goal of liberal politics and ethics has been to prevent harm to 
                                                
48 The association of violence with physical harm applied to individuals predates contemporary 
liberalism, of course. John Stuart Mill’s harm principle contains the same assumptions. In On 
Liberty, Mill writes that “The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as 
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion 
and control, whether the means used be physical force … or the moral coercion of public opinion. 
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, 
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” “On Liberty,” On Liberty and Other Writings, ed. 
Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 13. Mill’s harm principle thus figures violence 
as “physical force” (even as he includes moral coercion along side it) just as his concern with it is 
that it be applied to too many individual bodies, for the wrong reasons, etc. 
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individual bodies, with violence conceived as direct threats to such individuals. In turn, 
harm afflicted on individual bodies has come to take up much of the globalized collective 
imaginary of violence (found, for example, in visions of global governance and expressed 
doctrinally in the Responsibility to Protect) to the extent that it has become the de facto 
way of defining and understanding violence not only to self-identified liberals but also to 
all of us who act and live as if our beliefs and worldviews were indeed inherited from 
liberalism. 
     Another way of making this last point is to say that, in terms of how we understand 
violence, we are all liberals now. Per Raymond Geuss, “liberal ideas permeate our social 
world and our everyday expectations about how people and institutions will and ought to 
act; they constitute the final framework within which our political thinking moves.”49 As 
such, the liberal view of violence is rightly positioned alongside those views previously 
discussed, as part of the background against which climate change as violence might 
clearly be seen. Judith Shklar and John Rawls are two of the most prominent and most 
sophisticated postwar liberals: to get a good grasp on the theoretical foundations of 
liberal violence, I now turn to their thoughts. 
     Shklar’s connection to liberalism and her standing as one of liberalism’s finest and 
most formidable defenders “without illusions” is patently clear. Per Quentin Skinner, 
“Dita always presented herself in her own political writings as a liberal: as someone 
                                                
49 Quoted in John Meyer, Engaging the Everyday: Environmental Social Criticism and the 
Resonance Dilemma (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 29. Meyer’s point in quoting Geuss is 
to refute him, and to argue that, at the level of the everyday, even liberal societies are made up of 
a great number of practices both liberal illiberal and aliberal, and that focusing directly on such 
practices removes the necessity of deciding whether or not “liberalism” as such matters to any 
great degree. For this argument, see Chapter 2 of Engaging the Everyday, “We Have Never Been 
Liberal.”
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whose historical interests centered on the origins of liberalism, and whose main 
concern as a moralist was to vindicate what she eventually called, in a now-famous 
phrase, the liberalism of fear.”50 This means that Shklar's work is a valuable resource for 
examining how liberalism came to think about itself generally.  Her views on the 
centrality of violence, while not themselves simple or simplistic, can be neatly read out of 
her 1982 essay “Putting Cruelty First.”51 
     Shklar’s move of putting cruelty first, along with her take on violence, comes out of a 
revolt against the Machiavellian view discussed above. Where Machiavelli accepts the 
use of violence by the prince, Shklar’s move is to ask what becomes of the recipient of 
such violence: 
In The Prince, Machiavelli had asked whether it was more efficient for a self-
made ruler to govern cruelly or leniently, and had decided that, on the whole, 
cruelty worked best. Montaigne raised the question that the prince’s victims might 
ask: Was it better to plead for pity or to display defiance in the face of cruelty? 
There are no certain answers, he concluded. Victims have no certainty … putting 
cruelty first was thus a reaction to the new science of politics.52 
In this staged encounter, Shklar is doing more than putting Montaigne and Machiavelli 
into conversation in the service of historical interest. Rather, she is espousing and giving 
form to the liberal view in which violence applied to the individual, which might always 
appear arbitrary, is the worst possible thing, with “nothing above it, and with nothing to 
                                                
50 Quentin Skinner, “Thomas Hobbes’s Antiliberal Theory of Liberty,” in Liberalism without 
Illusions: Essays on Liberal Theory and the Political Vision of Judith S. Shklar, ed. Bernard Yack 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 149. 
51 Shklar, “Putting Cruelty First.” 
52 Ibid., 18. 
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excuse of forgive” it.53 While it was developed over and against Machiavellianism, 
however, Shklar’s understanding of cruelty (and the violence that constitutes cruelty), 
mirrors Machiavelli’s. Rather than offering a different conceptualization, the liberalism 
of fear simply switches moral sides in arguing, in the mold of Mill, that violence ought be 
kept to a minimum and that unnecessary violence is a stain on liberal society. 
     Rawls is notable not only for the extent to which his views of violence conform with 
how I have been discussing liberal violence, but also for the paucity of the term in his 
work. In Political Liberalism, for example, I count two uses of the term. The first comes 
early, in the claim that “the wars of this [20th] century with their extreme violence and 
increasing destructiveness, culminating in the manic evil of the Holocaust, raise in an 
acute way the question whether political relations must be governed by power and 
coercion alone.”54 Rawls here explicitly raises the problem of violence by reference to the 
Holocaust, even as his questioning leads him to the prospect, if not the conviction, that 
such violences might be controlled, dispelled, or perhaps prevented by coercive state 
power. 
     The second appearance in Political Liberalism comes nearer to the end of Rawls’s 
reflections, and holds that “a well-designed constitution tries to constrain the political 
leadership to govern with sufficient justice and good sense so that among a reasonable 
people such incitements to violence will seldom occur and never be serious.”55 Situating 
violence as a problem of and for constitutionalism, Rawls’s second mention turns from 
violence that is external to an individual state (as in his first use) to violence internal to a 
                                                
53 Ibid., 17. 
54 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia UP, 2005), lx. 
55 Ibid., 336. 
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liberal society. Within the liberal state, he suggests, any violence should be able to be 
taken care of through constitutional design aimed at restraining leadership to such a 
degree that it will not be able to produce unreasonable amounts of violence nor able to 
repress would-be perpetrators of violence to an undue degree. 
     In both Shklar and Rawls, the thinkers of 20th century liberalism, violence is imagined 
as a direct result of one party intending to and succeeding in harming another. Where the 
legitimacy of violence so central to early modern attempts to situate it in a science of 
politics has dropped out of the picture, a liberal ethics crops up in postwar liberalism that 
insists on putting cruelty, and the direct violence that inheres in cruelty, above other 
forms of harm. Nowhere in Shklar or Rawls, then, do we find any direct grounds for 
challenging our received interpretation of violence as a direct and intentional force. 
Violence Augmented? Environmental Scarcity and Climate Change 
     Where such thinkers have offered sweeping theories of violence, locating violence in 
the state, in moments of resistance, or in attacks on individual and thereby individuated 
bodies (putting cruelty first “leads to an ethic for isolates,” per Shklar),56 scholars who 
make arguments about the relationship between environmental degradation or climate 
change and violence have tended, with little exception, to decline to think deeply about 
their own use of “violence.”57 Rather, they have tended to look for empirical connections, 
or theories that explain such connections, between environmental degradation and the 
escalation of direct, intentional eruptions of violence. In other words, while the location 
                                                
56 Shklar, “Putting Cruelty First,” 22. 
57 A welcome exception, by which I am obviously influenced, is Vandana Shiva, The Violence of 
the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology, and Politics (London: Zed Books, 
1991). 
  
72 
of legitimate violence in the state has drifted out of political theoretic appraisals, the 
understanding of violence as direct and intentional has not been interrogated. Along with 
Parenti’s work discussed above, Thomas Homer-Dixon, in an oft-cited and paradigmatic 
work of this sort, characterizes it nicely. He situates his own Environment, Scarcity, and 
Violence, an early work in this approach, as an attempt to focus on “how environmental 
stress affects violent national and international conflict.”58  This approach, to Homer-
Dixon, “can say a good deal about how and where environmental stress–or what I have 
come to call “environmental scarcity”–contributes to social breakdown and violence.”59 
     Where the political theorists discussed above – despite important historical and 
contextual differences – agreed in conceptualizing violence as direct and intentional, we 
can now see how proponents of what we can now call the environmental scarcity 
approach accept a quite similar (and often implicit) definition of violence. Thinkers like 
Parenti and Homer-Dixon60 see the violence of climate change as something along the 
lines of (armed) conflict in which one agent or set of agents harm another in order to 
secure access to resources (in the face of real or imagined scarcity).61 Yet in the case of 
climate change, to say nothing of broader environmental concerns, there is more work for 
                                                
58 Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999), 
3. 
59 Ibid., 4. 
60 Along with a great many other authors. For a few examples, see Hans Günter Brauch and 
Jürgen Scheffran, “Introduction: Climate Change, Human Security, and Violent Conflict in the 
Anthropocene,” in Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict, ed. J. Scheffran et al. 
(Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2012), 3-40 and H.P. Harrod and D.L. Martin, “The Bioarchaeology of 
Climate Change and Violence: A temporal and Cross-Cultural Approach,” in Bioarchaeology of 
Climate Change and Violence (New York: SpringerBriefs in Anthropology and Ethics), 1-11. 
61 It is symptomatic that Parenti mentions Ugandans crossing the border to claim resources from 
neighboring Kenya rather than something like the more complex case of dispossession that took 
place at Mount Elgon. 
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the political theorist to do in conceptualizing violence. Where thinkers from 
Machiavelli to Rawls (despite important differences) agreed that violence was intentional 
and direct, I aver that we now need to invert our conception of violence in light of 
unintended consequences of the material, social, and political constellations of neoliberal 
capitalism in which humanity finds itself unevenly positioned and from which a changing 
climate emerges. The problem with arguments put forward by Parenti, Homer-Dixon, and 
others is not that they are wrong; it is that they are one-sided insofar as they look at the 
violent effects of climate change but not the violence of climate change itself. Regardless 
of whether or not a warming climate will mean more direct violence, another problem is 
raised by climate change: the dislocations, disruptions, and dispossessions that climate 
change is causing and will continue to cause are, by any measure, violent. Contrary to 
more familiar forms of violence, though, such as those said to increase in times of 
scarcity, they lack clearly defined (or better yet easily definable) agents and the 
intentionality that can be attributed to such agents. Climate change is itself the violence 
that does the harm; it stands in for the agent in those forms of violence that are more 
familiar historically speaking. 
     In my introductory chapter I suggested that climate change inverts and pressures us to 
alter some of our dearest assumptions in political theory. Violence is a case in point: the 
violence of climate change is clearly not the intentional violence of war, of the state, of 
attempts to change the course of history through revolution, or of the sort applied to 
individual and individuated bodies. It does not accord with what Yves Winter calls 
“positivist conceptions of violence,” which “restrict violence to the intentional, direct, 
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immediate, and visible infliction of physical harm, the assault or encroachment on the 
physical integrity of another human being or his or her property.”62 Yet as Kivalina 
shows us, it clearly is violence. Likewise, ours is a time (in the American political 
context, at least) in great need of ways to think about violence without intention – to 
think of violence beyond these inherited definitions. Frazer and Hutchings, writing on 
Arendt and Fanon, summarize the two views of violence against which I wish to define 
the violence of climate change in the remainder of this chapter. They note that: 
For some political theorists and philosophers, it is taken for granted, one way or 
another, that violence and politics are inextricably intertwined. For others, it is 
crucial to keep the two clearly apart, and to set politics up – conceptually, 
theoretically, practically – as antithetical to violence.63 
Yet the violence of climate change is neither direct nor intentional. Rather, it is has to do 
with unintended consequences: it arises out of myriad (productive and consumptive; 
everyday) behaviors that are often spatially and temporally distant from its effects.64 I 
suggest that we can refer to this kind of environmental violence as such when, because of 
environmental degradation – in this case GHG emissions – harm is inflicted on 
                                                
62 Yves Winter, “Violence and Visibility,” New Political Science 34, no. 2 (2012), 196. 
63 Frazer and Hutchings, “On Politics and Violence,” 90. 
64 I am inspired by John Meyer to use the language of consequences / consequentialism. Drawing 
on James Dewey, Meyer writes that “By directing our attention to the consequences of human 
actions, Dewey argues that the very definition of “the public … consists of all those who are 
affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary 
to have those consequences systematically cared for.” In Meyer, Engaging the Everyday, 85. I 
will return to this conception of “the public” in my fifth chapter. For now suffice it to say that my 
conceptualization of climate change as violence owes much to this idea that we ought look at 
consequences of actions rather than (only) intentions when adjudicating political claims and 
attempting to politicize (otherwise purely scientific, environmental, or technocratic) issues such 
as climate change. 
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individuals, communities, or cultures, and when their state of being is thereby 
impacted.65 Environmental violence, therefore, cannot be coupled to or decoupled from 
politics at will (as can some of the intentioned kinds of violence described above). 
Rather, environmental violence is political insofar as its causes arise in one time and 
place and its impacts descend in another. It involves relations of power between disparate 
peoples, power that is at once economic, social, physical, and political. 
     In what follows, I conceptualize the violence of climate change more concretely. I see 
it operating in three primary ways (though it is important to note that these are not the 
only possible ways): dislocation, disruption and dispossession. Dislocation occurs when, 
as in the case of Kivalina, a set of people are made to leave their place of residence 
because of a degraded environment.66 Dispossession is more pointed. The case of Mount 
Elgon, the UWA, and the Benet people provides a paradigm case where, due to attempts 
to respond to climate change, a people is forcibly removed from its land in order that 
climate responses may be instituted. Disruption is more broad than either, and has to do 
with interruptions to well-being, to ways of life, to health, and so on. Each of these, in 
interrelated ways, arises out of the indirect and unintended violence of climate change to 
which I now turn directly. 
III. A Violence Indirect and Unintended 
     In order to shine light on violence that is largely invisible from the perspective of the 
                                                
65 Thanks to Joan Tronto for this formulation, and for pushing me to define my use of violence 
more generally. 
66 For a similar example that uses the language of displacement rather than dislocation, and is set 
against the backdrop of Katrina, see Peter Cannavò, “In the Wake Of Katrina: Climate Change 
and the Coming Crisis of Displacement” in Political Theory and Global Climate Change, ed. 
Steve Vanderheiden (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 177-200. 
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history of Western political thought discussed above, I now turn to a more recent set of 
thinkers, albeit one that stretches back to the late 1960s, who provide conceptual leverage 
with which to pry open those sorts of violence that are neither direct nor intentional. In 
contrast to the legacies discussed above, these thinkers allow for a theorization that helps 
us grasp conceptually the violence of climate change, my ultimate task in this chapter. To 
this end, Johan Galtung’s theory of structural violence opens up the possibility that 
violence happens apart from clearly defined agents. Iris Marion Young, likewise, helps 
flesh out the ethical implications of structural violence-as-injustice. And by tweaking 
Galtung’s structural violence, Rob Nixon’s writings on slow violence reveal an important 
temporal dimension of environmental violence that brings us closer to the problem of 
climate change. Each of these approaches help us to move safely away from the pitfalls 
provocatively raised by Ruth Miller in a somewhat different context. There, she poses an 
important question: “Why do even the most careful and critical descriptions of violence, 
and even those most wary of models of autonomous sovereign subjectivity, seem so often 
reducible to descriptions of victims, of perpetrators, and of methods of helping or 
punishing them?”67 
     I do not advocate that analyses of climate change completely abandon questions of 
agency, victims, perpetrators, and so on, nor do I think methods of helping those 
impacted by the violence of climate change or punishing those most directly responsible 
should be abandoned (these questions are discussed in my Chapters 4 and 5). Yet I am 
sympathetic to the spirit of Miller’s question, and suggest that a conceptualization of 
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climate change as violence ought to decenter these categories in order to slowly edge 
toward making ethical and political claims that get beyond already gridlocked debates, if 
only to come back to them with a fresh set of claims. An example of such debates could 
be the degree to which developing states ought to show their good faith by reigning in 
GHG emissions in the immediate rather than distant future. Put more simply, I want to 
conceptualize the violence of climate change in an a way that accords with Andrew 
Dilts’s formulation of the root-concern behind a recent symposium on Johan Galtung, 
which holds that “if we, as political scientists, limit ourselves to an analytic of violence 
that points solely to agents and intentions, we are sure to miss the pervasive forms of 
violence that are “built into”” myriad levels of common experience.68  This concern 
involves coming up with ways of understanding violence beyond the “liability-based 
models of agency and force” prominent in juridical and ordinary thinking and compatible 
with the bulk of the political theoretic ways of thinking about violence rehearsed above.69 
Turning to the following thinkers helps us in this regard. 
     One way of thinking in this direction is to think back to Galtung’s theory of structural 
violence: a violence that arises out of collectively reified (and therefore seldom 
questioned) everyday practices and ways of doing business, commerce, production, 
consumption, transportation, etc. Indeed political theorists have convincingly made the 
case that structural violence à la Galtung remains a valuable (if contested) starting point 
                                                
68 Andrew Dilts, “Revisiting Johan Galtung’s Concept of Structural Violence,” New Political 
Science 34, no. 2 (2012), 191. 
69 Ibid. 
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for thinking about broad, diffused, and de-centered forms of violence.70 Per Galtung, 
violence occurs when human potential is diminished, and when this could have been 
otherwise. “Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the 
actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance.”71 
     While I take Galtung’s point, I prefer to think of the violence of climate change as that 
which dislocates, disrupts, or dispossesses. At any rate, structural violence is opposed to 
personal (direct, intentional) violence in which one subject acts violently against another, 
and is defined as violence “where there is no such actor.”72 Climate change would seem 
to fit this definition, insofar as no individual (nor apparently any state, corporation, or 
collection of shareholders) is directly responsible for, say, the increase in erosion that has 
rendered Kivalina uninhabitable and its people potentially dislocated. Rather, that 
violence depends on structural conditions and configurations organized such that 
individually insignificant GHG emissions combine to produce a threatening outcome. 
     Galtung’s later work may interrupt this interpretation. In a 1992 speech, Galtung 
suggests that environmental violence (and there he is not discussing climate change 
particularly, but a wide range of depletions and pollutions committed by corporate 
perpetrators) is essentially a direct form of violence. Having asked his audience whether 
environmental violence is direct, structural, and / or cultural, he tells them that “here it is 
essentially direct. But the State-Capital alliance will try to transform it into structural 
violence, as something “global” that just happens, built in to the system, unintended and 
                                                
70 See Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 
(1969): 167-91. See also the symposium in New Political Science 34, no. 2 (2012), edited by 
Yves Winter. Thanks to David Temin for this resource. 
71 Galtung, “Violence,” 168. 
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working with long time lags; thereby again getting capital off the hook legally 
speaking.”73 Galtung is here concerned not to let states or capital ‘off the hook’ by 
naturalizing, universalizing, or globalizing the environmental violence that is actually 
more directly attributable to perpetrators. His concern is that, by equating environmental 
violence with structural violence, it will be naturalized and allowed to recede into the 
background. I certainly share this concern, even as I do not think structural violence will 
necessarily appear natural, especially in light of a political project that aims to keep it 
visible and highlight its causes. 
     Likewise, when we focus more directly on the problem of climate change, and the 
violence of climate change, the idea that such violence is direct (as Galtung seemed to 
imply in 1992) becomes problematic. Here the problem is not that of a state-corporate 
alliance leading to the dumping of toxic waste in or around a poor community. In the case 
of climate change agency is dispersed more than it is, say, when a CEO decides to dump 
toxins into a particular river. In the case of climate change, capital is at fault to be sure, 
but it is less clear that particular capitalists can be seen as perpetrators, or that that 
language is the most useful for analyzing the problem (a concern raised by Ruth Miller, 
above).74 Still, Galtung’s caution is one among a few reasons that we ought not read 
climate change as a “structural violence” strictly speaking. 
     Iris Marion Young, focusing on ‘structural injustice’ but writing in the tradition of 
                                                
73 Galtung, “Eco-Logic and Politico-Logic: Are They Compatible?” Lecture given at the 
University of Trier on 9 December 1992, http://www.uni-trier.de/fileadmin/forschung/ 
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structural violence75 further clarifies the following contours of the latter: 
Structural injustice … exists when social processes put large groups of persons 
under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to 
dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising 
capacities available to them. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct 
from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a 
state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and 
institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part 
within the limits of accepted rules and norms.76 
I take the following elements to be important to Young’s discussion of structural injustice 
/ violence. First, large groups of people are negatively impacted, whereas other groups 
benefit from the policies and practices in question. Second, structural injustices are 
different from personal ones, in which a perpetrator directly and explicitly harms a 
victim. Finally, structural injustice arises when people follow most or all of the rules 
known to them. Climate change, and the injustices associated with it, again seems to fit 
with these elements of structural injustice, as large swaths of people are impacted while 
others benefit, the harms associated with climate change are not easily reduced to the 
perpetrator-victim framework, and climate change arises when the rules and (hegemonic) 
norms of contemporary life are followed. Again, climate change would seem to fit 
                                                
75 This conceptual leap from violence to injustice, and therefore the textual leap from Galtung to 
Young, is authorized by Galtung himself: “In order not to overwork the word violence we shall 
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171. Emphasis in original. 
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Young’s conception of structural injustice that is itself indebted to Galtung’s structural 
violence. 
     Yet structural violence as a conceptual term might not be enough to capture all of the 
important aspects of climate change. I thus appreciate the move in Slow Violence and the 
Environmentalism of the Poor, by which Rob Nixon expresses debt to and appreciation 
for Galtung’s older (1969) formulation of structural violence even as he wishes to expand 
upon it in order to get at the kinds of environmental violence that are the subject of Slow 
Violence.  
     So Galtung’s original formulation requires tweaking in order for it to shine light on 
the violence of climate change as I am wont to do. As Nixon highlights, “for all the 
continuing pertinence of the theory of structural violence … the notion bears the impress 
of its genesis during the high era of structuralist thinking that tended toward a static 
determinism.”77 As such it does not give enough attention to a temporal dimension of 
violence: to the slow unfolding and often delayed disruptions and dispossessions brought 
about by climatic changes. Writing on environmental degradation and its human toll in 
the postcolony, Nixon has proposed a theory of slow violence that helps to better account 
for the temporally insidious kinds of violence entailed by environmental degradation than 
does structural violence alone. Per Nixon, slow violence is a violence that “occurs 
gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time 
and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all.”78 Albeit 
lethargically, slow violence is violence that moves, that is neither static nor deterministic. 
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Recall here for contrast Galtung’s statement that “structural violence is silent, it does 
not show – it is essentially static, it is the tranquil waters.”79 Nixon’s claim thus leads me 
to suggest that the concept of structural violence allows us to focus adequately on the 
spatial elements of violence, yet inadequately on the temporal ones, insofar as the 
violence of climate change is neither ‘silent’ nor ‘static’: even those tranquil waters are 
comprised of circulating currents.80 However subtly, the violence of climate change is 
noisy and in motion. The value-added that the concept of slow violence provides in 
relation to structural violence is that it works “to foreground questions of time, 
movement, and change, however gradual.”81 Slow violence helps us move from thinking 
about non-personal violences that arise out of static and spatial backgrounds to thinking 
about them as emerging material processes that unfold and change in time and across 
space. Less a refutation of Galtung’s concept, Nixon’s work torques it in order to better 
describe the emerging specter of environmental violence.82 
     As such, the concept of slow violence helps to conceptualize the violence of climate 
change, even as it shares much with the concerns of Galtung and Young to theorize 
political phenomena structurally rather than personally. It does so by introducing the 
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problem of temporality into the conceptualization of (otherwise largely but not 
completely spatial) structural violence. Moving forward, I use the term ‘climate violence’ 
to gather existing theories of structural and slow violence together, and to allow for 
conceptual and grammatical precision in the remainder of this dissertation. 
IV. Conclusion: Climate Change as Indirect Violence 
I wanted to disseminate a flexible, mobile catch phrase–slow violence–that other 
activists and scholars could pick up and use adaptively.83 
 
Everything now hinges on making a definition of ‘violence’ … however, it is not 
so important to arrive at anything like the definition, or the typology – for there 
are obviously many types of violence. More important is to indicate theoretically 
significant dimensions of violence that can lead thinking, research and, 
potentially, action, towards the most important problems.84 
 
     Moving away from canonical approaches to violence, and positioned orthogonally to 
the theorization of climate change as leading to increases in violences which would have 
occurred albeit to a lesser degree, I maintain that climate violence should be thought of as 
unintended and indirect. As such, climate violence can still be seen as unnatural and as 
having particular causes, even as those who are ultimately found to be the worst 
offenders do not need to have intentionally committed any acts in order to be deemed 
responsible for those acts. When coastlines erode, when water sources deplete, when 
ocean acidification pushes out sources of sustenance, and so on, violence is very much 
present insofar as human and other communities suffer the consequences of dislocation, 
disruption, and / or dispossession. Yet intention and agency are difficult to locate here, 
and it is perhaps fruitless to do so in some cases of extreme complexity (even if it is 
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politically desirable to locate intention, agency, blame, etc.). I gather the work of 
Galtung, Young, and Nixon into my conception of climate violence insofar as each of 
these thinkers help us edge away from the view that climate change (only) augments 
other direct and intentional violences, as well as from the view of violence as (only) a 
tool that the state uses to achieve its aims, a means to revolt, or physical pain applied to 
individuals. Climate violence contrasts with these received ways of thinking about 
violence: Galtung, to drive home the point, wrote that across many uses of violence, 
“violence is not an end, but rather a means to overcome obstacles impeding the 
realization of a future order, the millennium, the communist society, etc; these future 
orders do not seem to contain violence.”85 Whether or not a certain ideology endorses 
violence is not of concern here. Rather, note that Galtung implies that violence (of the 
direct sort at least) is either a means or an end. In describing the violence of climate 
change as unintended I mean at least two things. 
     First, climate change is synonymous with the violence it produces: it does not lead to 
violence, it is violence. Next, this violence is neither a means nor an end, as each of these 
categories would imply intention and avowal (or disavowal), qualities that are by and 
large lacking or only weakly present in relation to climate change. Lacking intention and 
existing as neither means nor end, the particular violence of climate change presents a 
need to rethink the ethics and politics that surround it: if we cannot simply isolate and 
punish perpetrators, how can responsibility and political responses to climate change be 
organized? At stake here is not merely a question of whether the violence of climate 
change is the right or wrong thing to do. Instead, when thinking about the violence of 
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climate change we must think about what happens regardless of individual beliefs and 
intentions. As Winter suggests, “whether a person is killed by a shotgun or by the 
deprivation of the basic necessities of life is irrelevant. Individual agency and legal 
responsibility are unsatisfactory criteria for determining the incidence of violence.”86 
Whether a person is starved by the outright refusal of food or by the slow degradation of 
land’s ability to provide is irrelevant. Individual agency and legal responsibility are 
unsatisfactory criteria for determining whether climate change is a violent matter. 
     Yet this expansive view of climatic violence, paired with the broad definition of 
violence from which I started above, might lead us to a series of epistemological 
questions: how do we know when violence is present at all? if climate change, 
unintended and unintentional, is a violence, then who isn’t impacted? what, in such a 
world, isn’t violence? Furthermore, critics might ask, why shouldn’t we simply assume 
(from now on, at least) that any actions that contribute to climate change will be known as 
violent actions in a direct and intentional sense? These are, to be sure, important 
questions and potential ways of shifting our knowledge and sense of blame in order to 
make climate change fit with the kinds of violence discussed above. Yet I suggest that, 
rather than epistemological questions to be settled through philosophical reflection, these 
are actually political questions. In other words, we can know that violence is present, that 
climate change is violence, and who exactly is impacted through that violence when 
people bring those concerns into politics – when people act to create these political 
problems. At the level of political theory, this dissertation is partially an attempt to name 
this process. 
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     Likewise, to the question of whether climate change might be reconceptualized as a 
direct form of violence, I answer that this is possible (though not likely), even as I insist 
that that too would be a political move. Discussing the difference between direct and 
indirect forms of violence, of course, raises the political question of power: the power to 
decide whether violence is present, direct, indirect, and so on. As in Shklar’s extended 
and illuminating discussion of the difference between injustice and misfortune, the 
question of the presence of violence and whether such violence is direct or indirect is in 
large part “a question of who has the power to define the meaning of actions.”87 Clearly a 
great number of entities currently have this power, not least among them states, 
corporations, the United Nations, mass media, and so on. In terms of ideology (as I will 
argue in the next chapter), neoliberalism has a firm grasp on much of this power. Yet (as 
I will argue in Chapter 5) individuals and groups acting in concert might also take some 
of this power and thus render it more democratic. So while these questions of defining 
violence and of who gets to define violence are of great importance, we can still say with 
Galtung that we do not need to settle on one definition, one answer to any of these 
questions. Rather, we ought keep them in mind whenever we confront particular political 
claims about what is and is not violence, and what violence is intended or not. 
     For just as there is no single cause of climate change, there is no single answer as to 
whether or not its violence is intentional. Sometimes we might be able to say that, 
knowing what we know now, we ought read it as such. Yet for much of the history of 
carbon emissions, and for many people operating today, this likely does not apply. The 
unintended violence of climate change, rather, arises from a great many subjects with 
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fractured and minuscule amounts of agency, each intending by and large to follow the 
rules and norms of contemporary industrial and postindustrial society. Gathered into my 
concept of climate violence, then, are the concepts of structural violence, structural 
injustice, and slow violence. Insofar as climate change is a spatial and temporal 
problem,88 slowly and unevenly unfolding over great expanses of time and space, we 
need a way of thinking and talking about it that recognizes its complexity. Driven by 
dairy farms in California as much as coal plants in China, individual light bulb 
preferences as well as corporate quests to open Alaskan wildlife refuges to drilling, and 
so on, climate change is a violence the sources of which are perpetually rendered abstract 
and which perpetually shift. 
     While the theorists of violence who opened this chapter differ on many things, they 
agree on at least one. Violence, from Machiavelli to Rawls, is of political concern, even 
as it raises ethical considerations. In arguing that we ought conceptualize climate change 
as a problem of indirect violence that is at once structural and slow, I have meant to bring 
climate change into the realm of the everyday, interpreting it as an explicitly ethical and 
political problem, one that exceeds its usual place as a problem for technology or, at best, 
of elite politics (think here of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the other relevant constellation of NGOs, IGOs, etc. that contribute to 
projects like that of creating a carbon-offset project in Mount Elgon National Park, 
Uganda). In my next chapter, I turn more directly to the dominant climate imaginary 
before returning in subsequent chapters to the ways in which our thinking around 
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responsibility and democracy might shift once climatic change is recognized as 
indirect violence.
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Chapter 3: The Dominant Climate Imaginary 
I. Introduction 
Never forget: for neoliberals, the preordained answer to any problem, economic 
or otherwise, is more markets.1 
 
The groundbreaking report from Sir Nicholas Stern, released in October 2006, 
shows clearly that it [climate change] is a serious economic threat, not just a 
scientific concern. In his comprehensive report for the U.K. Government, the 
former chief economist at the World Bank describes climate change as “the 
greatest market failure the world has seen.”2 
 
The final neoliberal fallback is geoengineering, which derives from the core 
neoliberal doctrine that entrepreneurs, unleashed to exploit acts of creative 
destruction, will eventually innovate market solutions to address dire economic 
problems. This is the whiz-bang futuristic science fiction side of neoliberalism, 
which appeals to male adolescents and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs almost as 
much as do the novels of Ayn Rand.3 
 
It is possible to cool the planet by injecting reflective particles of sulfuric acid into 
the upper atmosphere where they would scatter a tiny fraction of incoming 
sunlight back to space, creating a thin sunshade for the ground beneath. To say 
that it’s “possible” understates the case: it is cheap and technically easy. The 
specialized aircraft and dispersal systems required to get started could be 
deployed in a few years for the price of a Hollywood blockbuster.4 
 
     In my last chapter I suggested that climate change should be conceptualized as a 
problem of indirect violence because it disrupts people’s lives, dislocates, and 
dispossesses them, all in the absence of clearly defined agents. In the two chapters 
following this one, I turn to the implications of this re-conceptualization for thinking 
about responsibility and the complications that climate violence presents to democratic 
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3 Mirowski, Crisis, 340. 
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theory and politics, respectively. This chapter, literally in this dissertation and 
metaphorically in climate politics, comes between Chapter 2 and Chapters 4 and 5. It 
deals with factors countervailing to or prohibitive of the ethical and political possibilities 
that I discuss in the next two chapters. It does so by critiquing the ideologies and 
practices that arise out of the dominant imaginary, and pointing to some of the most 
dramatic pitfalls of starting from such practices. 
     I borrow the chapter’s starting point from Philip Mirowski, who argues that 
neoliberalism prescribes markets first and foremost, and technology if and when markets 
cannot address problems sufficiently. The forces discussed in this chapter all reflect and 
re-entrench a dominant image of climate change (discussed in Chapter 1) that runs 
counter to my conceptualization of climate violence. Such forces impede the ethical and 
political arguments that comprise the next chapters. 
     Yet I also push back on Mirowski’s claim that technology – geoengineering in the 
case of climate change – is simply part and parcel of the ‘neoliberal playbook.’ I take his 
point that both neoliberalism and techno-optimism rely on a narrative of ‘unleashed 
entrepreneurs,’ who rush in to remedy what politics ‘cannot,’ even as I insist that 
important differences between the two persist. Lumping the two together under a singular 
heading misses the fact that there are two co-operational logics at play, and thus limits the 
usefulness of the critique. As such, I argue that Mirowski’s commentary on climate 
change actually points to two more or less distinct components of the dominant climate 
imaginary: neoliberalism and managerialism. Where neoliberalism substitutes politics for 
markets, managerialism replaces politics with expertise and technical precision. 
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     My main goal in this chapter is to elucidate the dominant climate imaginary by 
clarifying these elements of it and pointing to their material and ideological stakes. Along 
the way I explore concrete examples of the kinds of depoliticized responses these logics 
generate, and show why and how they work to undermine a democratic climate politics. I 
turn to two controversial cases in order to dramatize the stakes and also to show how 
extreme some of the mainstream, business as usual responses to climate change can look 
when viewed with fresh eyes. Without rooting our proposals for climate responses in a 
thorough understanding of and encounter with the violence of climate change – as these 
approaches certainly do not – I argue that we are prone to embrace solutions that appeal 
to dominant ideologies without adequately interrogating the real human effects that they 
have (or, perhaps, lack). Returning to a passage highlighted in Chapter 1, such 
approaches ask us “to change radically, but within the contours of the existing state of the 
situation … so that nothing really has to change.”5 This chapter tries to make this case 
while interrogating such effects. 
     In Section two, I offer initial definitions and critiques of neoliberalism and 
managerialism. The third and fourth sections shift from initial definitions to concrete 
examples of neoliberal and managerial approaches to climate: the creation of ‘carbon 
finance’ markets and the reliance on expert technology through ‘geoengineering.’ I 
conclude by arguing that when approaches start from the dominant climate imaginary, 
they risk leaving the social and political problems of climate change unaddressed, aiming 
instead to mitigate rather than transform the root causes of climate violence. Closer 
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attention to managerialism, undertheorized in many studies that critique mainstream 
climate solutions along neoliberal lines alone, helps explain in greater detail why we 
should not expect the dominant climate imaginary to open up new spaces for democratic 
understandings and engagements, or even to maintain existing ones. 
II. Neoliberalism and Managerialism: An Ideology Critique 
     As I discuss in my first chapter, neoliberalism is an oft-noted component of the 
dominant climate imaginary. Indeed, it simultaneously animates and reinforces dominant 
responses to climate change exemplified by the UNFCCC. In this sense neoliberalism 
steers the collective global response. Yet existing critical approaches to climate change 
are too quick to consolidate multiple logics under the umbrella of neoliberalism. 
Expanding on Mirowski, I want to point to two distinct logics at play: one neoliberal and 
one managerial.6 
     To do so, I make use of a relatively straightforward if not simplistic Marxian method 
of ideology critique as elaborated by Bertell Ollman and Richard Lichtman in the latter’s 
Essays in Critical Social Theory. The continuing power of such a critique is that it helps 
us explain why logics that ostensibly aim at making some fundamental change so often 
end up reproducing more of the same. Take the fundamental example of a laborer who 
works so that they can leave a life of work behind, yet ends up working their whole life. 
What has happened? According to the liberal-bourgeois view, perhaps the individual 
failed to work hard enough, or perhaps they were simply unlucky. To a neoliberal, it 
would appear that they were not entrepreneurial enough, failed to take enough risk, or 
                                                
6 Special thanks to Bud Duvall for encouraging me to parse out the differences between 
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declined to tend closely enough to the portfolio that had come to stand in for their life.7 
Perhaps. Yet viewed through the lens of ideology critique, such an outcome can be 
understood as a structural tendency rather than an individual accident. 
     Consider a brief discussion of this process from Bertell Ollman, who notes that events 
“give rise to and require a set of beliefs and a way of thinking that make the production of 
commodities, the accumulation of capital, and the sale of labor power both possible and 
necessary.” “For example,” Ollman continues, “people cannot give up what they produce 
unless they consider that its relation to them is contingent, that it is not an essential part 
of their identity. However, seeing their product acquire forms independent of them and 
taking on roles over which they have no control reproduces in them just this belief.”8 
Where liberal-bourgeois ideology presents the making and then selling of goods as 
natural and, crucially, promises that doing so well will change one’s life for the better, a 
critique of this ideology uncovers a different story. In the latter story, people only make 
and sell because they have internalized the story told by capitalism. In doing so they have 
lost something essential, watched it grow independent of them, and in turn internalized a 
sense of powerlessness. 
     While the objects of analysis are seemingly quite different from the (overly simplified 
and stylized) example of an individual laborer, similar critiques can be made of neoliberal 
and managerial responses to climate change. In what follows I walk through these 
critiques of ideology before turning to the processes through which we learn to be 
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powerless in the face of climate change. If, with Marx via Lichtman, we insist that 
“consciousness is not autonomous and that it bears the imprint, or “reflects,” the material 
conditions of its existence,”9 what should we expect of collective political thinking about 
climate change in the context of neoliberalism and managerialism? 
Neoliberalism 
     Neoliberal responses to climate change, as with neoliberal projects generally, tend to 
reify and naturalize a set of dispositions toward markets, the state, and individuals. The 
neoliberal framework has seen no shortage of coverage in contemporary political and 
social theory. Here I briefly summarize this work in order to show how existing critiques 
apply to and are illuminated by the dominant response to anthropogenic climate change. 
     First and most basically, neoliberal responses rely on market forces to understand 
what would otherwise be political and social problems. Indeed, this is the kernel of 
neoliberalism that holds true across scholarly analysis of neoliberalism10 and political 
practice. 
     Accordingly, market forces provide neoliberals with what they claim to be the best 
available information, the closest approximation of ‘truth.’ Per Brown, drawing on 
Michel Foucault, “the market becomes the, rather than a site of veridiction and becomes 
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Political Theory 34, no. 6 (2006): 690-714; Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth 
Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 2015); Caitlin Janzen et al, eds., Unraveling Encounters: 
Ethics, Knowledge, and Resistance under Neoliberalism (Waterloo, ONT: Wilfrid Laurier UP, 
2015); Susan Braedley and Meg Luxton, Neoliberalism and Everyday Life (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s UP, 2010); Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derluguian, The Deepening Crisis: Governance 
Challenges after Neoliberalism (New York: NYU Press, 2011), for just a few examples. 
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so for every arena and type of human activity.”11 This mirrors Mirowski’s more 
general claim that neoliberalism credits itself (though not necessarily its individual 
adherents) with possessing the truest available information at any given time: the market 
is the “Ultimate Cyborg … in that it is literally taken to be smarter than any human being, 
and further, to convey just the right information to those who need it in real time.”12 
Nicolas Stern, author of the influential Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change, prepared for the Government of the United Kingdom, raised this possibility 
when he wrote about the need to construct “possible states of the world that might result 
from climate change” and held that “the basis of such probabilities should be up-to-date 
knowledge from science and economics” because otherwise “many of the ‘true’ 
uncertainties around climate-change policy cannot themselves be observed and 
quantified.”13 
     More recently, Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., in light of sustained skepticism of 
government-funded scientific studies, have deemphasized Stern’s scientific element in 
favor of knowledge derived from markets. As such, they propose a private prediction 
market “to address the disconnect between climate scientists and doubters,” by 
performing three functions: “(1) aggregate climate-science information accurately, (2) 
provide a credible source of that information for doubters, and (3) communicate that 
                                                
11 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone 
Books, 2015), 67. 
12 Ibid., 334. 
13 Nicholas Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, 33. It remains unclear why, 
to Stern, ‘science and economics’ are able to ascertain ‘true uncertainties’ around climate change 
policy. It also remains unclear why we should not expect other methods to do the same. 
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information so enough doubters to make the effort worth the cost.”14 Such a market, 
they aver, “would have the merit of serving simultaneously as a source of credible 
information about climate science and also as a tool for regulating emissions.”15 In 
matters of climate as in matters more generally, markets are put forth as the mechanism 
through which even those who are skeptical of expert knowledge or prone to conspiracy 
theory can know about the world. 
     Second, neoliberal responses require a state strong enough to create and underwrite 
such markets while denouncing states strong enough to do much else. As is already 
apparent in the above proposals for the creation of new markets, neoliberalism leaves 
behind the classical-liberal or contemporary libertarian idea that markets emerge 
naturally and can exist separately from the artifice of states. Mirowski, in light of the 
changing climate, highlights these two elements by telling us that neoliberalism believes 
“humans can never be trusted to know whether the biosphere is in crisis or not, because 
both nature and society are dauntingly complex and evolving; therefore, the neoliberal 
solution is to enlist the strong state to allow the market to find its own way to the ultimate 
solution.”16 From a neoliberal perspective, such a state helps foster markets that deliver 
information to stakeholders. A critique of this ideological article of faith reveals the more 
material side of this “strong state” to consist of violence and policing, as is evident in the 
case of Mt. Elgon I discussed in Chapter 2.17 
                                                
14 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Kaitlin Toner Raimi, and Jonathan M. Gilligan, “Energy and Climate 
Change: A Climate Prediction Market,” UCLA Law Review 61 (2014): 1991. 
15 Ibid., 1993. 
16 Mirowski, Serious Crisis, 336. 
17 Daniel Aldana Cohen describes the dangers of this strong state bluntly: “The actually realistic 
danger zone,” he writes, anticipating what he deems a likely future, “is a combination of 
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     While strong enough to enforce markets, the neoliberal state gives up on its ability 
or desire to provide much by way of (other) public goods: it gives up on the project of 
beneficial political rule in favor of libertarian, negative freedom. This in turn produces a 
vacuum that, as I discuss in the next section, invites managerial rather than democratic 
projects.18 Because the public good that states and government might provide are held at 
bay by the libertarian elements of neoliberalism that do persist, managerial politics has 
space to unfold. And in part by witnessing and internalizing various forms of managerial 
politics we learn to manage ourselves in turn. 
     Indeed one of Brown’s staunchest points is relevant here: that whether at the level of a 
state or an individual, neoliberal reason demands that a given ‘firm’ conducts itself in 
much the same way. “As both individual and state become projects of management, 
rather than rule … a range of concerns become subsumed to the project of capital 
enhancement, recede altogether, or are radically transformed as they are 
“economized.””19 When the state or the individual becomes a project of management 
rather than rule it trades the organizing principle of the public good for one of 
“competitive positioning and stock or credit rating.”20 In other words, it starts to look and 
behave like any other private firm, as “the conduct of government and the conduct of 
firms are now fundamentally identical; both are in the business of justice and 
                                                                                                                                            
hardening inequalities of class, race, and gender – in short, eco-apartheid. Those brutal 
inequalities, and the bullets that maintain them – not molecules of methane – are what kill 
people.” Cohen, “New York Mag’s Climate Disaster Porn Gets it Painfully Wrong,” Jacobin, 
July 10, 2017: https://www. jacobinmag.com/2017/07/climate-change-new-york-magazine-
response. Cohen’s point is important, even as I see nothing wrong with the suggestion that 
methane and bullets are threats on the horizon. 
18 Or, at least, that has primarily been filled by managerial rather than democratic projects. 
19 Brown, Undoing, 22. 
20 Ibid., 27. 
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sustainability, but never as ends in themselves.”21 Coming back to the individual who 
witnesses and learns to value such processes, they too start to act like the private firm in 
the name of self-betterment or self-sufficiency. In turn, the individual helps undermine 
public institutions that might otherwise provide the conditions for self-sufficiency, 
pointing us to a third target of neoliberal reification.  
     Third, neoliberalism contains a tendency to break down the social worlds it inhabits, 
figuratively and literally, and to reconfigure them as mere collections of individuals. 
Neoliberal responses to environmental problems thus produce subjects/citizens as 
primarily individual and individuated, autonomous individuals. Brown, in turning to 
Michel Foucault’s lectures, has helped us to think though ways in which the subject of 
neoliberalism becomes an individual, abstract entity: homo oeconomicus. Here, the 
individual loses much of their richness, and sees all things according to the logic and in 
the mold of markets: “the point is that neoliberal rationality disseminates the model of the 
market to all domains and activities–even where money is not at issue–and configures 
human beings exhaustively as market actors.”22 Foucault discusses this by introducing the 
idea of “human capital” that moves homo oeconomicus away from the “partner of 
exchange” as conceived by classical liberalism and toward a new nature as “an 
entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for 
himself is own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.”23 In other words, 
Foucault and Brown insist, neoliberal ideology offers self-sufficiency. Upon closer 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 31. 
23 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, ed. 
Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 225-6. 
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inspection, such self-sufficiency turns out to be little more than increasingly intensified 
isolation from even the thinly relational “partner of exchange” envisioned by Adam 
Smith and company. 
     To recapitulate: neoliberalism reduces complex, historically rich situations to 
straightforwardly economic ones capable of being addressed through market forces allied 
with a particular kind of state and transacted by individuals. The problem, per Erik Bryld, 
is that in this neoliberal vision “little attention is paid to non-economic factors, and the 
political aspects are overlooked. Thus, the complex political, social, and cultural 
landscape in which the state operates is grossly over-simplified.”24 In offering economic 
solutions to complex social and political problems, the neoliberal playbook gives little 
guidance to those who would seek to engage the world in non-economic spheres and 
according to non-economic logics. 
Managerialism 
     Mirowski connects technologies like geoengineering to neoliberalism by suggesting 
that when markets are not enough, the neoliberal playbook says to embrace new 
technologies to solve problems. Yet Mirowski does not make it clear why the turn to 
technology is neoliberal, exactly. While I accept that the two logics are broadly 
connected, insofar as they often operate alongside one another in existing (climate) 
politics and policy, I am not convinced they are equivalent. Here I suggest that we can 
see in the dominant imaginary’s turn to technology to solve climate change the presence 
not only of neoliberal logics, but managerial ones as well. Where neoliberal logics 
                                                
24 Erik Bryld, “The Technocratic Discourse: Technical Means to Political Problems,” 
Development in Practice 10, no. 5 (2000): 703. 
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replace politics in the ways outlined above, managerial approaches rely on the use of 
top-down technologies and techniques to solve particular, narrowly construed problems 
and to keep relevant organizations running. Insofar as Mirowski declines to investigate 
this second logic, he omits the grounds needed for fully critiquing the ideology of the 
dominant imaginary. 
     A turn to a few textbook definitions of management is helpful for getting the point 
across. According to Richard Mettinger, management “is a body of knowledge, skills and 
expertise that must be applied in ways demanded by the particular organization in which 
the individual manager is working; and in ways demanded also by the particular 
environment in which activities are conducted.”25 To John R. Schermerhorn, Jr., “a 
manager is someone in an organization who supports and is responsible for the work 
performance of one or more other persons” and management is “the process of planning, 
organizing, leading, and controlling the use of resources to accomplish performance 
goals.”26  Finally, Martin Parker gives three definitions: 1) a “group of executives 
directing an industrial undertaking,” 2) a “process or act of managing; skill in contriving, 
handling etc., and 3) “the academic discipline concerned with managing and 
administration; the part of an educational institution concerned with the same.”27 
     A few qualities cut across these definitions that supplement our understanding of 
dominant climate politics and its ideological effects: a reliance on expert knowledge and 
                                                
25 Richard Pettinger, Management: A Concise Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), 3. 
26 John R. Schermerhorn, Jr., Core Concepts of Management (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2004), 5-6. 
27 Martin Parker, Against Management: Organization in the Age of Management (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2002), 6-8. 
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skills, a sense that important decisions are made from the top down, and a tendency 
toward technological and indeed technocratic solutions. In Sheldon Wolin’s words, and 
in this case, “the political has been managerialized … its values shaped by the pressures 
of a competitive economy that persistently push the limits of legality and ethical 
norms.”28 At times such managerialism can be outright dangerous: consider the 
implications of the following passage in the context of a firm or international institution 
tasked with managing climate change with ever more sophisticated and yet unpredictable 
forms of technology: “more than one CEO has ruined his firm while “managing” to 
emerge unscathed and richer for the experience.”29 Where Mirowski maintains that 
neoliberals call for technocratic solutions if and when markets cannot solve problems, I 
suggest instead that this kind of managerial and top-down politics fills the political void 
or power vacuum left by neoliberalism, placing an expert-driven techno-centric politics 
where a more democratic and participatory political might have been. 
     What is the ideological impact of swapping the political for well-managed 
technology? Taken as a group, political theorists have long been ambivalent with regard 
to technology in general. In one light, technology and the promises and perils thereof 
have been discussed since, at least, Aristotle conceived of both dead and living tools,30 
and made epistemological distinctions between theoretical, technical, and practical ways 
                                                
28 Sheldon Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted 
Totalitarianism (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008), 135. 
29 Ibid., 145. 
30 “Instruments are partly inanimate and partly animate: the steersman of a ship, for instance, has 
an inanimate instrument in the rudder, and an animate instrument in the look-out man (for in the 
arts a subordinate is of the nature of an instrument) … the slave is an animate article of property, 
and subordinates, or servants, in general may be described as instruments which are prior to other 
instruments,” in Aristotle, Politics, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), 13. 
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of knowing and doing amidst which such living and dead technologies are situated 
(epistēmē, technē, and phronēsis).31 Thinkers from Karl Marx through Martin Heidegger 
to Hans Jonas, from Sheldon Wolin to Langdon Winner, and from Francis Bacon to the 
Frankfurt School have likewise embraced or disputed Aristotle’s parsing of technology, 
centering it even if occasionally denying it and ensuring that political theory never 
wanders too far from Aristotelian questions of technology.  
     Yet in a different light, something about studying the political implications of 
technology did not reach the center of political theory’s concerns until relatively late. As 
recently as 1986, a political theorist could still write that “the basic task for a philosophy 
of technology is to examine critically the nature and significance of artificial aids to 
human activity … yet if one turns to the writings of twentieth-century philosophers, one 
finds astonishingly little attention given to questions of that kind.”32 Technology (as 
Aristotle would affirm) is a practical matter, an outcome at the end of a line of political 
and practical questions rather than at the beginning. Yet, and as a general rule that 
certainly comes with exceptions, political theory has tended to focus more on the idea of 
technology, rather than on particular technologies themselves. Only in the last couple of 
decades, in the time since Winner wrote the above words, has a philosophy of technology 
                                                
31 Where, roughly, epistēmē is ‘scientific knowledge’ of things unchanging: “it is eternal; for 
things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal;” technē pertains to making 
things: “a state concerned with making;” and phronēsis is ‘practical wisdom’ that enables 
political deliberation:  “it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things 
that are good or bad for man … it is for this reason that we think Pericles and men like him have 
practical wisdom, namely, because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for 
men in general.” Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2009), 104-6. 
32 Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High 
Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 4. 
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solidified across the related fields of science and technology studies, object oriented 
ontology, new materialisms, posthumanism, and so on. 
     Here I want to depart from these somewhat abstract critiques and appreciations of 
technology, instead critiquing the managerial use of technology.33 I want to rein them in a 
little, by bringing them closer to the ground. As such, I offer here a critique of technology 
the goal of which is to interrogate the ideological effects of geoengineering, a very 
practical and increasingly pressing managerial application of technology, all in the 
context of global climate change politics. Specifically, I want to suggest that a reliance on 
the managerial use of technology (like a reliance on a neoliberal use of markets) enables 
and perhaps encourages a turning-away from concern and, ultimately, an abdication of 
political responsibility. 
     Writing long before his later warnings about managerial politics, Sheldon Wolin (and 
Jack Schaar) sounded a warning about technological society that I would like to pick up 
and extend to contemporary managerial responses to climate change. Writing through the 
struggles that took place at UC Berkeley and elsewhere in the late 1960s, Wolin and 
Schaar warned that a technological society (such as that of the 1960s and, more so, that of 
today), “is always trying to destroy … its past – a past in which work, self-denial, 
                                                
33 My critique is thus inspired by and dovetails with the Marxian / Marcusian view that 
technology, if freed from capitalist logics of profit and if explored and implemented through 
human rationality rather than market rationality, might indeed be an emancipatory force. Yet I am 
not as optimistic as Marcuse was about such prospects generally, and as will become clear, I see 
no evidence that geoengineering specifically might attain autonomy from managerial rationality 
any time soon. As such I do not pursue the Marxian / Marcusian view here. For one of its biggest 
proponents, see Andrew Feenberg’s work cited throughout. 
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simplicity, and physical strength were celebrated.”34 Just as technological society tries 
to destroy its past, managerial technologies like geoengineering enable us to ‘overcome’ 
past wrongs by ‘knowing’ they will be fixed or mitigated moving forward. This, to be 
sure, does not comprise an exclusively technological danger, but one that is also 
ideological: it lets those who contributed most to the problem off the hook. If in 
managing the global warming problem technologically we forget the uneven levels of 
harm and benefit – of violence – that preceded such a solution, we fail to heed the 
warning that Wolin, Schaar, and others sought to provide. Even if the past of ‘work, self-
denial, simplicity, and physical strength’ never was, and now reads as misguided or even 
dangerous nostalgia, the basic point that the technological society risks sliding into 
collective amnesia concerning its own wrongs rings true. 
     As suggested in my introduction, any adequate political response to climate change 
(outside of a quietist acceptance of present disasters those and to come) must involve 
some degree of technological innovation or implementation: what we might call techno-
realism rather than techno-optimism. If, for example, we are to end the fossil fuel era 
while maintaining or increasing even modest levels of electricity use, a collective shift to 
solar, wind, nuclear, or other power sources, appears to be necessary.35 
     Yet accepting some role for new technology need not bind one to total acceptance, and 
                                                
34 Sheldon Wolin and John Schaar, The Berkeley Rebellion and Beyond: Essays on Politics and 
Education in the Technological Society (New York: Random House, 1970), 105. I am not 
convinced that their simple past ever existed; if it did I do not think we should be nostalgic for it. 
35 While such debates are beyond the scope of this project, note that in the context of the US, 
nuclear power - and the uranium mining that nuclear power requires specifically - has a long 
history of impacting indigenous and other disadvantaged peoples disproportionately. I am more 
or less convinced (over and against ecomodernists) that nuclear could be left out of the equation. 
See Kristin Shrader-Frechette, What Will Work? Fighting Climate Change with Renewable 
Energy, Not Nuclear Power (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011). 
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clearly not all technologies are created equal. If technology (and material conditions 
more generally) can cause not only environmental but social and political 
reconfigurations, any politics that potentially suggests or demands technological 
innovations must take a close look at the possibilities that are opened or closed (or pasts 
erased) when those technologies are put in place. Contrast Heidegger’s assertion that 
“everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately 
affirm or deny it,” with the liberal progress narrative in which technological progress can 
only expand the scope and content of human freedom.36 Where Heidegger points to a 
perennial unfreedom when it comes to technology, American common sense suggests 
that only technology will free us (at least from the particular problem of environmental 
degradation). 
     Rather than endorse one of these two views, I instead embrace the view that 
“technology is not neutral but fundamentally biased toward a particular hegemony” so 
that “all action undertaken within its framework tends to reproduce that hegemony.”37 In 
other words, whatever forces implement a given technology are simultaneously going 
some way toward self-reproduction: networks of gas and petrol stations will tend to 
reinforce the hegemony of the fossil fuel era, and impress in most people a conviction 
that no other way is possible; decentralized community-based solar grids may foster a 
sense of collective concern, etc. Indeed Heidegger recognizes as much as the context of 
the passage above makes clear. To quote at greater length:  
                                                
36 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Krell 
(London: HarperPerennial, 2008), 311 
37 Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2002), 63. 
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Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we 
passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible 
way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which 
today we particularly like to pay homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of 
technology.38  
Heidegger thus warned then of what is now another widespread understanding of 
technology (one that recurs whenever gun laws are debated in the US, for example): that 
technologies are neutral tools that can be used this way or that, the essences and 
ideological implications of which lean in no one direction. Instead, we might follow the 
Heideggarian line of thought through to its end, and realize that “technologies are not 
merely aids to human activity, but also powerful forces acting to reshape that activity and 
its meaning.”39 Rather than trying to give a reception history of the concept of 
technology, or a general critique or appraisal of technology for political theoretic 
purposes, I discuss below how a particular technology – geoengineering – might reshape 
human activity and its meaning. 
     So far in this chapter I have tried to draw out and critique the general ideological 
components of two logics central to the dominant climate imaginary: neoliberalism and 
managerialism. In what follows I turn to particular applications of these logics that 
attempt to “solve” or “manage” climate change through these logics: carbon finance and 
geoengineering, respectively.40  
                                                
38 Heidegger, “Technology,” 311-12. 
39 Winner, The Whale, 6. 
40 For a suggestion that looking for “solutions” to climate change is a wrong turn in itself, see 
Thom Brooks, “How Not to Save the Planet,” Ethics, Policy & Environment 19, no. 2: 119-135. 
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III. Neoliberalism and Carbon Finance 
Climate change poses several environmental problems, many of which now have 
a clear focus. The scientific problem: How can the high amounts of CO2 in the 
atmosphere causing the earth’s climate to change be lowered to 350 ppm? The 
economic problem: How can the economy be decarbonized while addressing 
global economic disparities? The social problem: How can human societies 
change their climate-altering behaviors and adapt to changes in climate? The 
cultural problem: How can commodity culture be reigned in? The problem 
policymakers face: What regulations can be introduced to inhibit environmental 
degradation, promote GHG reductions, and assist the people, species, and 
ecosystems most vulnerable to environmental change? The political problem is 
less clear, however, perhaps because of its philosophical implications.41 
 
     Previous scholarship, with Adrian Parr’s The Wrath of Capital front and center, has 
pointed to the limits and dangers of approaching climate change through the lens of 
neoliberalism. The neoliberal framework is limited insofar as it reduces the world to 
markets, the state, and homo oeconomicus, and performs a limiting function insofar as 
what we can think about climate change is limited when we think through neoliberalism. 
As Parr maintains in the quote above, climate change is a problem for, at least, the 
environment, science, economics, the social, culture, policymakers, and the political. I 
would add that it is a problem of violence and impersonal domination, and increasingly a 
problem of everyday life in material and psychological ways. Yet neoliberalism limits 
this (already necessarily incomplete) list to a question of economies and markets first and 
foremost. The climate problem is the externality problem par excellence. Nowhere is this 
clearer than in its projects of carbon finance. 
     The drive to curtail climate change by financializing carbon – by treating it as a 
commodity and by trading it as such, relies on the creation of markets as a means of 
                                                
41 Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics (New York: 
Columba UP, 2013), 4. 
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prodding homo oeconomicus to behave in a way that reduces the emission of GHGs 
either directly or indirectly (by increasing the capacity of carbon sinks to capture the CO2 
released globally or by funding expanded carbon sinks). 
     Here we might think broadly or narrowly. Broadly, carbon finance “explores the 
financial implications of living in a carbon constrained world–a world in which emissions 
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases carry a price.”42 Thus, exploring carbon 
finance could mean exploring all of the myriad ways in which a changing climate might 
impact all things financial. Addressing the content of this broad definition, however, is 
unrealistic for a single chapter. Somewhat more narrowly, the World Bank refers to 
carbon finance as “the generic name for the revenue streams generated by projects from 
the sale of their greenhouse gas emission reductions, or from trading in carbon 
permits.”43  Here, carbon finance connotes the revenue from any of the three market-
based approaches to reducing greenhouse gas concentrations found in the Kyoto 
Protocol: Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS), Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).44  ETS is more commonly known as “cap-and-trade,” 
and refers to the markets that emerge when states set quotas on allowable emissions and 
firms sell extra or buy additional allowances as needed. Joint implementation allows 
wealthy countries to invest in “another industrialized nation or a country with economies 
in transition” in order to satisfy their own emissions targets.45  Similarly, CDM allows 
industrialized countries to invest in poorer countries as a means of satisfying their own 
                                                
42 Labatt and White, Carbon Finance, 1. 
43 World Bank, 10 Years of Experience in Carbon Finance: Insights from Working with the Kyoto 
Protocol (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), 1. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Labatt and White, Carbon Finance, 11. 
  
109 
emissions goals while transferring low-carbon technologies to the poor countries. 
Conceptually, we can think of carbon finance as the neoliberal response to dealing with 
the problem of climate change by creating markets. Here, “finance” refers to the 
resources (demand) used to purchase the product (supply), and the product is any project 
that results in the reduction of GHGs. As of 2016, Per the World Bank’s Carbon Finance 
Unit website, 50% of the supply is rooted in Asia, 27% in Latin America.46 
     Consider how different elements of carbon finance construct the climate problem 
along economic lines. The theory behind ETS, for example, holds that the problem of 
climate change is essentially an externalities problem: that some true cost of doing 
business is not reflected in the actual cost thereof. The response, then, is to internalize the 
(currently) external cost of carbon: “since pollution problems arise because no property 
rights have been allocated to the problems that pollution causes, the solution is to allocate 
specific and limited rights to polluters.”47 Modeled on the relative success of cap-and-
trade in reducing the problem of ozone depletion, the United States ensured that 
emissions trading was central to the Kyoto protocol. In the time since Kyoto, ETS has 
become one of the most common market approaches, and such markets “are now in the 
process of becoming … the central element of states’ regulatory tools to deal with climate 
change.”48 Yet the ostensibly real goal of such markets – reducing GHG emissions – is 
uncertain, and requires a leap of faith. “The Carbon economy,” Parr writes, “operates on 
the neoliberal presumption that the market will sufficiently discipline polluters, all the 
                                                
46 https://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=FAQ&ItemID=24677. 
47 Newell and Patterson, Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the 
Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), 96. 
48 Ibid., 99. 
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while boosting the profit margins of those whose business practices engage 
environmental issues.”49 Unfortunately, Newel and Patterson point out, “the flourishing 
of market-based approaches … has in fact been driven less by the neat abstractions of 
economics, or the pragmatic concerns of negotiators, and more (and increasingly) by the 
inventiveness and greed of financiers.”50 A question central to the various elements of 
carbon finance becomes evident here: to what extent do carbon markets primarily 
function to limit GHG emissions, and to what extent do they function to secure profits in 
a time of uncertainty, transition, and instability? 
     Whereas emissions trading is perhaps the most well-known form of neoliberal climate 
politics, the commodification of carbon itself is the theoretical development that 
underpins the various forms of carbon finance described above. In its own right, the 
commodification of carbon is striking insofar as it is perhaps the purest form of 
commodification more generally. Whereas commodification of other basic units (food, 
water, etc.) is easily if not always perfectly linked to those material things, the 
commodification of carbon aims essentially to commodify a lack of material things, or 
even the negation thereof: “unlike traditional commodities, which sometime during the 
course of their market exchanges must be delivered to someone in physical form, the 
carbon market is based on the lack of delivery of an invisible substance to no-one.”51 
     What exactly is neoliberal about this? Per Brown, the financialization of carbon 
follows neoliberal rationality insofar as its model is that of financial/investment capital 
                                                
49 Parr, Wrath of Capital, 24. 
50 Newel and Patterson, Climate Capitalism, 107. 
51 David Layfield, “Turning Carbon into Gold: The Financialization of International Climate 
Policy,” Environmental Politics 22, no. 6 (2013): 908. 
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rather than “only productive or entrepreneurial capital.”52 As such, the 
commodification of carbon is part and parcel of a stage of neoliberal capitalism in which 
finance and valuation (appearance) are of greater importance than production or 
entrepreneurialism, or, in this case, than the ‘production’ of actual reductions in 
emissions (substance). This is because carbon finance projects “are increasingly re-
framing the climate change debate in terms of the norms of the financial sector, rather 
than the needs and perspectives of communities at the frontlines.”53 Yet David Layfield 
points out that some of these issues arise not because of individual greed or some 
supposed neoliberal conspiracy, but because of the “length and abstraction of the value 
chains involved in carbon markets.”54  He continues: 
There remains a key difference between carbon-based products and other forms of 
security, bond or derivative contracts. The difference is that the direct connection 
between the carbon product and the real reduction in emissions is essential. If this 
connection is broken … then, environmentally, they are useless. Whatever their 
market price, whatever value traders attach to them as they are bought and sold, if 
they do not equate to real reductions in carbon emissions then they simply do not 
work as a means to address climate change.55 
If for whatever reason carbon markets fail to work as a means to reduce GHGs, they 
                                                
52 Brown, Undoing, 33. 
53 Oscar Reyes, Introduction to Understanding Private Climate Finance, ed. Oscar Reyes 
(Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 2012), 6. 
54 Layfield, “Turning Carbon into Gold,” 909. 
55 Ibid., 910. 
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should not be central to international climate efforts on purely pragmatic grounds.56 
Yet even if they are working to reduce GHGs, we should still want to know what other 
work these markets are doing, insofar as “the market itself is political.”57 We want to 
know, for example, who benefits and who is harmed from various climate solutions, just 
as we want to know about the ideological effects of such markets, and how carbon 
markets “also entail the production of certain sorts of subjectivities.”58 If the 
commodification of carbon reduces GHGs, for example, yet re-produces individuals as 
consumers who rightly or wrongly learn they can always buy their way out of ethical and 
political conundrums, we still might want to highlight this as a limit of such projects and 
of the dominant imaginary that supports them. 
     Alongside such ideological critiques of neoliberal economic approaches to climate 
change, older moral critiques of approaching the environment or nature through classical 
liberal economics are relevant here. They are relevant insofar as they might be mistaken 
for the critique that I am making of neoliberal responses to climate change. Yet they are 
distinct insofar as they start from moral and aesthetic objections to bringing markets to 
the environment, rather than directly ideological, political and consequentialist ones. 
                                                
56 To be sure, not all are pessimistic about the practical functioning of these markets and their 
ability to reduce emissions. Based on a synthetic overview of scholars and practitioners that are 
optimistic on this front, a 2011 report concludes that changes to emissions trading schemes: 
Suggest that emission reductions created through the 2008-2012 phase are likely to be 
significantly greater than those in the so-called ‘learning’ phase from 2005-2007. 
Furthermore, emissions reductions in the 2013-2020 phase will take the European 
economy substantially below business-as-usual, and indeed 20-30% below in emissions 
in 1990. 
See Simon Caney and Cameron Hepburn, “Carbon Trading: Unethical, Unjust and Ineffective?,” 
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, Working Paper no. 59 (Leeds: University of 
Leeds, 2011), 33. 
57 Benjamin Stephan and Matthew Paterson, “The Politics of Carbon Markets: An Introduction,” 
Environmental Politics 21, no. 4 (2012): 549. 
58 Ibid., 567. 
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     Take philosopher Mark Sagoff. He argues in Price, Principle, and the 
Environment, that it is morally suspect and perhaps nonsensical to draw upon economic 
terms and concepts in the environmental quest. Instead, one must draw only on moral and 
aesthetic judgments insofar as the world and humans’ place in it, to Sagoff, raise moral 
and aesthetic questions. In reference to John Muir’s distinction between “temple 
destroyers, devotees of ravaging commercialism,”59 who would destroy “nature” for gain, 
and those who would protect God’s creation, Sagoff tells us that “I understand these 
categories – the conflict between commerce and Creation. What I object to is the 
penchant of environmentalists to invoke the vocabulary of commerce – utility, benefit, 
instrumental value generally – to protect the works of Creation.”60 In other words Sagoff 
brings an ethically admirable ecocentric approach to questions of the environment. Yet 
admirable does not mean complete, as such an approach downplays important questions 
in its own right. Where the neoliberal approach restricts answers to questions of the 
environment to markets, Sagoff’s moral-ecocentric approach restricts answers to 
environmental questions to the domain of ethics.61 I agree with Sagoff that the response 
to environmental problems and climate change ought not be entirely instrumental, and 
especially that it should not be entirely economic. Yet ideological analysis, rather than 
moral and aesthetic consideration alone, must lead the response to the violence of climate 
change if we are to address it as a political question. 
                                                
59 John Muir, “The Hetch Hetchy Valley,” Sierra Club Bulletin VI, no. 4 (1908): 220. 
60 Mark Sagoff, Price, Principle, and the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), 20. 
61 To be sure, Sagoff’s use of the language of “Creation” to describe the natural world raises the 
question of whether his is essentially a religious worldview that rejects economic analysis as part 
of that which ought be ‘rendered unto Caesar.’ Alternately he could simply be following Muir’s 
language of ‘temple destroyers’ and so on. Either way, such religious elements can be considered 
part and parcel of Sagoff’s ‘moral’ approach. 
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     I by no means wish to denounce moral, ethical, or religious experience and 
conviction in relation to the nonhuman world. Rather, I want to suggest that like 
economic approaches alone, moral approaches are not sufficient given my purposes. My 
twofold critique of market-based solutions to climate change is that they might simply 
not work (insofar as such markets are too ‘distant’ from actual GHG emissions), and that 
even if they do work in this way, they may also work ideologically to re-produce the 
kinds of capitalist relations out of which environmental degradation emerges to begin 
with and thereby allow for continued political damage to various peoples across the 
globe. Whereas philosophers like Sagoff (rightly) ask moral questions about the endeavor 
of leaving environmental problems to markets, I suggest that we ought also to focus on 
the practical question of whether markets are too indirect (or ineffective) a path for GHG 
reductions, and whether they therefore facilitate rather than transform the ideologies that 
unleash climate violence.  
     Some would see the disconnect between promise and practice of carbon finance – 
emissions reductions and increase of wealth – as accidental, or a problem of non-ideal 
application. Yet, keeping ideological commitments of neoliberalism in mind, it seems fair 
to consider an analogy between Marx’s worker who, after being sold the idea that hard 
work means social mobility, endures a life of exploitation that much more willingly and 
works much more strenuously than they would have otherwise. Here we might ask 
whether those why buy into the idea that carbon finance might trade away the problem of 
climate change are being sold a similarly risky promise, one that may occasionally come 
true and provide success stories while aiming at another goal – capital accumulation – 
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more broadly and centrally. This is the central ideological danger of neoliberal 
climate politics. 
IV. Managerialism and Geoengineering 
     In embracing the managerial use of technology – geoengineering especially – 
adherents of the dominant imaginary make possible additional ideological effects hostile 
to democracy. This is the case for at least two reasons: 1) the specific technologies 
involved in geoengineering invite centralized power and unresponsive decision making, 
and 2) managerialism more generally is by nature a top-down, technocratic endeavor. 
     In 1986, Langdon Winner surveyed a world still centrally concerned about the nuclear 
bomb and about to embrace the personal computer, the iPod, the smartphone, the body 
camera, and so on, and claimed that “what is needed is an interpretation of the ways, both 
obvious and subtle, in which everyday life is transformed by the mediating role of 
technical devices.”62 In making the claim that we ought think about the ways that 
technical devices change everyday life, he pinned down part of the truth. Indeed, then and 
now, asking how everyday life is mediated by technology is of pressing importance. Yet 
by limiting the analysis to technical devices, Winner unnecessarily narrowed the scope of 
his claim. By implicitly excluding non-devices, Winner bracketed analyses of much that 
is important about technology to environmental political theorists: the technologies that 
suspend GHGs in the atmosphere, the half-life of the nuclear aftermath of Fukushima, the 
chemical compounds that some propose ought be intentionally injected into the 
atmosphere in order to literally mediate between people and the sun, reflecting some of 
                                                
62 Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High 
Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 9. 
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its heat back to the great abyss, and so on. These latter forces, no less than the devices 
that signify technological change, require continued critical attention insofar as each 
either elicits or is caused by managerial political responses. How might subjectivity be 
altered in light of widespread geoengineering projects? 
     Per the British Royal Society, geoengineering is “the deliberate large-scale 
intervention in the Earth’s climate system, in order to moderate global warming.”63 In 
other words, it is the attempt to manage the climate. Recalling the definition cited above, 
geoengineering does indeed comprise “a body of knowledge, skills and expertise that 
must be applied in ways demanded by the particular organization in which the individual 
manager is working; and in ways demanded also by the particular environment in which 
activities are conducted.”64 If climate change can be conceived as the accidental or 
unforeseen manipulation of the earth’s delicate balance, geoengineering can be seen as 
the attempt to do it all over again, this time with a sense of purpose and direction. David 
Keith, a strong (yet cautious) proponent of geoengineering highlights this sense of 
purpose, calling geoengineering “the intentional manipulation of climate forcings with 
the goal of counteracting undesired climate change.”65 Most often, it is broken down into 
two main groups: solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal 
(CDR). CDR projects attempt to remove carbon dioxide that is already in the atmosphere. 
As a founder of Carbon Engineering, Keith has a personal stake in CDR: Carbon 
                                                
63 Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty (London: 
Royal Society, 2009), ix. 
64 Pettinger, Management, 3. 
65 Keith, Climate Engineering, 48. Emphasis added. Proponents like Keith do not fully lack an 
appreciation for the unintended consequences that will accompany their projects. Yet they often 
judge the pressing issues at hand to do be of greater importance than potential future issues, a 
judgment that breaks with the precautionary principle too quickly. 
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Engineering aims to develop “technology for direct capture of carbon dioxide from 
the air.”66 Cognizant of conflicts of interest, Keith purports to limit his academic work to 
SRM projects (in which Carbon Engineering has no stake), which aim to cool the globe 
by reflecting solar energy back out to space, thus precluding it from sticking around and 
warming the globe further.67 Keith, one of the most active and visible proponents of 
geoengineering limits his analysis to SRM projects. Here I will do the same, with the 
additional reason that proposed methods of SRM clearly demonstrate the stakes of 
managerialism: they could be deployed by just a few unaccountable managers – whether 
individuals, corporations, states, or otherwise – and, once done, would impact broad 
swaths of the population in multiple ways. 
     It is important to note that SRM remains a largely hypothetical enterprise. Indeed, in 
defending the prospect Keith admits as much, presenting a choice between “the status 
quo–with almost no research on the subject–and commitment to a serious research 
program that will develop the capability to geoengineer, improve understanding of the 
technology’s risks and benefits, and open up the research community.”68 His argument is, 
first and foremost, an argument for more research. While I am less optimistic about such 
research, I want to be careful here and state that I do not take issue with the research 
being done in the first place, especially if scientific research on geoengineering is taken 
together with and informed by ethical and critical considerations.69 
                                                
66 Ibid., xix. 
67 http://carbonengineering.com/. I still wonder about conflicts of interest insofar as the successful 
adoption of SRM might well open the door to CDR projetcs. 
68 Ibid., 13. 
69 The foremost scholar of the ethical implications of geoengineering is perhaps Stephen 
Gardiner. See his “Geoengineering and Moral Schizophrenia: What Is the Question?” in Climate 
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     Keith may be right to claim that there has not been much research done to date, but 
there have been a few notable reports and controversial experiments in recent years. The 
most recent IPCC report, released between 2013 and 2014, included the language of 
geoengineering for the first time.70 Per Nature, “mention of ‘geoengineering’ in the report 
summary was brief, but it suggests that the controversial area is now firmly on the 
scientific agenda.”71 In 2015, the US National Academy of Sciences authored two reports 
on geoengineering. One of those reports explicitly covered SRM techniques. Its general 
conclusion was that SRM (“albedo modification”) “at scales sufficient to alter climate 
should not be deployed at this time,” but that “an albedo modification research program 
be developed and implemented.”72 Most recently, in July 2017, the US Global Change 
Research Program delivered an official report to congress that steps up the language 
somewhat. “While climate intervention cannot substitute for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and adapting to the changes in climate that occur,” the report reads, “some 
types of deliberative climate intervention may someday be one of a portfolio of tools used 
in managing climate change.” Likewise, the report highlights sources of a potential “arms 
race” in geoengineering, writing that the need for research “becomes all the more 
                                                                                                                                            
Change Geoengineering: Philosophical Perspectives, Legal Issues, and Governance 
Frameworks, eds. Will Burns and Andrew Strauss (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013),11-38 and 
A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011, 
especially Chapter 10. For an argument that geoengineering research has largely excluded, but 
would very much benefit from, gender analysis See Holly Jean Buck, Andrea R. Gammon, and 
Christopher J. Preston, “Gender and Geoengineering,” Hypatia 29, no. 3 (2014): 651-69. 
70 The next report, which will be the sixth, is currently being researched and is scheduled for 
release between 2021 and 2022. 
71 Daniel Cressey, “Climate Report Puts Geoengineering in the Spotlight,” Nature (October 2, 
2013): http://www.nature.com/news/climate-report-puts-geoengineering-in-the-spotlight-1.13871. 
72 National Academy of Sciences, Climate Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth 
(Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2015), 9-10. 
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apparent with the recognition that other countries or the private sector may decide to 
conduct intervention experiments independently from the U.S. Government.”73 
     Alongside such reports, a few experiments are notable. In July of 2012 American 
businessman Russ George experimented with a CDR technique known as ocean 
fertilization by releasing 100 tons of iron sulphate into the Pacific Ocean in a bid to study 
its effects on plankton, where “the intention is for the plankton to absorb carbon dioxide 
and then sink to the ocean bed.”74 George’s experiment, it is worth noting, ran afoul of 
two UN conventions: the Convention on Biological Diversity and the London 
Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea.75 This experiment exemplifies some of the 
direct political dangers of managerial projects: that rogue states, corporations, or 
individuals might take matters into their own hands without broader accountability or 
scientific consensus, that profit rather than actual impact on climate woes might be the 
goal of the particular firm undertaking the projects, that climate could someday be 
weaponized, and that communities with little to no say may be negatively impacted, to 
name a few. In the wake of George’s experiment and in the midst a UN meeting attended 
by indigenous peoples’ organizations, an article in The Guardian highlighted such 
concerns: 
“If rogue geoengineer Russ George really has misled this indigenous community 
and dumped iron into their waters, we hope to see swift legal response to his 
                                                
73 US, Global Change Research Program, The National Global Change Research Plan 2012-
2021: A Triennial Update (Washington, DC, 2017), 37. 
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behavior and strong action taken to the heights of the Canadian and US 
governments,” said Silvia Ribeiro of the international technology watchdog ETC 
Group, which first discovered the existence of the scheme. “It is now more urgent 
than ever that governments unequivocally ban such open-air geoengineering 
experiments. They are a dangerous distraction providing governments and 
industry with an excuse to avoid reducing fossil fuel emissions.”76 
Along with the direct impacts mentioned above, Ribeiro points to an explicitly 
ideological function of geoengineering; in the name of combatting climate change it may 
indeed legitimize the continued consumption of fossil fuels. 
     Despite his caveats, Keith stands out as a clear defender of a managerial endeavor on 
the precipice of emergence. Indeed, Keith is at the center of a second impending 
geoengineering experiment that has been widely discussed and reported. Having used 
computer modeling to conduct preliminary experiments, Keith aims to conduct a real-
world experiment by 2018, when he and Frank Keutsh: 
Hope to launch a high-altitude balloon, tethered to a gondola equipped with 
propellers and sensors, from a site in Tucson, Arizona. After initial engineering 
tests, the “StratoCruiser” would spray a fine mist of materials such as sulfur 
dioxide, alumina, or calcium carbonate into the stratosphere. The sensors would 
then measure the reflectivity of the particles, the degree to which they disperse or 
coalesce, and they way they interact with other compounds in the atmosphere.77 
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     While such research remains preliminary, Keith is at its forefront. His defense runs 
as follows. In a world in which a first round of climate change was unintentional and is 
now unavoidable, and in which global governance is not (yet?) mature enough to guide 
profound changes in the release of GHGs, geoengineering might step in as a reasonable 
policy response. Specifically, Keith is intrigued by the relative ease and low-cost of 
aerosol geoengineering: “the most plausible near-term method is to increase [the] amount 
of sulfuric acid aerosol in the stratosphere.”78  The result would be as follows: 
Aerosol particles scatter light. That’s why we see clouds but can’t see the water 
vapor out of which they condense. It turns out that the amount of light scattered 
for each kilogram of aerosol is greatest if the aerosols are a few tenths of a micron 
across, about the size of transistors in your computer’s CPU and about a thousand 
times smaller than a raindrop … the immense leverage provided by stratospheric 
aerosols is evident in the ratio of carbon to sulfur. Only a few tons of sulfur in the 
stratosphere is needed to offset the radiative forcing of a million tons of carbon in 
the atmosphere … an amount sufficient to counterbalance half of the current 
carbon dioxide forcing, would require injecting about only one million tons of 
sulfur into the stratosphere each year to maintain the required amount of sulfate 
aerosol.79 
Likewise, such an effort, Keith tells, would be easy. In order to inject sulfuric acid 
aerosol in the stratosphere, we would only need to configure and coordinate existing 
technologies, at least at the outset. Again, to quote at length, it would go as follows: 
                                                
78 Keith, Climate Engineering, 64. Sulfuric acid is one of the chemicals his upcoming experiment 
will assess. It is also a chemical, along with nitric acid, associated with acid rain. 
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Injection of sulfates might be accomplished using Gulfstream business jets 
retrofitted with off-the-shelf low-bypass jet engines to allow them to fly at 
altitudes over sixty thousand feed [sic] along with the hardware required to 
generate and disperse the sulfuric acid. Only one or two aircraft would be needed 
to start the program, and after a decade it would take about ten aircraft to lift the 
required 250 thousand tons each year at an annual cost of about 700 million 
dollars. It would then make sense to convert to purpose-built aircraft with longer 
wings better suited to high-altitude flights; this change would cut costs roughly in 
half an might allow global distribution of sulfate from two airfields … you might 
find this scenario intriguing or crazy, but it’s hard to argue that it’s technically 
infeasible. The necessary hardware could be ready by 2020 and even after half a 
century the direct cost of the program would be less than one percent of what we 
now spend on clean energy development.80 
In short, while the exact planes and technologies needed for this version of 
geoengineering might not exist in the world, the component pieces do. Likewise, 
assembling them and putting them to work would be relatively easy, and relatively cheap.  
     Yet we might ask whether the end result, whether a failure or a smashing success, 
would have unforeseen consequences. Keith is not in denial about such risks, even as he 
devotes relatively little attention to them. “The best understood risk of sulfate 
geoengineering,” he says, “is ozone loss.”81 More grimly: “if we begin putting a million 
tons of sulfur into the stratosphere each year, it will probably contribute to thousands of 
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air pollution deaths a year.”82 Finally, “the largest concern is not the risks we know 
but rather a sensible fear of the unknown-unknowns that may surprise us.”83 Ultimately, 
however, his conclusion is clear, and front and center. “I myself,” he writes,” have 
concluded that it makes sense to move with deliberate haste towards deployment of 
geoengineering.”84 
     Others, like Clive Hamilton and Mike Hulme have given more reason for pause. A 
general reason, which those who still want to focus on mitigating climate change rather 
than adapting to it would endorse, is that geoengineering “attacks a symptom of the 
disease, a warming globe, rather than its source, rising greenhouse gas emissions, and 
leave other symptoms, notably acidifying oceans, untouched.”85 This applies to both 
CDR and SRM geoengineering projects. Devotees to climate mitigation, to stopping 
climate change before it really starts to get bad, might therefore reject geoengineering 
outright as too shallow a solution. As noted above, this also highlights the ideological 
function of managerialism and geoengineering: treating the symptom opens the 
possibility of continuing to encourage the cause. Geoengineering and the fossil fuel era 
are by no means incompatible. 
     Others less wedded to mitigation might stick around to hear more. To such an 
audience, Hamilton might suggest that Keith’s optimism is unfounded because it relies on 
relatively few studies and contrary studies exist.86 More substantively, he might suggest 
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that additional risks inhere in the project, like the impact on rainfall: “while rainfall is 
expected to increase with a warming globe, reducing solar radiation enough to force 
temperatures back down would weaken the global hydrological cycle, meaning less 
precipitation.”87 Most drastically, Hamilton points to the “termination problem,” which 
would arise if and when the supply of sulfates to the stratosphere was interrupted by 
“political turmoil or international conflict, or the realization that one of its side effects … 
is much worse than expected.”88 In the case of rapid cessation, climate scientists warn of 
a corresponding rapid spike in temperatures, a spike that might present a greater threat 
than more gradual but significant warming.89 
     So, geoengineering might not work as planned. It might have dire consequences and, 
depending on who one asks, there is no way to “test” it short of total deployment (even 
Keith admits that his impending experiments are preliminary, intended primarily to 
bolster computer models, and that they will not tell us much about full scale deployment). 
Just as carbon finance techniques might ultimately result in the creation of successful 
markets without limiting GHG emissions, geoengineering projects might be successfully 
deployed without making the world a more hospitable place, especially if they function to 
authorize continued use of fossil fuels. 
     Mike Hulme helps define a second ideological and potentially depoliticizing function 
of geoengineering. Hulme suggests that managerial projects like geoengineering enable 
us to imagine that the global climate is much more simple than it actually is: that the 
globe can accurately if metaphorically be described as having a “global thermostat” 
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which small groups or even singular experts could control. To this end, he writes that 
“representing climate change through the language of global temperature is rhetorically 
powerful - scientifically, politically and culturally. But it is also dangerous, as it offers 
too easily the imagery of a thermostat and the illusion of planetary control.”90 Such an 
illusion, I would add, lends credibility to the unaccountable “experts” like George and 
Keith who might implement managerial approaches to climate change: if the world has a 
thermostat that some humans might somehow control, it stands to reason that we ought to 
entrust experts to do that work. 
V. Conclusion 
     Taken together, the centrality of endeavors like carbon finance and geoengineering in 
the dominant climate imaginary reify the ideologies of neoliberalism and managerialism 
through which they operate, entrenching those political logics in common sense and 
eclipsing other potentially more democratic ones. As such, it should come as no surprise 
that there exists a widespread tendency to accept or endorse as fact the idea that the world 
on the other side of climate solutions will resemble fundamentally the way the world is – 
or was, before we knew what we now know about the climate. Also embedded in such an 
idea is the fundamentally optimistic view that new market forces and forms of technology 
will solve the problem. 
     In turn, when scholarship is framed by the dominant imaginary along with its 
neoliberal and managerial commitments, it implicitly disavows (or at least leaves for 
later) the need to reconceptualize climate change, and to re-present climate change as a 
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problem that invites a turn to a democratic imagination, a need to tarry with questions 
of responsibility, to reassess citizenship in light of climate violence, etc. The common 
person as figured by neoliberalism and sidelined by managerialism has little reason to 
want to engage politically, given the “widespread economization of heretofore 
noneconomic domains” such as climate, or nature more generally.91 
     In my second chapter I proposed the concept of indirect violence as a way of drawing 
out and encouraging democratic concern with climate change. Insofar as the indirect 
violence of climate change impacts large swaths of human and nonhuman beings, it 
should be a concern for those committed to democratic goals like equality, repair, anti-
domination, and the fostering of public things available to many, if not all, people. To 
think democratically about the indirect violence of climate change is to think about how 
that violence can be slowed, stopped, and ultimately reversed (or otherwise repaired) by 
impacted individuals and communities. The dominant imaginary just interrogated 
provides few opportunities to ask such questions, and its operations should not be 
expected to open up such spaces. 
     How can we think about responsibility for climate violence, and how might 
democratic emphases shift in light of such violence? My next two chapters address these 
questions, respectively. 
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Chapter 4: Situating Responsibility 
I. Introduction 
     Whether the dominant imaginary continues to drive the collective response to climate 
change – or whether other logics are able to expand and/or eclipse that imaginary – the 
question of responsibility looms large. As I have just argued, the ideological function of 
neoliberal and managerial logics encourage us to shirk responsibility by mystifying the 
problem, making it seem as if markets or managers will address the vast and multifaceted 
problem of climate change. In that case, political responsibility would seem to involve 
showing our moral support for such approaches and demanding their swift 
implementation. Personal or ethical responsibility would likewise be reduced to limiting 
our individual carbon footprints by becoming more conscious consumers. In this chapter 
I turn to the question of how we can think about responsibility beyond this limited 
formulation, and in relation to the structural, slow unfolding of climate violence. In order 
to do that, I aim to accomplish a first goal of drawing out the existing discussion 
surrounding responsibility for climate change and a second goal, as has often been my 
move throughout this dissertation, of nudging it away from limited and abstract 
formulations toward the concrete, the everyday, and the tangible. 
     The standard way of approaching responsibility for climate change – the way I aim to 
move away from – is to ask from the outset what it might mean to take responsibility for 
climate change and what it might take to act in line with the responsibility one has taken: 
to consume responsibly; to reduce, reuse, and recycle, etc. Yet in the context of (my) 
everyday experience, how to go about this is by no means clear. Now that I know a 
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decent amount about climate change, for example, is it my responsibility to generally 
consume less in order to emit fewer GHGs? to personally boycott the extraction, 
production, or circulation of carbon intensive commodities? to advocate that others do 
the same? to lobby the government that represents me as an abstract citizen to invest in 
renewable energy? to lobby the university for which I teach and under the guidance of 
which I have written this dissertation to divest from fossil fuels, as members of the 
student group Fossil Free Minnesota might like me to do?1 should I help organize 
students and faculty in order to collectively convince the University or the student body 
to foot the bill for transitioning the University of Minnesota from carbon to renewable 
energy, like fellow students and I did at my undergraduate institution of UC Santa Cruz? 
should I more simply change my proverbial light bulbs? should I decrease my luxury 
emissions by refusing to take unnecessary “Sunday drives?” 
     Even if I was sure that any one of these avenues was the ‘correct’ way to take on and 
subsequently discharge responsibility in light of climate change, I might then be faced 
with more questions rather than fewer. Take the first response alone: If it is my 
responsibility to consume less so I emit fewer GHGs (or so that I am responsible for the 
emission of fewer GHGs), how am I to go about this? do I consume fewer calories? do I 
use my relatively limited resources to pay more for locally sourced food and other 
consumer goods? do I devote my scarce free time to growing my own food in the limited 
outdoor space that I share with my housemates and if so, must I coordinate with them or 
does my responsibility to emit fewer GHGs take precedent over my responsibility to 
acknowledge the desires of those close to me? am I acting responsibly by declining to 
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own a car? what if I take public transportation? or Uber, with its own ethical pitfalls? 
what if I occasionally – or frequently – accept the generous offers of those close to me, 
and borrow their cars? what if I fly to one or two conferences a year and I reason that, 
since there are limits to reimbursement for conference travel, I really shouldn’t purchase 
the carbon offsets offered by the airlines?  
     Similar strings of questions could be raised for any of the proposals for acting 
responsibly in light of climate change listed above, as well as many that I have neglected 
to list. And people and peoples who are positioned differently than I am would obviously, 
when asked, come up with their own lists of how one might take responsibility for 
climate change. Any one answer, then, is not going to come forward quickly, and the 
question of whether a singular calculated answer is productive is itself legitimate. A 
singular answer to individual responsibility for climate violence, like the managerial and 
neoliberal answers to climate change discussed in the last chapter, might problematically 
downplay the complexity of the situation or, worse, might end up having been misguided 
and ineffective. Eschewing complexity, a straightforwardly calculated responsibility 
might reach for “a simple view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all 
the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction.”2 If we settle for simple 
calculations of responsibility for climate change (change the light bulbs, drive less, etc.), 
we risk embracing metaphysical and abstract responsibilities without working through 
whether such enactments might address and redress the very material and relational past, 
                                                
2 Edmund Burke, quoted in Harlan Wilson, “Burke: The Nature of Politics” in Peter Cannavò and 
Joseph Lane Jr, Engaging Nature: Environmentalism and the Political Theory Canon 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), 157. I come back to the centrality of relation in a political 
sense in the next chapter. 
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present, and future violences at play. In the same way that the distance in value chains 
risks divorcing the success of carbon-reduction markets from the reduction of actual 
GHGs, a simplistic approach to responsibility risks divorcing the good moral feeling one 
might get by acting responsibly from the question of whether such actions help produce 
better outcomes in the world.3 
     If there is no quick and easy answer to the question of responsibility for the climate, 
perhaps there is something suspect about redressing climate violence through the lens of 
individual responsibility in the way I have done above. Perhaps the simple “nakedness 
and solitude” of trying to render responsibility for climate change a private matter goes 
too far. And perhaps, as Chad Lavin has suggested more generally, some issues require 
that we think about responsibility “after liberalism.”4 Responsibility “after liberalism,” or 
“postliberal responsibility” offers a way of suggesting that some issues are simply too 
obstinate to be affected by the actions of individuals and their contracts, to homo 
oeconomicus and its singular, contractual way of relating to others and to the broader 
world. If we listen to Lavin’s claims about postliberal responsibility, it becomes 
necessary for individuals and groups to think beyond the liberalism of, for example, 
“Anglo-American criminal law, in which responsibility stems from a competent agent’s 
                                                
3 Feeling good and doing right are not mutually exclusive, of course, and the former can be a 
good motivation for doing the latter. I turn to the role of emotion in responsible democratic 
action, and the prospects for seeing affective response as a locus for democratic projects toward 
the end of the next chapter. For now, I raise this distinction in order to acknowledge the 
possibility that some forms of responsibility might produce more good feelings than substantive 
change. 
4 Chad Lavin, The Politics of Responsibility (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008). 
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willed causality” and in which “we are responsible for what we cause.”5 Instead, 
postliberal responsibility means thinking in reference to the structures and social relations 
out of which problems emerge and against which a concrete grasp of what it would mean 
to be responsible might appear. Whereas (as I argue in my second chapter) the violence 
of climate change is indirect, frustrating familiar liberal categories such as agency and 
causality, one way to start to come to terms with responsibility for climate violence is to 
shift the register from a liberal individual one (reflected by the commonsensical 
individualist questions with which I begin this chapter) to a postliberal and relational one. 
I start this process here and draw out its conclusions in the following chapter; it is in this 
way that I hope to achieve this chapter’s goals of both surveying past discussions of 
responsibility for climate violence and nudging their starting points away from 
abstraction and toward a concrete and hopefully more complete register. 
     I do this, eventually, by shifting the starting point of the conversation away from 
climate responsibility and toward a prior engagement with climate responsiveness. Where 
the first assumes that the meaning of responsibility is in some significant way clear, 
intelligible, or easily calculable,6 the latter accepts that understanding and embracing 
one’s responsibility requires a prior willingness and ability to be responsive. 
Responsiveness, in turn, works through a sense of openness, or curiosity even, about 
what it would mean to be responsible. 
                                                
5 Ibid., vii. In conceptualizing climate violence in Chapter 2, I have already suggested that 
specifically liberal notions of will, intention, causality, responsibility, liability, etc. are not 
particularly useful when it comes to responding to climate change. 
6 I borrow the language of “calculable” responsibility from Shalini Satkunanandan, Extraordinary 
Responsibility: Politics Beyond the Moral Calculus (New York: Cambridge UP, 2015). I 
appreciatively discuss Satkunanandan’s work in more detail below. 
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     In order to motivate a move from responsibility to responsiveness (and then to 
edge back again), the second section of this chapter looks at how individual responsibility 
for climate change is conceptualized in the liberal register. A third section turns directly 
to promises of and limits to recent conversations in political theory that seek to theorize 
postliberal responsibility in one way or another, and points to different ways of 
understanding the necessarily political, collective nature of postliberal responsibility. 
Fourth, I make the case that getting to postliberal responsibility for climate violence 
requires tending to and fostering responsiveness, and end with a return to the question of 
political responsiveness to and responsibility for climate violence.7 
     In doing so, I aim to describe a political ethic of responsiveness between two 
extremes. One extreme has to do with my concerns about responsibility in the 
anthropocene, in which responsibility is figured as essentially burdening all humans in 
much the same way: we are all particulars under the universal of the anthropos and, as 
such, we are all responsible.8 I call this the “universal responsibility” approach to climate 
ethics. At the other extreme is the “individual responsibility” approach, which offers the 
common, persistent, and distracting idea that responsibility is essentially personal. 
Common to both responses, moreover, is the idea that responsiveness need not come 
before responsibility. Between these unhelpful or perhaps dangerous extremes, but 
without constituting a straightforward synthesis of the two, rests a third view with which 
                                                
7 The distinction between responsiveness and responsibility that runs throughout this chapter and 
many of the authors I turn to below – especially Jade Schiff – comes from scholars of care ethics 
who follow (if also challenge) Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1982). 
8 A closely related view of responsibility is in Kristin Schrader-Frechette, Environmental Justice: 
Creating Equality, Reclaiming Democracy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002). 
  
133 
I conclude. My task here is to parse out an understanding of responsibility for climate 
change in light of responsiveness to the fact of uneven contributions to and uneven 
capabilities for responding to climate change. Resting between universal and individual 
responsibility, I call this, simply, “situated responsibility.” 
     Like Donna Haraway’s “situated knowledge,” situated responsibility affirms that we 
“don’t want to theorize the world, much less act within it, in terms of Global Systems, but 
we do need an earth-wide network of connections.”9 Where ‘theorizing or acting in the 
world in terms of Global Systems’ means presuming one can calculate the world from 
outside of it and thus know it objectively, focusing on an ‘earth-wide network of 
connections’ means keeping in mind that one is situated on a globe or in a greenhouse 
and yet can never grasp it entirely. As such, rather than reach for a universal sense of 
responsibility in which one is responsible to everyone equally, or an individual sense in 
which one is responsible only for oneself – one’s carbon footprint for example – situated 
responsibility accords with Joan Tronto’s thinking about partiality and relational 
responsibilities. Such thinking holds that “starting from a partialist account of moral life 
that relies upon our concrete responsibilities provides a better guide to our global moral 
duties than does starting from a universalistic perspective that presumes ‘wide but 
shallow’ commitments to all others.”10 In different ways, Haraway and Tronto each push 
their readers to think seriously and concretely about the relations one has with others – 
whether such relations are readily apparent or have been previously disavowed – and 
                                                
9 Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 579-80.  
10 Joan Tronto, “Partiality Based on Relational Responsibilities: Another Approach to Global 
Ethics,” Ethics and Social Welfare 6, no. 3 (2012): 314. 
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about one’s position in the world. 
     Starting from similar concerns about relations, connections, and partiality, and coming 
back to the problem of climate change, I am here suggesting that one’s responsibility at 
an individual level and / or as part of a collective derives from their position(s) vis-à-vis 
climate violence, and is best acknowledged, allocated, and embraced as such. Again, with 
Tronto, “such an approach is not universalistic in its construction, but it turns out to be 
radical and far-reaching in its effect.”11 I now take a critical look at several ways of 
considering responsibility in order, ultimately, to suggest that thinking about 
responsibility for climate violence means thinking about where oneself, one’s 
community, or any number of corporate entities (companies, states, etc.) to which one is 
beholden is positioned in relation to that violence: as perpetrator? as victim? as 
beneficiary? as bystander? or as some complex combination thereof? 
II. Responsibility as Moral Mathematics12 
     In opening this chapter I tried to express some of the pitfalls that inhere in thinking 
through climate violence from the perspective of well intentioned yet highly individualist 
registers of responsibility. Before making my main argument, it is necessary to examine 
more closely the ways that scholars have proposed we think about responsibility for 
climate change. I do this to draw attention to the ways in which political studies of 
climate responsibility tend to fall into two camps: one that locates responsibility in 
individuals themselves and another that locates responsibility in individuals as 
                                                
11 Ibid., 315. 
12 In discussing “moral mathematics,” I am drawing on Shalini Satkunanandan and Steve 
Vanderheiden, who offer usefully contrasting discussions of the possibility and desirability of 
calculating responsibility as if it were subject to mathematical precision. 
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represented by states and institutions. Note that this method of arrangement mirrors 
standard understandings that approach climate change as first and foremost an issue of 
environmental policy with a concomitant need that responsibility be highly calculable. 
Charles Eccleston and Frederic March, for example, suggest that environmental policy 
(in the US, but globally as well) is first put on the table by individuals and the social 
movements they spark, epitomized by Rachel Carson’s 1962 Silent Spring and its 
aftermath. In this analysis, environmental policy is then addressed by states through 
legislation such as the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act in the United States. 
Finally, the environment is then addressed globally by international institutions, as the 
United Nations Environment Programme started to do in 1972.13 First individuals take 
responsibility by creating problems as such, then states and institutions take responsibility 
by responding to those problems. 
     In this model, responsibility for climate change is cast in the mold of what Chad Lavin 
calls “liberal responsibility.” My critique of the existing literature is that, whether 
responsibility is located in the individual as such or individuals collected by states and 
international institutions, the concept of responsibility at play is essentially liberal for two 
related reasons. The first commonality of the liberal approaches discussed below has to 
do with its methodological individualism. Even once responsibility is scaled up above the 
level of the individual, that is, the individual remains at the core of the concept of 
responsibility and groups are reduced to mere collections of individuals. Methodological 
individualism “denies that there are any actions, interests, or intentions of organizations 
                                                
13 Charles Eccleston and Frederic March, Global Environmental Policy: Concepts, Principles, 
and Practice (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press / Taylor and Francis Group, 2011), xxxviii-xl. 
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that cannot be reduced to those of their constituent members. By this account … 
groups do not cause harm; only individuals do.”14 Second, liberal responsibility is but one 
variety, and, I am convinced, not the one best suited for confronting the violence of 
climate change and our positions in relation to that violence. I come back to this at the 
end of this section. For now, suffice it to say that liberal responsibility is both too 
calculating and too generic, resting on what Shalini Satkunanandan describes as the 
“moral calculus” approach to responsibility and endorsing what Steve Vanderheiden 
deems the “moral mathematics” approach. Moral mathematics reduces responsibility to a 
cognitive calculation rather than, say, one that includes ethical, reflexive, or indeed 
political entanglements. 
Individual Mathematics 
     As I suggest above, I am not convinced that individual responsibility - when the 
individual is conceived non-relationally, as an “ideal moral agent of universalist ethics, 
which must abstract from specific circumstances in order to achieve responsible moral 
judgment”15 is a fruitful approach to climate change. Yet many others are convinced, so it 
is necessary to engage this line of thinking. In line with the common sensibility of the 
liberal individual, many scholars support analyses that place the autonomous (and, 
indeed, often hypothetical) individual at the center of discussions about responsibility for 
climate change. As Melissa Lane points out, “moral philosophers have become 
preoccupied with the question of whether individuals have a moral obligation to take 
                                                
14 Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2008), 169. 
15 Fiona Robinson, The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security (Philadelphia, 
PA: Temple University Press, 2011), 28. 
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action on climate change … a question answered with a provocative negative by 
Sinnott-Armstrong.”16  For Sinnott-Armstrong, individuals lack a personal responsibility 
to decrease their contributions to climate change because such contributions are infinitely 
small, even across a lifetime. In line with Lane’s claim, though, are a series of arguments 
defending individual responsibility for climate change. Avram Hiller, for example, 
responds to Sinnott-Armstrong with the claim that it is indeed morally wrong to 
participate in the kinds of ostensibly superfluous activities that contribute infinitesimally 
to a changing climate, such as a “sunday drive:” a drive that is purely luxurious and 
therefore “unnecessary.” Arguing against Sinnott-Armstrong’s view  (deemed “individual 
causal inefficacy” by Hiller) Hiller suggests that it is indeed a moral hazard to emit 
superfluous emissions. Individual causal inefficacy, he writes, is exemplified by Dale 
Jamieson’s insistence that “joy-riding in my ’57 Chevy will not in itself change the 
climate.”17 In other words, against my view that climate violence is first and foremost a 
slow and structural process, Hiller insists that it ought nonetheless be assessed at the level 
of individual choices. Defending individual responsibility in turn, Hiller proposes that “it 
is prima facie wrong to perform an act which has an expected amount of harm greater 
than another easily available alternative.”18 Given the availability of not driving for fun, 
Hiller deems it inherently wrong to go for superfluous drives, even if the GHG emissions 
from that drive are minute. 
                                                
16 Melissa Lane, “Political Theory of Climate Change,” Annual Review of Political Science 19 
(2016): 114; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual 
Moral Obligations,” in Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics, 
eds. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Richard Howarth (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005) 
17 Quoted in Avram Hiller, “Climate Change and Individual Responsibility,” The Monist 94, no. 3 
(2011): 350. 
18 Ibid., 352. 
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     Ultimately, the argument that Hiller makes hinges on a surprising comparison. 
Noting that arguments like Sinnott-Armstrong’s against individual responsibility (not to 
drive) usually denounce individual responsibility in order to support a broader effort 
toward collective responsibility for political or structural change, Hiller suggests that both 
options suffer from the same shortfall. Here he suggests an irony in Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
claim that instead of focusing on individual questions about responsibility we ought 
instead turn to politics, since the same argument can be made against political action: 
“famously, an individual’s voting in an election is held to make virtually no expected 
difference. And it would be impossible to determine that a possible future drought was 
averted because one individual wrote a letter to her congressperson or carried a sign at a 
climate rally.”19 If we cannot calculate the importance of political action, that is, Hiller 
suggests that we turn to individual responsibility and behavior insofar as we can at least 
keep tabs and give an account of what we have done. If we cannot change the structure or 
process that leads to climate violence, we can at least keep a zealous eye on our carbon 
footprints. 
     I understand the distinction, analytically. Yet it is difficult to take Hiller completely 
seriously. Yes, there is a case to be made for avoiding one’s own superfluous driving. Yet 
in casting doubt on precisely and only those individual acts aimed at broader and more 
impactful ends, Hiller wanders into analytical obscurity. It seems to me that voting, 
writing letters, picketing, or organizing to discredit broader activities that can be seen as 
superfluous is each as (if not more) important than opting out of one’s Sunday drive. The 
former activities, perhaps incalculable, hold at least a slight promise of adding to 
                                                
19 Ibid., 365. 
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something unpredictable – in a hopeful sense – occurring, precisely because those 
individual acts are acted out publically.20 
     Whatever one decides about the particulars of this argument, or about the (in)efficacy 
of individual-liberal responsibility, the exchange between Sinnott-Armstrong and Hiller 
is important insofar as it exemplifies a wider trend toward ideal theory within climate 
ethics and moral philosophy, of seeking to ground responsibility or a lack thereof in 
calculable principles of one sort or another. 
     Given my concern to invite a turn to responsibility and activism by bringing out the 
dramatic elements of climate politics, and to thereby produce theory relevant to political 
engagement, such arguments are somewhat irrelevant. By assessing climate change as a 
problem of abstract philosophy or ideal theory, thinkers like Hiller produce 
philosophically sophisticated and beautiful works. Yet such works feel alienating ‘on the 
ground’ if they are never made concrete and if their importance is never plainly stated. In 
the grand scheme of climate violence, how many people are really out there deciding 
whether or not to go for a Sunday drive? And even if they were to read Hiller, and 
accordingly decline to drive on Sundays for pleasure, would a difference be made to the 
structures and processes that produce climate violence? At best, such a question makes 
the public crisis of climate change into a private one, at worst it tempts people to obsess 
                                                
20 Joan Tronto rightly asked me to think about the implications and appropriateness of avoiding 
the ‘Sunday drive’ alongside organizing against broader and more impactful activities like car 
racing, dune buggies, and the particularly arrogant and egregious case of “rolling coal,” in which 
drivers “soup up their engines and remove their emissions controls to “roll coal,” or belch black 
smoke, at pedestrians, cyclists and unsuspecting Prius drivers.” It is in embracing the former and 
implicitly denouncing the latter individual acts that Hiller’s argument makes little sense to me. 
For the discussion of rolling coal, see Hiroko Tabuchi, “Rolling Coal in Diesel Trucks, to Rebel 
and Provoke,” New York Times (September 4, 2016): https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/05/ 
business/energy-environment/rolling-coal-in-diesel-trucks-to-rebel-and-provoke.html. 
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over their own lives rather than the world that we share in common. To be sure 
reflecting on one’s own life is important. It is also clearly not enough. 
Collective Calculations 
     When scholarship does not start with individuals and their responsibilities, the 
alternative is to think about other actors – most often the collective actor that is the state 
but occasionally sub-state units like cities and towns – through which responsibility 
might be assigned and discharged.21 Such scholarship tends to take a broadly legalistic 
approach, concerning itself with “the interpretation of the meaning of substantive legal 
principles in multilateral agreements.”22 The most relevant way of thinking about 
responsibility for climate change along these lines is to think about the “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” of states as introduced by the UNFCCC in 1992.23 In 
Article 3.1, the relevant text of the UNFCCC, this is the language we find: 
The Parties [member states] should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
                                                
21 In the time since Trump’s election and subsequent threats to defund key scientific research, for 
example, California Governor Jerry Brown notably replied that “if Trump turns off the satellites, 
California will launch its own damn satellite … We’re going to collect that data.” Likewise, cities 
and other regional units are often at the forefront of attempts to adapt to climate change. For the 
Brown quotation, see Christopher Cadelago, “Jerry Brown Strikes Defiant Tone: ‘California Will 
Launch its Own Damn Satellite,” The Sacramento Bee (December 14, 2016): http://www. 
sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article120928688.html. With regard to cities’ 
actions see Jeff Biggers, “Cities and States Lead on Climate Change,” New York Times 
(November 30, 2016): https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/opinion/cities-and-states-lead-on-
climate-change.html. 
22 Paul Anderson, Reforming Law and Economy for a Sustainable Earth: Critical Thought for 
Turbulent Times (New York: Routledge, 2015), 198. 
23 See Christopher D. Stone, “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law,” 
The American Journal of International Law 98, no. 2 (2004) for a discussion of “common but 
differentiated responsibility” in international law; see especially 278-81 for the argument that the 
principle if not the language goes back at least as far as the Treaty of Versailles (1919), continues 
through a 1965 GATT provision, and shows up periodically in the World Bank as well as other 
United Nations endeavors. 
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accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take 
the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.24 
     While the legal meaning of Article 3.1 is an ongoing question, its broad contour is 
clear. “The idea,” most simply, “is that some countries should contribute more than 
others to the provision of global public goods [climate health in this case], usually but not 
inevitably divided along a Rich-Poor axis.”25 
     Steve Vanderheiden, as noted, was centrally concerned with theorizing Article 3.1 in 
Atmospheric Justice. Where Hiller barely nods to non-individual responsibility for 
climate change (“the fact that I have emphasized individuals’ direct moral responsibility 
should not be taken as an argument that we have no political responsibilities as well”26), 
Vanderheiden’s analysis is praiseworthy for going beyond a strictly individual approach. 
In Atmospheric Justice, Vanderheiden relates the question of individual responsibility to 
the responsibility of states and the international institutions in ways that are more 
productive. He thus introduces the political question of justice by taking seriously the 
idea of a global climate regime and the premise of “common but differentiated 
responsibility” embedded in the UNFCCC.27 For Vanderheiden, settling questions of 
(common, differentiated) responsibility means settling questions of how to distribute the 
costs of mitigating climate change in a way that is equitable and fair to all of the (state) 
                                                
24 United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992. Emphasis 
added. 
25 Stone, “CDR in International Law,” 299. 
26 Hiller, 365. 
27 Much of the book is about this attempt. For the first mention see Vanderheiden, Atmospheric 
Justice, xvii. 
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parties involved. 
     Yet the turn to distributive justice is not dictated by Article 3.1. Within the common 
but differentiated approach to responsibility differences abound. With Vanderheiden, Eric 
Posner and David Weisbach for example agree on the need for an overarching treaty to 
coordinate policy: “whatever policies are chosen … governments around the world … 
will need to coordinate these policies, most likely through a treaty. The importance of an 
international treaty can scarcely be exaggerated.”28 However, Posner and Weisbach are 
skeptical of Vanderheiden’s willingness to use the UNFCCC to start to address historical 
injustice (even though his suggestion would only be a start). Under the guise of fairness, 
Posner and Weisbach suggest that thinkers like Vanderheiden “improperly tie valid 
concerns about redistribution to the problem of reducing the effects of climate change.”29 
Citing the argument uncontroversially attributed to some developing countries, that “the 
developed world should bear most of the cost of greenhouse gas mitigation efforts,” 
Posner and Weisbach interpret that the reason the developed world should pay, in this 
line of thinking, is “because they are rich.”30 
     Yet it is worth noting that arguments like Vanderheiden’s do not actually link 
                                                
28 Eric Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010), 2. 
For doubts about placing hope in a single treaty, or an “integrated regime,” see Robert Keohane 
and David Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 1 
(2011): 7-23. Keohane and Victor first advocate a “regime complex” in which particular 
agreements tend to particular climate related harms (sea level, forced migration, desertification, 
etc.). By the end, though, they also caution against the viability of a regime complex approach. 
For a third take, which sees the need for “governors” other than the state given the task of climate 
governance, arguing that such governance “must not be performed by states only; it is also a 
matter for other authorities–for example, nongovernmental organizations and epistemic 
communities,” see Sverker C. Jagers and Johannes Stripple, “Climate Governance Beyond the 
State,” Global Governance 9, no. 3 (2003): 385. 
29 Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, 73. 
30 Ibid. 
  
143 
inequality and climate change arbitrarily (as is the suggestion underlying Posner and 
Weisbach’s claim). Rather, Vanderheiden suggests that developed countries ought pay 
for mitigation not because they are rich, but because such wealth has in a sense been 
taken from the global commons, and in many cases from those same developing 
countries. The “respective capabilities” for responding did not appear out of nowhere, 
they were developed in the course of long histories spent industrializing, modernizing, 
and emitting tremendous amounts of GHGs. Instead of arguing that rich countries pay 
“because they are rich,” Vanderheiden simply demands that history be taken into account 
when trying to parse out “common but differentiated responsibilities.” 
     In the distinct but related context of the legacies of colonialism, Tronto argues that 
“the fact of relationship, the mutual constitutive effects of past colonial relationships, 
continues to create responsibilities,” and that, as such, harmful relationships that are 
‘past’ nonetheless continue to create responsibilities in the present.31 A similar and 
intertwined line of reasoning applies in the case of mitigation: developed countries ought 
to pay not because they are rich. Rather, they are rich in no small part because of ‘past’ 
colonial wrongs they helped enable and that produced the underdeveloped postcolony. As 
such they have a responsibility to pay. Responsibility here, at the national level, comes 
not from being rich in the abstract, but from having become rich by developing in the 
distant past before it was possible to consider development’s contribution to climate 
violence. 
     Vanderheiden’s move to theorize responsibility beyond the individual, and therefore 
to locate it in the state and in international institutions themselves, is a step forward. Yet, 
                                                
31 Tronto, “Relational Responsibilities,” 312. 
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as with my opening hypotheticals, even approaches like his hark back, by and large, 
to what Lavin describes as the liberal model of responsibility and what Iris Marion 
Young calls the “liability model.”32 So while the ostensible unit of analysis shifts 
between the individual, the state, and international institutions, the turn to responsibility 
for climate change, if made at all, has usually been made in the name of political 
liberalism and using the method of moral mathematics. Whatever important details and 
differences inhere in such debates, the point here is that even when responsibility is 
scaled up to the levels of collectives, the quality and characteristics of responsibility at 
play continue to mirror that held by individuals. It concerns (legal) liability, calculability, 
and a teleological assumption that responsibility can be accounted for, discharged, or 
otherwise completed in some reasonable timeframe. Responsibility belongs to individuals 
and states in such a way that figures those actors as specifically possessive individuals 
rather than, say, relational human and corporate bodies. In light of climate change, 
scaling individual responsibility up to the level of states is a step forward on liberal terms 
insofar as discharging this sort of responsibility might be bolstered by an ‘economy of 
scale’ effect: actions undertaken by states are more effective than actions undertaken by 
individuals alone since they come closer to affecting the structures out of which climate 
change emerges. Yet given the ubiquity of climate violence and the relations forged 
between peoples who contribute to and are harmed by such violence unevenly, it is 
                                                
32 See Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model,” 
Social Philosophy & Policy 23, no. 1 (2006): 102-30 and Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2011). Vanderheiden’s work contains a partial exception in that he makes an effort to 
root his causal / legal conception of responsibility in a prior sense of moral responsibility. Yet his 
sense of moral responsibility seems to me every bit as liberal as his sense of causal responsibility. 
“In many ways,” he writes, “legal responsibility is analogous to moral responsibility, as the use of 
such terms as “fault” and “liability” suggest.” Atmospheric Justice, 150. 
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unclear that starting from liberal theories of responsibility that locate responsibility in 
possessive individuals and according to methodological individualism can ever really 
grasp the severity of the problem, let alone (motivate people to) respond to it adequately. 
     Moving beyond the singular individual, a second problem arises with regard to 
thinking through the liberal responsibility of states: assigning responsibility at the level of 
states does not necessarily reflect the groupings or classes that climate violence produces 
(more on which in the next chapter). Importantly, this view divides the world and 
produces relevant state-collectivities based on what Elizabeth Cripps calls an 
intentionalist model of collectivities. “For many years” Cripps writes, “the dominant 
view was that sets of individuals constitute collectivities because they think of themselves 
as doing so: either because each individual considers herself to be a member of some 
group with the others, or because they all jointly intend to do something. This, broadly 
put, is the intentionalist view.”33 In other words, collectivities form when and where 
people imagine themselves to be a part of them: we can think here of Benedict 
Anderson’s classic argument in Imagined Communities.34 Yet as I pursue in the next 
chapter, it might make more sense to think of collectivities beyond the nation-state when 
it comes to climate violence. Given that virtually any single state will contain people 
whose carbon emissions (direct and indirect) range from negative (through the purchase 
of offsets, participation in mitigation projects, etc), to zero, to tremendous, we might 
instead think about collectivities to which we belong along lines of violence: in terms of 
                                                
33 Elizabeth Cripps, Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an 
Interdependent World (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), 28. Cripps attributes the idea to Margaret 
Gilbert, On Social Facts (London: Routledge, 1989) and A Theory of Political Obligation 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006). 
34 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2006). 
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victims, perpetrators, bystanders, and beneficiaries. Or we might think about them 
along economic lines: in terms of a “transnational capitalist class,”35 a transnational 
working class, the transnational poor, those from whom resources are expropriated rather 
than labor exploited, and so on.36 The point is that the state is not necessarily the best 
indicator of relevant collectivities. 
     Finally, the shift from strictly individual responsibility to state/international 
institutional responsibility explicitly or implicitly suggests that responsibility for climate 
change is primarily a question of distribution: that distributive justice is the justice around 
which we ought to orient theories of responsibility for climate change.37 Vanderheiden 
exemplifies the latter point here, when he notes that “our practical question concerns 
legal responsibility, because a climate regime must hold parties liable for climate-related 
harm.”38 Distributing liability fairly thus exhausts the question of responsibility. With 
thinkers like Young, Lavin, and Jade Schiff we can critique and go beyond the reliance 
on a strict liability and liberal model of responsibility held by individuals, mirrored by 
collectives-as-states, and assumed by many of those who approach climate change as 
only or primarily an issue of distributive justice. 
III. Responsibility “Beyond the Moral Calculus” 
     As suggested, the moral mathematics approach to adjudicating responsibility is not 
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enough in the case of climate violence. As thinkers like Hans Jonas and Stephen 
Gardiner suggest, our ethical frameworks and political institutions – within which rest the 
kinds of liberal responsibility just discussed – were not designed to address problems 
spanning such vast expanses of space and time, as does climate change. Per Jonas, 
“modern technology has introduced actions of such novel scale, objects, and 
consequences that the framework of former ethics can no longer contain them.”39 Or, 
with Gardiner, perhaps “our existing institutions were simply not designed for, and did 
not evolve in response to, global environmental problems that play out over many 
generations.”40 Finally, as Cripps writes, climate change “is a global-scale problem, but 
one that does not result from intentional collective action and to which we are not yet set 
up to respond collectively.41 Perhaps, that is, ‘global humanity’ is simply not yet 
equipped to confront the problem of anthropogenic climate change. 
     Yet to say that past ethics cannot fully address present concerns decidedly does not 
imply that no present response can be composed. Political theorists have turned directly 
to rethinking responsibility in recent years, a turn that provides the broad contours to an 
approach that can help disrupt and refocus the above conversation in productive ways. In 
light of the two factors that frustrate discussions about responsibility for climate change 
mentioned above – that responsibility is highly individual and the collectives in question 
are states, which are perhaps not the most appropriate collectives in light of climate 
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change – I now want to suggest that we ought ask a prior question of responsiveness.  
     The turn to responsiveness runs against the argument that in lieu of an ideal and well-
functioning climate regime, we ought default to locating responsibility in sovereign 
individuals (homo oeconomicus). Instead, this line of thinking holds that we can 
reconceptualize responsibility in a way that is less concerned with calculation and less 
individualistic and individuating. In place of attaining liberal responsibility, it suggests a 
goal of political responsibility, political insofar as it arises in and through our relations to 
others and to the broader world. Political responsibility, in other words, “needs to ponder 
the obligations–past, present, and future–of human beings in their domain of life and 
action as members of political collectivity.”42 
     Yet because the gulf between liberal responsibility and the turn to responsiveness is so 
wide, I want to show how we get from the former to the latter by surveying some of the 
more relevant works in political theory’s turn to responsibility, a turn implicitly or 
explicitly rooted in Hannah Arendt’s short essay “Collective Responsibility.” First, 
Arendt raises the question of collective responsibility as such. Along the way, she helps 
us to differentiate guilt from responsibility, a distinction that is important for locating the 
place for liability, calculability, and distributive justice in the response to climate change 
on the one hand, and the place for something less calculable on the other. In turn, Lavin 
provides a nice summary of the reasons for shifting away from liberal responsibility, 
which Shalini Satkunanandan complements by turning our focus to the problems specific 
to calculability. Finally, Schiff provides a compelling argument in favor of a turn to 
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responsiveness that is especially apropos of climate violence and the collectives thus 
generated. 
Guilt and/or Collective Responsibility 
     “I do not know when the term “collective responsibility” first made it appearance,” 
Hannah Arendt wrote, “but I am reasonably sure that not only the term but also the 
problems it implies owe their relevance and general interest to political predicaments as 
distinguished from legal or moral ones.”43 While applications of the political, the legal, 
and the moral may at times only be analytically distinct, it is nonetheless useful to 
separate them as such. In light of the above discussion, Arendt’s distinction is particularly 
useful since it allows us to pose directly the political question of collective responsibility 
of individuals and groups, after having edged away from the calculating liberal answers 
discussed above. 
     Indeed Arendt’s work allows us to make a further distinction between purely 
individual responsibility – where I am responsible for my actions, like taking a Sunday 
drive – and ‘individual’ responsibility for collective endeavors – where I am responsible 
for working with similarly situated others to address something common: shifting my 
community’s electricity generation from carbon sources to renewable ones, perhaps. The 
former is represented by familiar demands to change one’s shopping habits, one’s 
consumption patterns, or one’s light bulbs in order to counter climate change. The latter 
might include the former, but also accounts for and necessarily goes beyond it, asking 
about an individual’s responsibility for the wrongs done by collectives to which she or he 
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belongs. In Arendt’s terms, this involves a shift from thinking about one’s guilt to 
one’s responsibility. Individual members of collectives, Arendt claims, can neither be nor 
feel guilty if they have not actively participated in evil. “There is no such thing as being 
or feeling guilty for things that happened without oneself actively participating in 
them.”44 Climate change, against thinkers like Hiller, is too vast for individual 
contributions to constitute a significant enough basis for assigning guilt to individuals. 
Likewise, the kinds of participation in harm associated with Arendt’s guilt are 
categorically different from the more diluted kinds of harm associated with one’s 
oversized carbon footprint: it would be difficult if not morally suspect to sustain the case 
that driving to work constitutes the same kind of moral harm as actively participating in 
the evils perpetrated in Nazi Germany. 
     Yet unwilling to give up on the idea that bystanders and others who enable harm 
without actively participating in it are implicated to some degree, Arendt helpfully turns 
to the concept of responsibility. Having moved away from guilt as the concept through 
which to engage bystanders, beneficiaries, and others who enable harm, whom we can 
call passive rather than active participants, Arendt holds that “there is such thing as 
responsibility for things one has not done; one can be held liable for them.”45 Though her 
point of reference, again, is that of the postwar condition of Germans as such, here her 
position is relevant to my case. Bystanding individuals should neither feel nor be seen as 
guilty for the things a universal to which they belong (Germans in her case; humans in 
mine) has done. Yet they can be thought of as responsible. Here, Steven Esquith is 
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incisive. In relation to a US company that, in 1908, had benefitted from convict-
leasing resulting in the death of Green Cottenham, an African-American who had been 
charged with vagrancy, Esquith points to that company’s contemporary denial of guilt. In 
response, Esquith highlights the place for bystander and beneficiary responsibility: 
When contacted by Blackmon, U.S. Steel officials denied that such practices had 
occurred and then suggested that there is no reason to revisit these matters. For 
corporations that believe they are being responsible citizens now, historical 
injustices are not an issue. I will argue that such corporations (including their 
employees and stockholders) are complicit everyday bystanders to severe 
violence. Because they continue to enjoy benefits from these past unjust practices, 
they have shared and institutional responsibilities to bring these benefits to light 
and create appropriate methods for addressing them fairly.46 
While contemporary employees and stockholders of US Steel are not guilty of the racial 
injustice perpetrated in 1908, they are responsible insofar as they benefit from the 
corporation passed on by those persons guilty of placing Cottenham in the slave-like 
conditions that led to his death. To ignore this responsibility is to remain a bystander to 
continued injustice; to avow it requires some form of redress. 
     Guilt is distinct from collective responsibility because “where all are guilty, nobody is. 
Guilt, unlike responsibility, always singles out; it is strictly personal.”47 Responsibility 
per Arendt is not personal in the way that guilt is. Indeed it is always already collective. 
As Young notes, Arendt’s collective responsibility contains two political components: 
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“(1) I am responsible for what I have not done, and (2) the reason for my 
responsibility is my membership in a group which no voluntary action of mine can 
dissolve.”48 Against the intentionalist conception of community, thinkers like Arendt and 
Young suggest the unavoidability of communal life and responsibility. While we may not 
be individually guilty of climate violence, this reading of Arendt allows us to suggest that 
we may indeed be responsible for it (as individuals and as members of collectives) in 
some still-significant way. 
     But how? If we are neither to think about responsibility for climate violence as 
reducible to individual guilt, nor as located only in the intentionalist ‘collectivity’ of the 
nation-state, to what might the collective aspect of collective responsibility for climate 
violence refer? 
     I start to answer that question in the concluding section of this chapter, and address it 
more fully in the next chapter. Before getting there, I want to be more specific about the 
usefulness and the limitations of applying Arendt’s thinking about responsibility to the 
case of climate violence. While each of the following thinkers offer distinct studies and 
would propose we think somewhat differently about responsibility, I read them together 
(and insofar as they each circle around Arendtian themes) in order to arrive at a concept 
of situated responsibility in the concluding section: I do not think their differences are 
sufficient enough to preclude such a move. 
Responsibility beyond Liability 
     Though I find Arendt’s discussion tremendously useful, I am not convinced by one 
aspect: the connection that inheres between collective responsibility and liability. I am of 
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course not the first to want to distance the concept of collective responsibility from 
individuating and calculating aspects of the language of liability, which Arendt retains. 
Here, Young suggests that applying liability to collective responsibility “is inappropriate, 
pragmatically, in political discussion, because it tends to make people defensive and 
engage in “blame switching.””49 This may well hold true in the case of collective 
responsibility for climate violence: to be sure many people do not take well to being held 
liable for that violence and often go so far as to deny climate change entirely, as we 
know. Yet there is more to be said in favor of separating the question of liability from the 
question of collective responsibility. 
     To come to a theory of situated responsibility, I now turn to a series of reasons given 
for separating liability from collective responsibility. There are at least three issues at 
stake here. First, responsibility as liability largely assumes individual autonomy rather 
than rightly regarding it as one potential (and perhaps rare) condition. Second and 
relatedly, turning to Young, we see that liberal responsibility (the “liability model, per 
Young) risks becoming inundated with the details of calculation: questions of where and 
how to hold whom liable, on what principles, according to which rules, and so on 
threaten to drown bigger questions and, specifically, forward-looking challenges of 
responsibility. Third, per Satkunanandan, reducing responsibility to its liberal variety also 
pushes responsibility too far toward the domain of inattentive calculation: calculation 
done without thoughtful reflection, calculation in the abstract, calculation without 
attentiveness to incalculable qualities resulting in an “openness” that can “encourage an 
embrace of the fullness of our responsibility” through which, indeed, even calculable 
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elements are better addressed.50 
     In The Politics of Responsibility, Lavin covers the first of these issues. There he points 
to the limitations of what he calls “liberal responsibility” and argues in favor of a 
“postliberal" view.51 Specifically, liberal responsibility for Lavin is based on an often-
fallacious commitment to ahistorical, a priori individualism, rooted in the “autonomous 
and coherent subject that voluntarily chooses actions.”52 While this conception of the 
individual might at times be a useful one (when attempting, for example, to attribute 
straightforward moral guilt or legal liability), Lavin points out that such an autonomous 
and coherent subject can hardly be assumed: the sovereign individual “appears today 
increasingly threatened by revelations of the degree to which individual bodies and wills 
are permeated and formed by external conditions.”53 In other words, if the sovereign 
individual were ever a safe assumption it no longer is under conditions of mass culture, 
globalization, postmodern capitalism, climate violence, and so on. The application to 
responsibility for climate violence is clear: it would be difficult to sustain a line of 
argument claiming that the agent that causes climate change is a fully sovereign 
individual one. Indeed a decent one-line understanding of climate violence might be that 
it is created by a tremendous collection of people yet willed by none of them. Instead, 
postliberal ideas about responsibility (Lavin mentions thinkers like Bernard Williams, 
Karl Marx, and Judith Butler) “begin with the proposition that desires and abilities arise 
not from any essential self but from cultural and disciplinary inputs that form subjects; 
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the individual is not the cause but rather the effect of social life.”54 We who continue 
to drive to work, to fly to conferences, to throw away plastic containers, then, must find a 
way to think about responsibility that moves away from sovereign liability insofar as 
even if we were to stop doing those things, we would not contribute in any significant 
way to the cessation or repair of climate violence. 
     Somewhat relatedly, Hans Jonas intimated in 1973 that responsibility now faces a 
scope problem: a critical disjuncture separates a “traditional” (face-to-face) ethic of 
responsibility and the kinds of problems that humans face in the technological age.55 Per 
Jonas, again, “modern technology has introduced actions of such novel scale, objects, and 
consequences that the framework of former ethics can no longer contain them.”56  We 
can read Jonas’s ‘former,’ neighborly ethics of responsibility as overlapping substantially 
with liberal responsibility insofar as each sort locates responsibility in individuals: I am 
responsible for or to the things I can see in and around my small community or, 
extrapolating, things I can calculate according to methodological individualist methods. 
Yet this view limits the extent to which one can confront one’s responsibility for 
collective actions and, indeed, for future reverberations of contemporary and past actions. 
Or, per Lavin again, given the need to assign responsibility for events with structural 
underpinnings like Abu Ghraib, police brutality, terrorism, and, I would add, climate 
change, we now see “the incommensurability of dominant conceptions of responsibility 
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and enduring political urgencies.”57 The one cannot well account for the other. 
     The broader point to take away from Jonas and Lavin is that when conceptions of 
responsibility are rooted in an isolated “I,” or in face-to-face interactions with friends, 
neighbors, Others, and so on, they falter in light of contemporary issues born from 
(post)modernity’s intensification of technology, globalization, etc. In light of the 
technological and (post)industrial structures out of which climate change arises, 
responsibility itself takes on a new set of constraints and delivers a new set of obligations 
than it might have in previous eras. 
     Arendt’s ideas about collective responsibility, written in the same era as Jonas’s 
claims about the insufficiency of traditional forms of responsibility, usefully take us some 
way toward the new ethics Jonas sought, insofar as they incorporate a broader space of 
concern.58 In the quest to theorize a way of responding to collective issues (somewhat yet 
imperfectly like climate change), Arendt offers a useful starting point by shifting 
attention away from individual guilt and toward collective responsibility. Yet in de- and 
then re-contextualizing her thought away from the question of postwar Germany and 
toward that of global anthropogenic climate change, the question of liability is altered. 
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Reconsider her above claim that while there is no collective guilt insofar as one 
cannot be guilty of something they have not done, “there is such thing as responsibility 
for things one has not done; one can be held liable for them.”59 In the case of climate 
change there is an idea very much worth holding on to here, the idea that one can be seen 
– or see oneself – as responsible for something one has not done, where “doing” implies 
fully autonomous action and willed causation. Yet if this thought is followed through, 
especially but not only in light of climate change, we might question Arendt’s second 
implication, that there is a direct link between being or holding responsible and being or 
being held liable. Insofar as liability, like guilt, has a tendency toward individuation and 
calculation, we might want to push back on this connection before applying Arendt’s 
collective responsibility to the case of climate violence. 
     Indeed Iris Marion Young expresses this second tension in the association of liability 
and collective responsibility throughout Responsibility for Justice, concerning the 
dangers of the primarily backward-looking tendencies of the concept of liability. 
Engaging directly with Arendt’s turn to collective responsibility, Young argues against 
the backward-looking nature of liability and instead proposes a much commented “social 
connection model” of responsibility. In the liability model: 
One assigns responsibility to particular agents whose actions can be shown to be 
causally connected to the circumstances for which responsibility is sought. This 
agent can be a collective entity, such as a corporation, and when it is, that entity 
can be treated as a single agent for the purposes of assigning responsibility … [t]o 
say that an agent is responsible means that they are blameworthy for an act or its 
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outcome.60 
By now, this likely sounds familiar as there is significant overlap between Young’s 
liability model, Lavin’s liberal one, and much of the extant work on climate change. Yet 
where Lavin is concerned with the autonomy of the liable individual in question, Young 
highlights more directly the problem with finding individuals liable for structural 
processes to begin with: 
The primary reason that the liability model does not apply to issues of structural 
injustice is that structures are produced and reproduced by large numbers of 
people acting according to normally accepted rules and practices, and it is in the 
nature of such structural processes that their potentially harmful effects cannot be 
traced directly to any particular contributors to the process.61 
Liability alone simply cannot account for structural injustice, nor could enforcing liability 
ever cause it to cease. 
     Instead, Young proposes a “social connection model” of responsibility, in which 
people are responsible not as liable individuals but “by virtue of their social roles.” To 
quote once more at length, the social connection model of responsibility: 
Says that individuals bear responsibility for structural injustice because they 
contribute by their actions to the processes that produce unjust outcomes. Our 
responsibility derives from belonging together with others in a system of 
interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek 
benefits and aim to realize projects …. All who dwell within the structures must 
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take responsibility for remedying injustices they cause, though none is 
specifically liable for the harm in a legal sense. Responsibility in relation to 
injustice thus derives not from living under a common constitution [we might here 
think of the intentionalist model of collectives], but rather from participating in 
the diverse institutional processes that produce structural injustice.62 
In drawing on Young’s work in my Chapter 2, I have already pointed to the ways that 
“structural injustice” and “climate violence” overlap and differ. From the angle of 
political responsibility, they overlap greatly, and Young’s work shows the need to think 
through social connections instead of – or at least in addition to – personal liability. 
     Still, I find it important to note that the legitimate reservations that Lavin and Young 
have about associating responsibility with liability themselves have limits. In the different 
ways discussed above, both Lavin and Young give up too much ground by moving 
postliberal responsibility completely away from liability.63 To be sure, they are right to 
want to delimit liability and guilt: in the context of postwar German guilt, Arendt notes 
that the sentiment “‘We are all guilty’ that at first hearing sounded so very noble and 
tempting has actually only served to exculpate to a considerable degree those who 
actually were guilty.”64 In other words, though perhaps an admirable moral position, the 
assumption of guilt on behalf of nonguilty Germans (beneficiaries instead of perpetrators, 
perhaps) served politically to let truly guilty Germans off the hook. “We are all guilty,” 
Arendt finishes the thought, “is actually a declaration of solidarity with the 
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wrongdoers.”65 
     Coming back to climate violence, charging the anthropos with guilt for bringing about 
the anthropocene paves over differences between 1) actually guilty parties, 2) those of us 
who participate in processes that lead to slow violence, and 3) those who still live to 
some degree outside of such processes. Lavin follows Young (parenthetically referencing 
her 2003 essay “From Guilt to Solidarity”)66 on this point, noting a flip side to Arendt’s 
warning that universal guilt means identifying with wrongdoers. On this he writes that 
“because liberal responsibility focuses on providing particular indictments, it 
simultaneously provides general exonerations.”67 So whereas universal guilt exonerates 
actually guilty parties, focusing too narrowly on particular guilts risks letting those who 
contribute passively to harm off the hook entirely. Young and Lavin are right to suggest 
the need to keep a backward looking view a safe distance from forward looking practices 
of and engagements with responsibility on behalf of postliberal (not necessarily 
intentionalist) collectives. Still, in the case of something like climate change (at least) we 
ought not be too quick to give up entirely on guilt and liability for past actions, lest we let 
go of the more justice-oriented approaches to “common but differentiated responsibility” 
propounded by Vanderheiden and others. 
     Eschewing guilt and liability entirely, for example, would collapse the differences 
between active and passive contributions to climate violence. As an example of active 
contributions, we might consider the Exxon corporation (now ExxonMobil, “the world’s 
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largest oil and gas company”),68 a defendant in the case of Native Village of Kivalina; 
City of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil et al. discussed in Chapter 2.69 Recent investigative 
reporting paints a clear picture of the guilt and potential liability Exxon bears for burying 
the story and science of climate change early on. “Exxon was aware of climate change as 
early as 1977, 11 years before it became a public issue” Shannon Hall writes.70 “In the 
1970s and 1980s,” she continues, Exxon: 
employed top scientists to look into the issue and launched its own ambitious 
research program that empirically sampled carbon dioxide and built rigorous 
climate models. Exxon even spent more than $1 million on a tanker project that 
would tackle how much CO2 is absorbed by the oceans. It was one of the biggest 
scientific questions of the time, meaning that Exxon was truly conducting 
unprecedented research.71 
And yet, of course, Exxon buried the story. “By 1989,” Hall continues, “The company 
had helped create the Global Climate Coalition … to question the scientific basis for 
concern about climate change” and “helped to prevent the U.S. From signing the … 
Kyoto protocol in 1998.” Finally, since as recently as 2014, per Greenpeace, “Exxon has 
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spent more than $30 million on think tanks that promote climate denial.”72 On top of 
clear causal lines of moral guilt if not legal liability for producing the fossil fuels that 
release GHGs when metabolized, Exxon intentionally covered up the science it itself had 
discovered.73 It would be a mistake to let go of backward-looking guilt and liability in 
favor of a forward-looking responsibility, even as forward-looking responsibility aimed 
at the basic structural sources of violence is of primary importance.  
     Here Shalini Satkunanandan argues (and Young also notes) that the two are actually 
compatible, by claiming that endorsing forward-looking, postliberal responsibility need 
not mean giving up on backward-facing ideas like guilt and liability when such categories 
are appropriate. Satkunanandan’s terms are again different: calculable and extraordinary 
responsibility. Like backward-looking guilt or liberal responsibility, in the calculable 
variety “we expect that our responsibilities are to some extent predictable; that they are to 
some extent specifiable and so can assume the form of relatively discrete tasks.”74 
Extraordinary responsibility, instead, is broad, all encompassing, and requires a 
responsive ethos rather than a calculating moralism, aimed at bringing to the fore “the 
kinds of responsibility that are always present but that are ordinarily concealed by the 
calculable responsibility framework.”75 This is extraordinary not because it refers to some 
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Schmittian politics of the exception,76 but because it is literally extra-ordinary: it pulls 
us away from the calculability so inherent in common sense thinking about responsibility 
and reflected in the approaches to climate change discussed above. 
     Yet to say that calculation can conceal the extraordinary is not to suggest that the 
latter ought eclipse the former entirely: 
Although thinking about responsibility as a series of calculable debts can 
degenerate into pettifogging … calculable responsibility is helpful. The problem 
is that calculable responsibility is often our default way of thinking about 
responsibility …. I ultimately argue for a political ethos that both gives calculable 
responsibility its place and strives to keep it in its place.77 
Or, per Thomas Keenan: 
It is when we do not know exactly what we should do, when the effects and 
conditions of our actions can no longer be calculated, and when we have nowhere 
else to turn, not even back onto our “self,” that we encounter something like 
responsibility.78 
Though there are many contenders, climate violence is high up on the list of problems 
about which ‘we do not know exactly what we should do’ because the situation itself 
exceeds easy calculability. For Satkunanandan and Keenan it is here that extraordinary 
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emergency.” ibid. For such a politics see Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) and the expansive 
literatures that have sprung up around Schmitt in recent decades. 
77 Ibid., 5. 
78 Thomas Keenan, Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997), 2. 
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responsibility comes into play. Lastly and importantly, Satkunanandan tells us that 
when being responsible is not reducible to calculation, “to be responsible is to be 
responsive.”79 
     At last, we can turn directly to the idea and project of responsiveness. While I will 
want to agree that in some sense, to be responsible is to be responsive, I also want to posit 
that there is value in thinking about responsiveness as a prior site of engagement, 
cultivation, or, on the other hand, refusal, missed opportunity, or thoughtlessness. 
     Here, Jade Schiff’s Burdens of Political Responsibility is beautifully helpful. In 
Burdens, Schiff plots a way of thinking about responsibility as always already collective, 
aimed at structural injustice, and yet open to active participation rather than in some 
sense overdetermined. Whereas responsibility is something – some thing – that one must 
enact in order to discharge or refuse to enact in order to ignore, responsiveness has more 
to do with avowing, struggling with, and participating in one’s relations to the broader 
world. Though I will modify her definition slightly, Schiff prompts this turn to 
responsiveness, defining the latter thusly: “by “responsiveness” I mean the 
acknowledgment and experience of connections between our everyday activities and the 
suffering of others.”80 Following Young, Schiff’s main examples – sweatshop labor, 
paradigmatically – mean that it makes sense for her to focus on ‘our’ connection to the 
‘suffering of others.’ Yet given the more-than-human scope of climate violence, I think 
the concept of responsiveness can aim beyond the suffering of others to structures of 
power and processes of violence, even as such suffering remains a key target. More of a 
                                                
79 Satkunanandan, Responsibility, 8. 
80 Jade Larissa Schiff, Burdens of Political Responsibility: Narrative and the Cultivation of 
Responsiveness (New York: Cambridge UP, 2014), 34. 
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disposition to be cultivated than an action to be discharged, responsiveness shifts the 
question from one of acting or refusing to act back a step, asking instead about 
acknowledging or disavowing the very situation against which one might act or refuse to 
act. 
     Further, Schiff convincingly suggests starting with responsiveness insofar as we 
cannot assume – as Arendt, Young, and others do – that our mere inclusion in a 
collectivity offers any guarantee of our desire to accept responsibility. Accepting 
responsibility requires, in a sense, first becoming responsive, an aspect that Arendt and 
Young might implicitly acknowledge, but that is not placed front and center in their 
analyses. 
     In attempting to broaden the idea of responsibility past its most simplistic causal 
forms, Paul Anderson writes that “it is a mistake to think that issues of moral 
responsibility (including liability) are exhausted by those of causal responsibility.” He 
continues, sounding an Arendtian tone, to claim “that beneficiaries of past harm may not 
be causally responsible for past harm does not necessarily mean that they cannot be held 
liable for ongoing harms to descendants of the original victims.”81 I agree here, but I 
would argue that Schiff allows us to take this further, to claim that whether beneficiaries 
of past harm are or are not causally responsible for that harm, and whether or not liability 
is the best political crystallization of responsibility, there is no reason to suggest that 
beneficiaries and bystanders of climate change (categories which encompass the world’s 
relatively wealthy, those who participate in its capitalist economy) are not also and 
perhaps especially obligated to cultivate a sense of responsiveness to the violence of 
                                                
81 Anderson, Sustainable Earth, 200. 
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climate change. 
     Here, Schiff is explicit, writing that “the problem of responsiveness … is a problem 
for those who are implicated in suffering, and not for those in whose suffering they are 
implicated.”82 Analytically, I think this is correct. Yet in the context of our everyday 
lives, most of us will never be excused from the ‘problem’ of responsiveness to climate 
change, insofar as most of us are implicated in climate violence (if not in the ‘suffering of 
others’ directly). 
     A turn to responsiveness is thus both required by the turn to thinking about climate 
violence and a useful concept for thinking about how to start responding when we 
admittedly ‘do not know exactly what we should do.’ I now turn to these tasks, and to the 
difference responsiveness might make in the project of drafting a specifically political 
responsibility for climate change. 
IV. Responsiveness, Climate Violence, and Situated Responsibility 
     In opening this chapter, I walked through hypothetical and then scholarly proposals 
for how we ought think about responsibility for climate change. Finding them overly 
liberal in the sense that Chad Lavin describes, I suggested that ‘responsiveness’ might 
offer a better starting point insofar as it figures responsibility as necessarily collective, 
and insofar as it reaches further back into the process of acknowledging, accepting, and 
taking responsibility for the violence of climate change – a violence for which most 
people are responsible and yet of which few people are guilty. 
     In closing, I want to suggest some potential goals of responsiveness to climate 
violence, by describing one way that responsiveness might lead implicated parties to 
                                                
82 Schiff, Burdens, 41. 
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embrace and indeed struggle with their situated responsibility. 
     Yet first, it is worth reiterating and specifying the concrete rather than general political 
drawbacks of relying on liberal responsibility for climate change. One aspect of liberal, 
calculable responsibility that I postponed mentioning until now (and, indeed, that many 
of the above authors decline to thematize) has to do with its logical proximity to and 
compatibility with neoclassical economics, a parent category of the kinds of 
neoliberalism discussed in Chapter 3. Consider this description of one element of 
neoclassical economics – preference utilitarianism – as described by Paul Anderson: 
Preference utilitarianism is a moral theory that holds that the good consists in the 
satisfaction of people’s preferences (utility) and that the value of an action or 
policy depends on whether it is productive of such satisfaction. Individual welfare 
is understood as the satisfaction of the wants or preferences for goods and 
services individuals have or, if fully informed, would have …. Social welfare is 
conceived of as simply the aggregate of individual welfare thus understood.83 
In short, preference utilitarianism thinks of the collective good as the aggregated 
satisfaction of individuals’ private preferences. Furthermore, it values individual actions 
according to whether or not they produce such a good. Likewise, private good (one’s 
welfare) is attained when one gets what one thinks they want and, finally, public good 
(social welfare) is nothing more than the sum of individual and individuated goods. 
     Anderson wrote that passage as a critique of relying too much on neoclassical 
solutions to environmental problems. Yet he just as easily could have written it about 
liberal conceptions of responsibility (for climate change). Where “individual welfare” is 
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understood as getting what one wants, discharging “individual responsibility” can be 
understood in this framework as one such want. To return to my opening example, simply 
refusing to take luxurious drives on Sunday can discharge responsibility for climate 
change. Likewise, where “social welfare” can be thought of as a collection of individuals 
each getting what they want, discharging “collective responsibility” can be done by states 
making decisions on behalf of individuals and international institutions making decisions 
on behalf of states. Individual consumer choices, and the menu of individual consumer 
choices as constructed by states and international institutions, would then capture the 
extent of what it might mean to think about responsibility for climate change. According 
to liberal conceptions, being responsible for climate change is highly compatible with – if 
not paramount to – making responsible consumer choices or making responsible choices 
about what consumers are able to choose from. In sum, liberal and calculable theories of 
responsibility might help address climate change as an economic issue. Yet these 
approaches do little to address climate change as a form of violence that stems from and 
far exceeds consumer choice. 
     Anderson’s broader point, like my own, is to suggest that (neoclassical) economic 
approaches are indeed not enough. Arguing against the view that environmental 
degradation is reducible to an allocation problem (in which there are simply not enough 
markets to sufficiently ‘value’ each element of the environment), he counters that 
“diagnosing environmental change as arising from inadequate pricing in resource 
consumption gives the misleading impression that the primary economic actor is the 
consumer. This overlooks the fact, O’Neill explains, that it is predominantly “within the 
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productive process that ecological damage primarily occurs.””84 Crucially, Anderson 
thus suggests that if we want to understand environmental degradation, we need to look 
neither exclusively nor primarily at the individual actions of consumers as the liberal 
model would have us do, but instead turn to the corporate actions of producers. In 
instances when it is politically or ethically useful to ascribe collective blame rather than 
collective responsibility, we would thus do well to turn to those who have literally 
produced climate change. Yet when we want to assess responsibility of post-liberal 
subjects, a turn to responsiveness is key. 
Responsiveness and Situated Responsibility 
     I end this chapter with a modest claim: it is ethically and politically desirable to start 
from responsiveness rather than responsibility, insofar as a cultivation of responsiveness 
opens one up to the problem of climate violence instead of closing one off to it (either 
through denial of the problem or thoughtless acceptance of a problematic solution). 
Through responsiveness, one might gain an opportunity to respond and engage or, in 
George Shulman’s words, to acknowledge the political truth of climate violence rather 
than to disavow a “counter-narrative that connects private troubles to public causes 
differently.”85 Yet unlike more definite, calculable approaches to responsibility, 
responsiveness is neither necessarily an individual endeavor nor a closed, teleological 
process. Throughout Burdens, Schiff highlights the role of things held in common – her 
prime example being competing narratives of structural injustices and / or crises – in 
                                                
84 Ibid., 142. Reference is to John O’Neill, Ecology, Policy, and Politics: Human Well-Being and 
the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993), 176. 
85 George Shulman, “Acknowledgment and Disavowal as an Idiom for Theorizing Politics,” 
Theory & Event 14, no. 1 (2011): https://muse.jhu.edu/article/423098. Thanks to Nancy Luxon 
for pointing me toward this article. 
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fostering or impeding responsiveness: “narratives provide potential sites for 
cultivating responsiveness, and also for its frustration.”86 By narrating processes and 
events differently – by telling different stories but also by struggling to define public 
perception – we can unsettle settled and problematic ways of understanding the world 
and our relationships to it. 
     Yet narrations of climate change like those that inhere in managerial and neoliberal 
approaches tend to close down responsiveness, because such narratives “can frustrate the 
cultivation of responsiveness by depriving us of any sense of connection between crises 
and ordinary life.”87 On the other hand, narratives and dramatizations of climate change 
such as I have tried to provide in Chapter 2 and elsewhere88 might instead “do some work 
in connecting the experience of crisis to ordinary life” in order to invite responsiveness. 
On this note, Schiff stresses the importance of “horizontal” stories, or stories the privilege 
democracy, equality, and uneven responsibility, in light of globalization: “The possibility 
of cultivating responsiveness – and the capacity to view the frustration of responsiveness 
as a problem – depends on telling each other and ourselves horizontal narratives of 
globalization in which, rather than cogs in a machine, human beings are the active, 
creative sources of globalization.”89 
     The alternative is to start with the preformed responsibility of sovereign and 
autonomous individuals. Such an alternative produces two common models of 
responsibility for climate change, one “individual” and one “universal.” The individual 
                                                
86 Schiff, Burdens, 20. 
87 Ibid., 47. 
88 “Climate Change, Violence, and Film,” Political Theory OnlineFirst (2015): 1-21. 
89 Schiff, Burdens, 15. 
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approach locates responsibility largely within individuals who then make choices 
within markets (including the choice to try not to participate in markets) rather than 
citizens (or other members of communities for which they care) who make broader 
decisions. Scaling up, this liberal approach to collections of individuals produces the 
second, universal approach in which all are figured as responsible for climate change for 
giving moral support to and international institutions (under the guise of international 
law, global governance, etc.) that are tasked with determining what such a responsibility 
means by, for example, adjudicating the meaning of “common but differentiated 
responsibility” among states. 
     Alongside the individual and universal approach, questions about collective and 
extraordinary responsibility, and responsiveness, raised by Arendt, Lavin, Young, 
Satkunanandan, and Schiff, suggest a need for a more situated approach to climate 
violence in which one’s responsiveness opens them up to their historical and political 
responsibility. Such responsibility in turn stems from one’s position in relation to climate 
violence and its sources. Whereas this chapter has aimed to shift the discussion about 
responsibility toward responsiveness, questions remain about the possible goals of 
responsiveness and its relation to democratic theory and politics. It is to these questions 
that I turn in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Greenhouse Democracy 
I. Introduction 
     My goal in this chapter is to describe the contours of “greenhouse democracy,” a set 
of ideas that might enable and foster the enactment of a climate imaginary alternative to 
the dominant one, and a broad outline of practices through which to respond differently 
to climate violence. Along the way I will first discuss critiques and endorsements of 
approaching a problem like climate change democratically to begin with. Having made a 
case for democracy over and against more authoritarian, top-down political alternatives, I 
look at existing electoral, deliberative, and disruptive theories through which climate 
change might be connected to democracy. Finding that existing approaches were not 
conceived to address the problem of climate violence as I have outlined it throughout this 
dissertation, I then outline the ways that greenhouse democracy draws on and yet departs 
from other forms and consider the tasks that greenhouse democracy might help us start to 
perform. 
II. Why Democracy? 
     Given the ever present availability of the kinds of top-down solutions discussed in 
Chapter 3 as well as more authoritarian and ostensibly more effective options, a first 
question arises: why democracy at all? 
     Environmental political theory has long struggled with the question of democracy. 
Early debates about the connection between politics and the environment circled around 
whether democratic or authoritarian responses were variously preferable or ‘necessary.’ 
Simply put, the democratic case was based in the conviction that citizens would 
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recognize the importance of protecting the environment in which they were 
embedded: that newly dubbed Blue Marble.1 Because we are all dependent on the earth, 
fostering democratic engagement, participation, and decision making would, with some 
inevitable missteps, false starts, and other blunders common to all attempts at collective 
power, move us toward desirable environmental outcomes. Democracy could be a force 
against destructive private interests driven by immoral greed or amoral capitalist logics of 
growth. Yet on the other hand, as has become convention to note, writers in the early era 
of environmental political theory such as William Ophuls, Garret Hardin, and Robert 
Heilbroner found more cause for optimism in authoritarian politics. Such writers 
suggested that the vicissitudes of democracy would render it ineffective at delivering on 
environmental promises: those missteps, false starts, and other blunders along with more 
straightforward corruptions of the democratic ideal and capture of its institutional 
apparatus would be routine, not accidental.2 In turn, they suggested the need for 
authoritarian-leaning responses. Environmental protection, their thinking went, calls for 
strong and centralized governments capable of delivering swift results. 
     Flash forward four decades and things seem quite different: much if not all 
contemporary (environmental) political theory substantiates Sheldon Wolin’s observation 
                                                
1 Blue Marble is, of course, the name of one of history’s most widely circulated photographs. 
Taken by astronauts in 1972, Blue Marble shows a fully illuminated Earth and is often pointed to 
as a condition of possibility for thinking about a singular globe, global society, etc. Note the 
parallels between the importance of Blue Marble and Arendt’s opening reflection in The Human 
Condition, that the 1957 satellite that humans launched into orbit constituted an “event, second in 
importance to no other, not even to the splitting of the atom.” See Hannah Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 1. 
2 John Meyer, “Political Theory and the Environment,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Theory, eds. John Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006), 782, 
Matthew Humphrey, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the 
Deliberative Ideal (New York: Routledge, 2007), ch. 1. 
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that “democracy is one among many versions of the political but it is peculiar in 
being the one idea that most other versions pay lip-service to.”3 Among a great many 
thinkers, “it is perhaps true to say that broadly speaking there is a commitment to 
democracy in contemporary political theory.”4 Indeed when authors buck this general 
trend, their initial task is to navigate the pressure to at least pay lip service to democracy. 
Jason Brennan, for example, opens Against Democracy with a claim that the bulk of 
democratic political theorists are at heart romantics and “at the very least, democratic 
theory needs someone to play devil’s advocate.”5 In other words, much contemporary and 
environmental political theory expressly or implicitly endorses a future in which 
democracy (however interpreted and however robust) is the only legitimate, avowable, or 
permissible means of attaining environmental ends.  
     Yet even now among environmentally minded authors more broadly, the 
authoritarian-democratic split remains somewhat unsettled, and always ready to 
reemerge. James Lovelock, famous for developing the Gaia Hypothesis (the language for 
which was given to him by Lord of the Flies author William Golding), remains 
controversial for breaking authoritarian in recent years. In an interview in the Guardian, 
Lovelock proposed that: 
We need a more authoritative world. We've become a sort of cheeky, egalitarian 
world where everyone can have their say. It's all very well, but there are certain 
circumstances – a war is a typical example – where you can't do that. You've got 
                                                
3 Sheldon Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy,” Constellations 1, no. 1 (1994), 11; Wendy Brown, “We 
Are All Democrats Now …” in Democracy in What State?, ed. Amy Allen (New York: Columbia 
UP, 2011). 
4 Barry Holden, Democracy and Global Warming (London: Continuum, 2002), 5. 
5 Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2016), vii. 
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to have a few people with authority who you trust who are running it. And 
they should be very accountable too, of course.6 
Likewise, public intellectuals routinely espouse questions about whether democratic 
countries ought embrace authoritarian elements. Take Thomas Friedman, who has 
expressed the desire to wield authoritarian powers, if only to get ‘us’ to where ‘we’ need 
to be. In Hot, Flat, and Crowded Friedman wrote of a “mischievous thought” that he 
once had: “If only … If only America could be China for a day–just one day. Just one 
day!”7 Elaborating, Friedman notes that he is especially enamored of what he sees 
(projects?) as:  
The ability of China’s current generation of leaders–if they want–to cut through 
all their legacy industries, all the pleading special interests, all the bureaucratic 
obstacles, all the worries of a voter backlash, and simply order top-down the 
sweeping changes in prices, regulations, standards, education, and infrastructure 
that reflect China’s long-term strategic national interests–changes that would 
normally take Western democracies years or decades to debate and implement.8 
Yet at least three problems inhere in these authoritarian views, problems significant 
enough to cast doubt. 
                                                
6 Leo Hickman, “James Lovelock on the Value of Sceptics [sic] and Why Copenhagen was 
Doomed,” The Guardian (March 29, 2010): http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2010/ 
mar/29/james-lovelock. Though it is only an afterthought and not his central point, I wonder if 
Lovelock doesn’t betray himself in adding that authoritative powers should ‘of course’ be ‘very 
accountable:’ is not accountability already something of a democratic trait, at least in terms of 
how rulers operate and what citizens expect from them? Or, conversely, if a power should “of 
course” be accountable, shouldn’t it of course not be authoritarian? 
7 Thomas Friedman, Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution–and How it Can 
Renew America. 2.0, Updated and Expanded ed. (New York: Picador / Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2009), 430. 
8 Ibid. 
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     First, concerned scholars have attempted to correct the misconception of China as 
a straightforwardly effective authoritarian environmental policymaker, concluding that 
there is a significant disconnect between its ability to set policy from above and its ability 
to enforce such policy effectively.9 More generally, a second problem is with the idea that 
there is some objective environmental goal to be achieved. In Chapter 3, following Mike 
Hulme, I discussed this in terms of the “global climate thermostat” idea. The desire for an 
eco-authoritarian assumes that “solving” environmental issues is a matter of how to best 
arrive at some pre-defined end or telos: “we” all know where “we” need to be, yet the 
messiness of democracy does not allow for efficiency in decision making, or is too 
susceptible to capture by special interests. As such, the story goes, democracy cannot get 
us to where we need to be when it comes to environmental issues. But the complexity of 
both ‘natural’ environmental processes and human interactions with and experiences of 
such processes is too great for a single actor to divine knowledge sufficient to enact, from 
the top down, environmental solutions.  
     A third problem with an eco-authoritarian response has more to do with the 
vicissitudes of power not in a democracy, but in an explicitly hierarchical, authoritarian 
mode. As Alan Carter puts it: 
If a[n eco-authoritarian] leader is necessary, it must be because he or she has real 
power, and how can its exercise be guaranteed to remain benevolent? Even if a 
particular leader does turn out to be genuinely benevolent, even if he or she is not 
corrupted by the exercise of power or the need to retain it, how can it be 
                                                
9 See Bruce Gilley, “Authoritarian Environmentalism and China’s Response to Climate Change,” 
Environmental Politics 21, no. 2 (2012): 287-307. 
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guaranteed that those who inherit his or her position will be equally 
benevolent? Hierarchical structures, by their very nature, seem to make it easy for 
the most competitive, most ruthless and least caring to attain power. Moreover, 
the centralized exercise of authoritarian rule is an ever-attractive goal for would-
be usurpers, whose vision is usually less pure than that of those whom they usurp, 
as the history of many coups can be argued to attest to.10 
In short, an eco-authoritarian dream is by and large a fever dream, a desire for the ability 
to alienate one’s responsiveness to and responsibility for environmental degradation and 
to transfer it to an infallible leader to be discharged in one fell swoop. Taken together, the 
complexity of environmental problems along with the unpredictability of authoritarian 
futures cast significant doubt on the ability (not to speak of the desirability) of an 
authoritarian regime to respond to climate change. 
     Yet in the context of authoritarian promises made by people like Friedman, and 
broader signs of ill democratic health, even those who share a democratic conviction 
must express uncertainty about it. Terrence Ball, for example, in endorsing a democratic 
approach to environmental problems, admits “there is no logically or conceptually 
necessary connection between democracy and environmentalism.” Indeed, he continues, 
“the latter can take, and in several significant instances has taken, authoritarian and anti-
democratic forms. And, too, democratic majorities can and frequently do favor decisions 
and policies that degrade or destroy the natural environment.”11 
     While at a basic empirical level Ball is right here, there is room to think about the 
                                                
10 Alan Carter, A Radical Green Political Theory (New York: Roudledge, 1999), 26. 
11 Terrence Ball, “Democracy,” in Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge, eds. Andrew 
Dobson and Robyn Eckersley (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 131. 
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connection between democracy and environmental degradation somewhat differently. 
I agree with Ball that there is no necessary connection between democracy and 
environmentalism, if we take necessary to mean inevitable. Yet I would suggest that, at 
our historical conjuncture, there are solid reasons to think that democratic empowerment 
offers great promise, and to want to expand its potentials and increase its tasks rather than 
looking elsewhere: there is a necessary connection in the sense that democratic 
engagement is needed if we are to respond to environmental dilemmas. Here, democracy 
becomes less an institutional attainment (though that helps!) and more something to be 
cultivated and enacted in the face of destructive state and corporate actions. Once we 
understand climate change (specifically) as a kind of violence that invites projects of 
widely fostered responsiveness, collective responsibility, and that raises the question of 
one’s relationship to something like a human collectivity (Chakrabarty’s point discussed 
in Chapter 1), democracy in the broadest sense of a set of shared, collective, and public 
projects presents itself as an obvious contender. If everyone is impacted, then everyone 
counts as ‘the people’ who must, in one way or another, take and give responsibility and, 
ultimately, respond to the climate violence both in the world and in our own lives.12 I 
                                                
12 I’m inspired here by Nancy Fraser’s critique and rehabilitation of Habermas’s “all-affected 
principle” which “holds that all potentially affected by political decisions should have the chance 
to participate on terms of parity in the informal processes of opinion formation to which the 
decision-takers should be accountable.” Fraser is critical of Habermas here. Whereas in 
Habermas’s formulation the all-affected principle was coextensive with national, political 
citizenship (i.e. those able to be affected by national political decisions were by definition 
citizens), Fraser points out that this was never really the case, “as the long history of colonialism 
and neocolonialism attests.” Today, she continues, “the idea that citizenship can serve as a proxy 
for affectedness is no longer plausible … why not apply the all-affected principle directly to the 
framing of publicity, without going through the detour of citizenship?” I agree with the sentiment, 
though as I will discuss below, I think this calls for a re-orientation of citizenship around 
ecological and corporeal rather than national lines. See Nancy Fraser, “Transnationalizing the 
Public Sphere,” Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 4 (2007): 21. 
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return to this line of thinking below. 
     Yet even if we provisionally accept the argument (or the hypothesis, or perhaps the 
conviction) that invigorated democratic thought and action offers a better alternative than 
authoritarian approaches to environmental problems, we are immediately faced with 
another more challenging doubt having to do with the history of democracy itself. As 
Timothy Mitchell has shown, a historical account of Western democracy’s upbringing 
alongside the fossil fuel and colonial eras provides reasons to suspect democracy’s 
innocence itself: democracy viewed historically reveals itself only as a tarnished idea. 
Actually existing, institutional democracy, Mitchell argues, is tightly intertwined not only 
with histories of carbon extraction and consumption, but with destructive and 
antidemocratic histories of industrialization and colonization as well. “The relationship 
between coal, industrialization and colonization,” he writes, “provides a first set of 
connections between fossil fuels and democracy.”13 Whatever we make of this specific 
point, Mitchell’s work allows us to voice a broader concern about the relationship 
between liberal institutional democracy and climate change: that the material sources of 
climate change and the ability to measure it, to discover it as a problem, have emerged 
simultaneously with the narrative of liberalization and democratization of great swaths of 
the world: liberal democracy and climate change appear to be another set of what Wendy 
Brown calls “nonidentical birth twins.”14 
     Given authoritarian promises on the one hand and problematic historical connections 
on the other, we might just write off democracy. Indeed, such challenges provide 
                                                
13 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 
2013), 17. 
14 Wendy Brown, “We Are All Democrats Now …” 44. 
  
180 
compelling reasons to ask whether democracy has been complicit in the violence of 
climate change. Yet even if so, we might ask whether other forms of democracy might 
break with this complicity. In the next section I turn to three forms of democracy that 
concerned parties might embrace in the fight against climate change: electoral, 
deliberative, and radical. I select these three insofar as they move us incrementally away 
from the dominant imaginary (where the role for democracy is generally confined to 
elections) to a liminal form (where different forms of deliberative democracy might work 
with or against the dominant imaginary) to an explicitly disruptive account of democracy. 
At the same time, a look at these three forms allows us to see what is missing from the 
conversation that, I suggest, greenhouse democracy starts to address. 
III. Which Democracy? 
     While those wont to defend authoritarian approaches to environmental problems do so 
on dubious normative and practical grounds, reading them through the broader point of 
Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy shows that their critiques, often leveled at democracy 
outright, make more sense as critiques of particular formulations of democracy. While we 
should still be suspect of eco-authoritarian conclusions, and while we should note that 
already existing democracies run on and were built by fossil fuels, democratic thinkers 
and actors would do well to listen to the critique leveled by people like David Shearman, 
an Assessor of two IPCC reports. Shearman attributes what he sees as the “fundamental 
flaws in liberal democracy” with regard to climate change and its connection to the 
market economy, which “is fused with liberal democracy, such that each is dependent 
upon the other for survival.” “Together,” Shearman continues, “they have developed a 
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liberty for the individual that has environmentally destructive consequences. The 
liberty to negate these consequences is constrained.”15 In other words, if democratic 
thinkers cede democracy to those who imagine it in line with dominant forces associated 
with liberal capitalism, then democracy is likely not up to the task of responding to 
climate change. In a time shaped by neoliberalism and marked by Brexit and then Trump, 
the limited institutional forms to which democracy has been reduced – the emblems of 
which are voting as the extent of one’s likely participation and deliberation as the extent 
of one’s ideal participation in a representative democracy are indeed of uncertain use in 
the struggle against the violence of climate change. 
Electoral Democracy 
     Un- and anti-democratic cases against electoral democracy have long been made, not 
least by the kinds of ecoauthoritarians mentioned above. Yet in the contemporary 
moment, in which elections (if not necessarily the popular vote) have delivered outcomes 
with questionable relations to substantive democratic values and goals, a specifically 
democratic critique of elections is worth attention. 
     In Against Elections: The Case for Democracy, David Van Reybrouck offers a concise 
statement of the virtues of broadly participatory over electoral democracy in the context 
of what he deems an ongoing “Democratic Fatigue Syndrome” in which “our democracy 
                                                
15 David Shearman, “Democracy and Climate Change: A Story of Failure, OpenDemocracy, 
November 7, 2007, https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy_and_climate_ 
change_a_story_of_failure. To be clear, Shearman’s conclusions go too far in the direction of the 
authoritarians discussed above. My point is simply that if we write off his critiques when we 
write off his conclusions we risk missing something important. 
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is being wrecked by being limited to elections.”16 Citing the World Values Survey in 
which 91.6% of the 73,000 people surveyed across 57 countries (“representing almost 
85% of the world’s population”) gave their support to democracy, Van Reybrouck finds 
in the same survey “a considerable increase in calls for a strong leader and low support 
for elements that make up actually existing democracy such as “parliaments, 
governments and political parties.” His opening observations conclude: “It would appear 
that people like the idea of democracy but not the reality of it, or at any rate not the 
current reality.”17 
     Van Reybrouck explains this gulf between admiration for the concept of democracy 
and faith in actually existing democracy by suggesting a general crisis of legitimacy due 
to 1) decreased levels of voting, 2) high voter turnover between parties, and 3) decreased 
membership in political parties.18 Taken together, these constitute a crisis of legitimacy 
insofar as members of democratic publics are no longer engaged, which is in turn 
compounded by a second problem: a crisis of efficiency. Again, he provides three 
confirmations of this crisis: 1) negotiations between coalitions taking longer to convene, 
2) parties in government “coming under increasing attack,” and 3) the slowness of 
governance itself.19 Taken together, Van Reybrouck’s perceived legitimacy and 
efficiency crises suggest a democracy away from which members of publics are turning, 
resulting in weaker and less energetic governments. Where “politics has always been the 
                                                
16 David Van Reybrouck, Against Elections: The Case for Democracy, trans. Liz Waters 
(London: The Bodley Head, 2016), 1-2. The study, which is rich, can be found at http://www. 
worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp. 
17 Ibid., 1-2. 
18 Ibid., 7-9. 
19 Ibid., 10-2. 
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art of the possible” it has now “become the art of the microscopic,” in which “the 
inability to address structural problems is accompanied by the overexposure of the trivial, 
fueled by our insane media that, true to market logic, have come to regard the 
exaggeration of futile conflicts as more important than any attempt to offer insight into 
real problems.”20 
     Ultimately, Van Reybrouck leverages his observations of and explanations for the 
declining trust in existing democracy to make an argument against elections and for a 
different way of selecting political leaders: a (re)turn to ‘sortation.’ Reading elections as 
such as an 18th century technology, Van Reybrouck concludes provocatively and 
polemically that, like other 18th century inventions (“the stage coach, the air balloon, the 
snuffbox”), electoral democracy may have outlived its relevance: “a democracy that 
reduces itself to elections is in mortal decline.”21 In turn, Van Reybrouck turns to 
sortation as a solution, a system that mirrors Athenian democracy, selects citizens by 
lottery, and that is comprised of several councils: An agenda council, interest panels, 
review panels, a policy jury, a rules council, and an oversight council.22 
     Because his intervention and argument concerns coming up with better ways to do 
institutional democracy, the turn to sortation is understandable. For my purposes, and 
because climate violence is too complex and dispersed to be addressed by political 
leaders alone (even if those leaders were comprised of engaged citizens), I see no purpose 
in endorsing or critiquing this turn. Instead, I have walked through Van Reybrouck’s 
                                                
20 Ibid., 13. 
21 Ibid., 55-6. Van Reybrouck omits any specifics about where this supposed 18th century 
democracy took place, leaving open the likelihood that he is relying on an imagined past. 
22 Ibid., 142-3. 
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argument in order to raise his broader point, that electoral democracy, in our 
contemporary conjuncture, is not likely to provide an effective, legitimate response to our 
most pressing problems due to its efficiency and legitimacy crises. 
Deliberative Democracy 
     In seeking to move beyond merely electoral democracy toward sortation, Van 
Reybrouck also endorses deliberative democracy. In reference to a 1988 intervention in 
Atlantic Monthy, he cites James Fishkin’s plea that 1,500 citizens be selected by lot and 
tasked with the goal of deliberating, on television, in lieu of more traditional electoral 
polling. Fishkin pushed for this because “these polls model what the public is thinking 
when it is not thinking … A deliberative poll models what the public would think if it had 
a better chance to think about issues.”23 Fishkin, likewise, put this into practice during the 
election of 1996: “from 18 to 21 January, in Austin, Texas, the first deliberative opinion 
poll took place, called the National Issues Convention.”24 Based in part on the modest but 
not insubstantial success of the NIC and similar deliberative experiments around the 
globe, Van Reybrouck claims that after the deliberative turn, the idea that “deliberative 
democracy can give a powerful boost to the ailing body of electoral-representative 
democracy is no longer doubted by any serious scholar.”25 
     Yet the turn to deliberative democracy, of course, goes well beyond Fishkin and has 
been made across academic fields and political projects. Indeed this turn has influenced 
environmental political theory tremendously, and continues to guide many thinkers who 
want to globalize democratic thought and democratize global politics, environmental and 
                                                
23 Ibid., 108. 
24 Ibid., 110. 
25 Ibid., 111. 
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otherwise. 
     Some scholars, for example, devote much attention to theorizing how existing 
democratic institutions could ideally produce a strong response to environmental decay if 
more spaces were made for deliberative engagement. Graham Smith’s Deliberative 
Democracy and the Environment, for example, comes to a crescendo with 
recommendations about how existing “political institutions might be restructured to allow 
greater democratic deliberation,”26 a conclusion wholly compatible with Van 
Reybrouck’s. Central to this redesign, though, is a key premise of the book, that 
environmental values are just that: values and interests akin to any other values or 
interests rather than, say, a deeper concern with the foundations of life, flourishing, and 
collective responsibility. To be sure, we should be wary of attempts to wholly derive our 
politics from an abstract idea of “nature,” as John Meyer has shown, but crafting a 
politics that is cognizant of the material conditions necessary for life and flourishing does 
not necessarily go so far as to sound the “derivative” alarm.27 At any rate, Smith’s 
institutionalism holds that the environment is one value among many rather than, in some 
broad sense, a condition of possibility for life. However institutions are reformed or 
                                                
26 Graham Smith, Deliberative Democracy and the Environment (London: Routledge, 2003), 129. 
27 Meyer suggests that there have been two main ways of figuring the nature-politics relationship. 
The “derivative view” proposes that politics can somehow be built from knowledge of the 
ontology of nature: correct political institutions and truths are in this sense divined from what 
“nature” is and what “nature” demands. At the other extreme, the “dualist view” proposes that 
whatever “nature” may be, it is wholly separate from the artifice of politics: politics is a human 
endeavor that needn’t bow to the demands or ontology of nature. His preferred relationship, 
something like a material or dialectical view of nature and politics resists the extremes of the 
derivative and dualist views. Here there is no necessity of deciding, at the outset, between a 
socially constructed or an objective view of nature. On the contrary, the task is one of asking 
what the proper relation of nature to politics might be. Whether nature is a construct or objective, 
that is, is a diminished question once we ask what role nature should play in determining politics. 
See John Meyer, Political Nature: Environmentalism and the Interpretation of Western Thought 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
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redesigned, there is a deeper problem here with viewing the sustainability of the 
material foundations of life and democracy as just another realm subject to being valued, 
or not. 
     And yet there are other, less obviously liberal-pluralist varieties of the search for more 
environmentally responsive deliberative institutions. John Dryzek has put a tremendous 
amount of work into thinking seriously about the prospects for deliberative democracy 
generally, and with regard to global environmental problems specifically. Early in the 
deliberative turn, Dryzek recognized and thought through liberal sources of deliberative 
democracy, even as he insisted that his version was more in line with a line of critical 
theory “concerned with charting the progressive emancipation of individuals and society 
from oppressive forces.”28 In Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, he clarified that while 
both liberals and critical theorists “can believe in distortion-free political dialogue … 
what liberals fail to recognize is that getting constitutions and laws right is only half the 
battle” because extra-constitutional distorting factors such as dominant discourses and 
ideologies prevent the deliberative moment from becoming “distortion-free.”29 I more or 
less agree with Dryzek up to this point although, and this is an old critique, I am not 
convinced of the possibility of entirely “distortion free political dialogue.” The following 
passage, though, presages a rift that might give us pause: 
Liberals believe individuals are left unchanged as a result of political 
participation; individuals possess preferences that are given, such that before, 
during, and after participation they are the best judges of their own interests. 
                                                
28 John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2000), 20. 
29 Ibid., 21. 
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Critical theorists, in contrast, are among those who take the view that 
democratic participation can transform individuals.30 
While I agree, I want to suggest that Dryzek could have gone farther. If liberals believe 
individuals are unchanged by politics and critical theorists think individuals can 
transform in the course of some bounded “politics” such as occurs in deliberative 
exchange, I suggest that in contemplating democratic potential we need to think more 
broadly about how, where, and toward what ends democratic individuals might 
‘transform’ themselves and others. Put differently, we need to think more critically about 
the degree to which humans are, as is assumed by Habermas’s liberal and Dryzek’s 
critical deliberative democracy alike, always already autonomous individuals who then 
come together to deliberate and perhaps be changed around the margins. Instead we 
should think seriously about ways in which we are creatures who change and are changed 
in turn through our myriad relationships, environments, practices, habits, and, yes, 
“politics,” in both our public and private lives. So while Dryzek critiques other critical 
theorists (Habermas first and foremost)31 for lacking a critical edge and readopting 
liberalism, we might indeed turn that critique back on Dryzek himself. 
     In light of the relentlessly global problem of climate change, a separate set of doubts 
about deliberative democracy arises. Jane Gordon counters the deliberative approach with 
the claim that: 
One cannot, as is the norm in much Habermasian critical theory, allow certain 
foundational principles to remain outside of the bounds of negotiation: In 
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suggesting that the norms that define the intersubjective relations that 
constitute collective life should reflect ongoing deliberations of all implicated 
parties, he is describing the deliberate and active creolization of political life.32 
Gordon’s argument has to do with what she calls creolizing political theory, a process 
that “draws attention to the mutual transformation involved in molding that which 
emerges as politically shared.”33 In other words and contra deliberative democrats, those 
interested in democratic engagement of problems held in common cannot set some 
aspects of culture, experience, or expression aside as sacred (deliberative capacity, e.g.), 
cannot assume some general or universal a priori because interactions will necessarily 
overflow into those forbidden areas outside of moral-practical reason – to instrumental 
reason, yes, but also and importantly to aesthetic-expressive reason. On the question of 
excluding various forms of reason and the people who reason in prohibited ways, Teena 
Gabrielson and Katelyn Parady highlight that “the logic that underwrites these exclusions 
reserves full membership to those whose deliberative capacity is understood to control 
the passions and appetites of the body.”34 If deliberative democracy excludes various 
forms of reasoning as well as the ‘passions and appetites of the body’ from the frame of 
politics, it should come as no surprise when material forces like climate violence that act 
on and impress upon the body – physically, psychically, or emotionally – are subtly 
excluded as well. 
     Still, as environmental political theorists have tried to bring democracy to bear on the 
                                                
32 Jane Gordon, Creolizing Political Theory: Reading Rousseau Through Fanon (New York: 
Fordham UP, 2014), 167. 
33 Ibid., 3. 
34 Gabrielson and Parady, “Corporeal Citizenship,” 374. 
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problem of global climate change, the project of expanding upon the deliberative turn 
has seen continued popularity. Indeed Dryzek’s more recent writings, along with others 
writing since the late 1990s and early 2000s have tried to supplement theories and 
practices of global governance with insights from and infrastructures of deliberative 
democracy.35 Barry Holden, writing early on, pinned his hopes on a cosmopolitan vision 
of a global civil society populated by international organizations and regimes.36 Scholars 
after him largely followed suit. Yet more recently, Dryzek writing with Hayley 
Stevenson, admit that the international problem of climate “begets multiple challenges for 
effective and legitimate governance” and that “such settings beyond the national state 
largely transcend the reach of democracy, at least as traditionally conceptualized in 
liberal terms.”37 Dryzek and Stevenson have thus scaled back Holden’s grand vision 
accordingly, maintaining that the best we can do is to “promote the deliberative features” 
of the inherently non-democratic structure of global governance – to democratize those 
structures as far as they will go.38 I suggest we should think more seriously about what 
those impacted by climate change and wont to hold on to their democratic commitments 
and identities can focus on, given the overwhelming nature of the problem. How can we 
                                                
35 See Hayley Stevenson and John Dryzek, Democratizing Global Climate Governance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014) and John Dryzek, Richard Norgaard, and David Schlosberg, 
Climate-Challenged Society (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), esp. ch. 6. 
36 Holden, Democracy, ch. 4. See also David Held and Angus Hervey, “Democracy, Climate 
Change and Global Governance: Democratic Agency and the Policy Menu Ahead,” in The 
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37 John Dryzek and Hayley Stevenson, “Democractizing the Global Climate Regime,” in 
Interpretive Approaches to Global Climate Governance: (De)constructing the Greenhouse, Chris 
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edge out of our personal, purely private lives and bring ourselves to confront climate 
violence as a problem for publics? How, ultimately, can we grow the foundations for a 
broader climate justice movement that “adeptly link(s) policy advocacy efforts with 
powerful grassroots movement building, counterhegemonic discourse, organizing, and 
protest?”39 
     As Bonnie Honig has recently voiced, we diminish the work of democratic citizenship 
“if we leave to democracy merely the practice of electoral majoritarianism and 
deliberative proceduralism while divesting democratic states or publics of their 
ownership of or responsibility for public things.”40 With Honig, I suggest that limiting 
practices of democracy to electoral and deliberative forms risks further divesting publics 
of their responsibility for climate change, thus obscuring the public thing to which they 
might be responsive. Because these are the dominant forms of democracy, it should come 
as no surprise that there seems to be no ‘public thing’ for people to do with regard to 
climate change. 
Disruptive Democracy 
     Or perhaps it is more accurate to say there are not many public things for people to do 
with regard to climate change. In recent years public intellectual activists like Naomi 
Klein and Chris Hedges41 have presented disruptive protest as a third way for people to 
engage democratically with climate change. Such modes of engagement can be 
                                                
39 David Ciplet, J. Timmons Roberts, and Mizan R. Khan, Power in a Warming World: The New 
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MA: MIT Press, 2015), 248. 
40 Bonnie Honig, Public Things: Democracy in Disrepair (New York: Fordham UP, 2017), 4-5. 
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understood as an extension of Sheldon Wolin’s influential distinction between ‘the 
political’ and ‘politics,’ and an attempt to disrupt and reshape the latter through the 
expansion of the former. 
     In “Fugitive Democracy,” Wolin gave us the useful distinction between the political 
(the occasional and sporadic use of collective power to “expand the wellbeing of the 
community”) and politics (legitimized, continual public contest, “primarily by organized 
and unequal social powers”).42 Thinkers like Klein and Hedges implicitly suggest we 
collect electoral and deliberative modes of democracy under the heading of what Wolin 
calls politics, and advocate for public, disruptive actions that embrace the fleeting, 
fugitive, momentary eruption of the political. 
     When Wolin published “Fugitive Democracy” in 1994, he was not likely thinking 
centrally about global warming, climate change, or climate violence. Yet in a brief 
passage, Wolin did highlight pollution as a kind of problem that moves us from a 
“modern” (Hobbesian) focus on the nation state and its borders to a “postmodern” sign of 
the limitations of such borders. “The Hobbesian notion of “frontiers” has also been 
disputed on other grounds … as obstructionist by those who point to the grave problems 
whose causes and solutions defy political boundaries: pollution, famine, abuses of human 
rights, nuclear weapons, and epidemics.”43 Wolin himself is ambivalent here: he fears 
that democratic responses to problems like climate violence (“pollution”) may attempt to 
expand the political yet ends up expanding politics. The difference here has to do with 
those fleeting moments of fugitive democracy that expand democratic potentials for the 
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demos to rule itself, on the one hand, and the continual expansion of social control by 
states and corporations which attempt to manage the democratic political through the 
daily grind of politics, on the other. 
     Whatever Wolin may have concluded, others following in his footsteps have explicitly 
endorsed sporadic, disruptive responses that mirror the logic of the political. In a public 
talk given in 2014 just before between 100,000 and 400,000 people took to the streets of 
Manhattan to push for a more radical response to climate change,44 Hedges remarked 
that, when the state inevitably meets those marching with repression:  
We will have to carry out acts of civil disobedience that seek to cripple the 
mechanisms of corporate power. The corporate elites, blinded by their lust for 
profit and foolish enough to believe they can protect themselves from climate 
change, will not veer from our path towards ecocide unless they are forced from 
power. And this means the beginning of a titanic clash between our corporate 
masters and ourselves.45 
Collective disruption, per Hedges, is an unavoidable reaction to state and corporate 
powers that draw us ever closer to catastrophe. Democracy is in the streets. 
     In a similarly Wolinian moment, Naomi Klein writes that: 
The process of taking on the corporate-state power nexus that underpins the 
extractive economy is leading a great many people to face up to the underlying 
democratic crisis that has allowed multinationals to be the authors of laws under 
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which they operate–whether at the municipal, state/provincial, national, or 
international level. It is this corroded state of our political systems–as fossilized as 
the fuel at the center of these battles–that is fast turning Blockadia into a 
grassroots pro-democracy movement.46 
Blockadia, she notes, “is not a specific location on a map but rather a roving transnational 
conflict zone that is cropping up with increasing frequency and intensity wherever 
extractive projects are attempting to dig and drill.”47 Finally, pointing to the essence of 
this vision of democracy, Klein writes that “having the ability to defend one’s 
community’s water source from danger seems to a great many people like the very 
essence of self-determination.” “What is democracy” she asks, “if it doesn’t encompass 
the capacity to decide, collectively, to protect something that no one can live without?”48 
     Klein’s examination of Blockadia suggests one form that greenhouse democracy could 
take. Direct actions, aimed at expanding the political potentials of “the people,” and 
making demands for new forms of political and material power over and against ossified 
forms of state and corporate power that underwrite the fossil fuel era, might be the most 
that we can hope for. Yet those who have paid critical attention to the aftermaths of the 
political eruptions of the last few years (Occupy Wall Street; the Arab Spring) might raise 
points of caution, if not outright cynicism. Amidst so many praiseworthy (if disparate) 
moments of disruptive democracy, such critics might wonder whether a lack of attention 
to the aftermath of disruption is itself less a necessity of “fugitive” democracy and instead 
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a sign of the times, or a symptom of a broader lack of political commitment and 
capacity. “Might ADD,” asks Bonnie Honig, “be the symptomatic disorder of 
neoliberalism?”49 In other words, what if Blockadia, or the disruptive climate marches, of 
the sometimes-energized sometimes-deflated campaigns to ‘save the planet’ blow over 
precisely because they are momentary by design, and subject to getting caught up in 
shifting and momentary moods?  
     I am sympathetic with the drive to disrupt politics and expand the political that 
thinkers like Wolin, Hedges, and Klein share. Yet I am not convinced that it is enough; I 
worry that there is more to be done in the down time, the time in between momentary 
disruptions. At a basic level, such disruption takes planning, as activist-authors like Klein 
are well aware. As much as we might like to pretend, hundreds of thousands do not 
march together spontaneously and the camps that captured much collective attention at 
Standing Rock required tremendous effort behind the scenes. With regard to longer-term 
concerns and strategies, radical or disruptive forms of democracy need to tend to the 
more organized elements of participatory democrats. With Jason Vick (commenting on 
Wolin and Jacques Rancière), we can maintain that much about the contemporary world 
and its constellations of state and corporate power requires attention to the “momentary,” 
to “a transgressing of the ordinary,” in which concerted citizen action “triumphs over the 
politics of centralized state management.”50 Yet in light of slowly unfolding problems 
like climate violence that connect past, present, and future in ways that cannot be ignored 
disruptive democracy starts to look incomplete. Climate violence is not likely to be 
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addressed through disruption alone: were there to be a complete and total disruption 
of the fossil fuel industry tomorrow, people in communities across the world would still 
need to respond by coming up with ways of allocating responsibility, care, and cost of the 
damage already locked in. As Joan Tronto points out, allocation of care and responsibility 
are central if often neglected democratic projects.51 Without some form of participatory 
institutions – likely decentralized so as to retain political autonomy from ‘centralized 
state management’ – disruptive democracy alone risks ignoring these latter elements of 
democratic life. 
     Recently, Dean Mathiowetz has pointed to a similar set of concerns raised by Hanna 
Pitkin in relation to Wolin’s fugitive democracy and the outlines of what I am calling 
disruptive democracy more generally. Democracy, Mathiowetz writes: 
Thus involves not only its most agonistic moments, in which “the demos is 
activated and thus takes shape in the midst of revolt, resistance, or revolution … 
contest[ing] established boundaries, institutions, and practices.” For Pitkin, it also 
entails knowing the ways that one is connected to others, and taking responsibility 
for the consequences of those connections; of shifting one’s perspective to 
encompass that of a diverse and ever-shifting “we,” and in so doing, joining in 
political action.52 
In these latter projects of continually revisiting connections, shifting perspectives, and 
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thus joining in political action, disruptive democracy too finds its limits. As 
Christopher Meckstroth claims, change has not been particularly well-covered by 
democratic theorists. Instead, as is reflected in the above discussions of electoral, 
deliberative, and to some extent disruptive democracy, “most mainstream democratic 
theories define democracy as a set of timeless principles or institutions.”53 Meckstroth 
calls these “static theories” of democracy, and smartly points out that in focusing on 
timeless principles or institutions, static theories “ignore an entire field of political 
phenomena central both to the establishment of democratic states and to ongoing political 
life within them.”54 Where static theories of democracy might adequately grasp and 
design the ends of principles and institutions, they tend to ignore or erase the significance 
of “the actions and interactions of citizens as they pursue those ends.”55 Finally and most 
importantly, ignoring these more everyday political interactions means limiting the loci 
of (greenhouse) democracy. “Even when mainstream democratic theories consider 
political protest or activism as part of democratic politics,” Meckstroth tells, “they often 
see it only as raising free-floating arguments or reasons, and ignore the crucial element of 
organization and mobilization to which such arguments are tied.”56 Static democracy, 
that is, largely leaves democratic struggle and engagement – the prerequisites of 
democratic change and the practices that support it – aside. If Meckstroth is right, it 
should come as no surprise that existing democratic theories and politics have not 
enabled impacted citizens and peoples to keep up with a changing climate. 
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     Taken together, these three models of democracy lack attention to sustained, 
everyday engagement by assuming participation rather than recognizing a need to clear 
the way for it. In the case of climate violence, they lack attention to inter-related and 
mutually-reinforcing sites of what could be ongoing democratic work: allocating 
responsibility, expanding public attention to affective and emotional responses to climate 
violence alongside more strictly rational ones, and coming up with ways to sustain – and 
institutions to support – democratic responsiveness, struggle, and change. 
IV. Greenhouse Democracy 
“As phenomena are open to various modes of conceptualizing them as problems, 
so too their public character is open to various means of conceiving their 
resolution.”57 
 
“Democracy, in other words, is the only legitimate form of government not 
because it has a secure theoretical foundation, but just because it is the only form 
that needs no further foundation whatsoever.”58 
 
     The “forms” of democracy – if not government exactly – discussed above may be 
useful and even necessary, but they are insufficient insofar as they do not get us very 
close to ‘engaging with the everyday’ elements of climate violence, to recall John 
Meyer’s work once more. What if the central climate questions for those of us who lack 
significant access to institutional levers of power most of the time shifted from “what can 
I do about this vast problem?” or “what should an international response to climate 
change look like” to “how am I positioned in relation to climate violence, to its causes 
and effects, and to others impacted by it?;” “how does climate violence impact me, my 
community, and still more distant others?;” and “what can we do to repair the damage 
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done?” 
     Such questions might appeal immediately to political and environmental activists, and 
even a few empathetic bystanders might find that they are important. But as sociologist 
Kari Norgaard found when studying climate denial in Bygdaby, Norway, most of the 
time, “people want to protect themselves a bit.”59 Most people most of the time, that is, 
are motivated by self-preservation. For some, this might mean that they become 
responsive to climate violence insofar as the well being of their self – the image they 
have of themselves – is tied to the well being of the world and distant others: injustice 
anywhere is injustice everywhere. Others might become responsive insofar as they are 
directly impacted by rising sea levels, intensified storms or droughts, etc. Yet for others, 
protecting oneself might also mean turning away and remaining un-responsive through 
explicit denial or actions that suggest one denies or downplays the problem. Might 
starting from more familiar and concrete places around us, within us, and between us lead 
us toward engagement rather than away from it? Might the act of tending to where we are 
and how we feel – activities that allow us to protect ourselves a bit – indeed count as the 
beginnings of democratic engagement, insofar as those activities are “available to the 
participation of the many?”60 
     In this closing section I answer in the affirmative to this last question and outline some 
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components of and tasks for greenhouse democracy: a democracy of, by, and for the 
greenhouse, where engaging lived experience is a starting point and the democratic 
embrace and allocation of responsibility for repair an ultimate goal.  
     Engaging lived experience is important insofar as we often get stuck, caught up in 
abstract considerations, seduced by the ever recurring feeling that things will just work 
out, or obsessed with debates over that which we have little to no power. The students 
who I teach tend to be deeply concerned about climate change and environmental 
degradation. Yet when I ask about what might need to change, their answers are 
relatively constrained: shop from sustainable companies, appeal to the better nature of the 
fossil fuel industry until it accepts the logical, economic, or ethical necessity of closing 
down the fossil fuel era, etc. They are hardly alone in what might be described as their 
cognitive dissonance: I rarely come up with a satisfactory answer to similar questions 
when put on the spot. Rather than only read this as an overwhelming success of neoliberal 
depoliticization or individual failure, I think we should understand my students and 
myself to be reaching for that which is currently in reach, within the dominant climate 
imaginary. Per Manjana Milkoreit, “our imagination is to a large extent bound to the 
systems we live in … the things we know … provide most of the source material for our 
thinking about alternative realities and different futures.”61 
     The specific limit here, it seems to me, is as such: to really step into a different way of 
thinking about and engaging with climate violence, we would need resources and models 
with which to confront that problem. In short, my students and I, along with a great many 
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others, are dealing with the unacknowledged but sometimes sensed fact that that 
which is within reach is indeed not enough, even as we are seldom presented with 
alternatives. To reach for alternatives we would need institutions (broadly conceived) the 
purpose of which is to make bolder and more collective actions thinkable.  
     Yet clearly, it would not be enough to do this work purely on the self: it needs to be 
done in the world, with others, politically. The forms of democracy discussed above 
either explicitly reject or simply neglect the possibility of such work. Missing from 
electoral, deliberative, and disruptive democracy alike, we see inklings of how it might 
work in feminist thought and democratic theories that emphasize mindful attention to 
embodied citizenship. 
     I return to this below. First, I pose questions of a democratic imaginary, how it would 
present climate violence differently and, indeed, how it would make use of dramatization 
and presentation in ways that encourage us to situate ourselves in relation to broader 
public problems like that of climate violence. 
A Democratic Imaginary 
     A recent volume starts us down the path toward such an imaginary: Paul Wapner and 
Hilal Elver’s Reimagining Climate Change.62 There, the editors and contributors suggest 
an important impediment to countering climate change takes the form of what they call 
“Climate, Inc.,” which limits collective imagination. Climate, Inc. comes very close to 
what I have been calling the dominant climate imaginary: it is “the routinized system of 
response that has evolved to address climate change” that could theoretically work but 
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has not yet done so. From within Climate, Inc., we appear to be in an “if only” 
moment: “if only markets could capture full climate costs; if only states could find 
common ground and agree to appropriate international measures; if only technological 
innovation was given fuller reign and renewables could compete on a level playing field,” 
etc., then existing institutions – Climate, Inc. – could take care of climate violence in one 
way or another.63 
     The problem for Wapner, Elver, et al. is that Climate, Inc. has led to a “hardening” of 
thought: it has locked us into thinking about climate change in one particular way and not 
others. Along the way it has “fixed certain horizons and committed us along particular 
trajectories,” “narrowed the range of possibility for thought and action,” and 
“concentrated attention on the instrumentality rather than the ends of climate 
measures.”64 Ultimately Climate, Inc. has restrained “the ability to unleash the mind, 
heart, and spirit to envision, entertain, and develop hitherto neglected possibilities” by 
reifying and naturalizing the dominant climate imaginary.65 
     What, I now ask, might start to shift if we were to change the way we told stories 
about climate change and climate violence? how might a shift in stories help build a more 
democratic imaginary from which to tackle climate violence? and how might a more 
democratic imaginary approach the problem of climate violence? 
     Milkoreit proposes a turn to climate fiction, also known as Cli-fi. Cli-fi, she contends, 
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“might help us rethink Climate Inc. and open up new horizons of political, 
technological, economic, and cultural opportunity,” even as it might humanize climate 
change, allowing us to “feel, taste, smell, and think about climate change in a more 
personal way.”66 I agree. Yet for those uncomfortable with turning to fiction as a way of 
engaging ‘real-world’ problems, I would add that telling the stories of actually existing 
climate change differently might have the same effect. Consider an except from the 
conclusion to Christine Shearer’s Kivalina: A Climate Change Story, which takes us back 
to the island of Kivalina and the people who live there, under constant threat of climate 
violence: 
The effects of climate change become more apparent every day. The year 2010 
marked not just the hottest decade since instrumental climate records began in 
1850–eighteen nations around the globe experienced their hottest temperatures 
ever–but also the wettest …. 
     Meanwhile, fossil fuel companies and their supporters argue that the United 
States should continue drawing upon our oil, coal, and gas resources for our 
benefit. This argument, however, ignores that ownership of the resources and thus 
profits are concentrated among a small group of interests that are free to sell the 
resources as they see fit …. 
     The additional costs of fossil fuels also became apparent in April 2010, with 
the Massey coal mine explosion that killed twenty-nine, and the BP Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig explosion that killed eleven and resulted in the largest oil spill in 
U.S. History. Similar disasters, meanwhile, are all too common throughout the 
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rest of the world, including frequent coal mining “accidents” in China, 
widespread population displacement for the construction of coal mines and plants 
in countries such as Burma and Thailand, and oil “spills” that have long plagued 
Ecuador and Nigeria. These kinds of events will become more frequent as current 
fossil fuels supplies deplete and companies pursue harder-to-reach sources with 
more unconventional techniques, such as offshore oil drilling in the remote 
Arctic, blasting water and chemicals into the Marcellus Shale underlying the 
northeastern United States, and pumping increasing amounts of captured carbon 
dioxide underground for enhanced oil recovery. 
     Fossil fuels are not the only option, however, and the science on climate 
change suggests that what’s left of them should be used wisely, moving toward a 
model of smaller and more local development powered by cleaner energy sources 
…. 
     As this book has argued, climate change is a social issue that increasingly 
affects all of us. The dangers have become clear, imperiling people throughout the 
world like those in Kivalina, and it is time to act. To fail to do so is to leave this 
issue to the small number of powerful players who exert so much influence over 
U.S. and global policy, many of whom have worked very hard to dispute and 
downplay climate change and block meaningful action. We cannot afford to leave 
the fate of our planet in their hands. It is up to all of us.67 
Breaking with the attempt to describe only or even primarily the broad physical contours 
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of climate change, Shearer instead connects those realities to the social contexts out 
of which they emerge and to an alternative energy infrastructure, in order to make a plea 
for thick engagement. Here climate violence is held up as a call to action and engagement 
on behalf of those impacted rather than a problem requiring action only from above. 
     Or, consider Jose A. Kusugak’s foreword to The Earth is Faster Now, a collection of 
Indigenous observations of climate change: 
For Inuit, during most of the year, sea ice is really a large extension of land. In 
winter, it was rare to find igloos and camps built on land. The land was colder 
than building igloos on sea or lake ice. The radiant heat of the water made that 
much difference. 
     Climate change has real and serious implications for Inuit life because much of 
the traditional knowledge is based on the times of seasons and not traditionally on 
temperatures. In other words, one does “this” at “this time” of the year rather than 
when the temperature gets “like this.” For example, catching caribou is done in 
the fall after flies stop flying; not only to prevent maggots but because the meat 
shouldn’t be too fermented or for that matter, too fresh.  It is called pirujat 
(cached) or fermented meat and fat is called igunaq (singular), igunat (plural). 
There are many grades of igunat from mild to green. Now with climate change 
and warmer temperatures, much meat is going to waste because of over 
fermentation and botulism is becoming a real hazard.68 
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Kusugak’s description brings attention to the proximate implications of climate 
change more than it spells out the technical details. By doing so, he has room to explore 
how factors of life that reside in the intersection between politics and nature – factors like 
land, time, and food – shift, transform, or invert under conditions of climate violence. By 
describing climate change in this way, Kusugak dramatizes the problem so that demands 
readers feel the disruption of the everyday lives of concrete others. 
     A democratic imaginary, to push back on such restraints, starts by asking how we can 
make things public, and by asking which things can be made public. When we imagine 
climate violence democratically – when we think of it in all of its drama and impact upon 
concrete people and communities – it is more difficult to remain unresponsive. What is 
needed, then, are practices and institutions capable of fostering these kinds of attention. 
Greenhouse Democracy 
     The ultimate point of imagining climate change democratically – as a problem for 
democracy – is to explore “hitherto neglected possibilities.”69 By drawing our attention to 
quotidian and local instances of climate violence and then connecting such instances to 
climate change more broadly, authors like Shearer and Kusugak point to three related 
possibilities that I close by exploring. First, such stories prompt us to acknowledge that 
we are all embedded in vast and intricate webs of relations with human and nonhuman 
entities and forces. While such an acknowledgement has many implications at many 
levels – ontological, theoretical, ethical, existential, and so on – the focus here is on the 
public or political implication. At the political level such stories suggest a need to turn 
our attention away from citizenship organized around aggregative democracy and 
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sovereign states and toward what EPT and feminist scholars have described as 
corporeal agency and citizenship.70 Second, by bringing drama and dramatization into the 
narrative, writers like Shearer and Kusugak offer us the possibility that our emotional and 
affective reactions to stories of climate violence and to that violence itself  – and not just 
our rational attempts to understand, measure, predict, and persuade – might constitute 
opportunities for democratic engagement. If, per Charles Taylor, “we know with our 
feelings,” much of what we know about climate violence has been circumscribed and 
kept out of public affairs, leaving us with without frameworks for adjudicating truth when 
“what we sense through our feelings clashes with what we know through dispassionate 
reason.”71 A democratic imaginary allows us to ask whether such reactions – which 
common sense largely confines to our private and interior states – might indeed have 
public elements and whether there might indeed be a public ‘truth’ to how seemingly 
individual psychic reactions to a changing world are patterned. Taken together, the first 
two possibilities remind us of a third: a shift from (only) approaching climate change 
from the top down as modeled by the UNFCCC and other forms of global governance to 
starting from where one is and edging slowly outward as a specifically democratic 
practice available to many, if not all. 
Corporeal Citizenship 
     Where the picture of human agency and citizenship held by the dominant climate 
imaginary “rests on a faculty of rational autonomy,” a democratic imaginary emphasizes 
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the degree to which humans are always in relations with other humans and with the 
world around them, a point that some feminists, new materialists, and others have 
stressed.72 Such thinkers have long insisted that a relational ontology offers a better 
starting point for approaching social and political issues surrounding agency and citizenly 
activity such as they are rather than as they might be. In this view, myriad relations 
(familial, local, national, international, to other people, to other species, to the earth, etc.) 
make us what we are and enable us to be what we want to be, to achieve our goals, and to 
generally live our lives. 
     Received Western notions of the human, the citizen, and so much else, Teena 
Gabrielson and Katelyn Parady write along these lines, rest on “a privileging of the 
epistemic that constructs political space through the reinforcing dualisms of mind/matter, 
nature/culture, reason/emotion, men/women, public/private and so on.”73 In other words, 
our traditional fixation on epistemology implies a tendency to categorize and leads to the 
creation and subsequent reinforcement of binaries. Implicit here are many concerns: that 
binaries will be reified and essentialized, that they will ignore or exclude aspects of the 
world that remain uncaptured by relevant binaries, and that, politically, one side of a 
given binary will be singled out for inclusion while the other is excluded. Drawing such 
concerns together, Gabrielson and Parady suggest it is our focus on epistemology 
specifically that “makes possible the abstract and universal citizen, disembodied from the 
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particularities of both context and human difference.”74 Epistemology and 
categorization, rather than things more material or experiential, constitute the conditions 
of possibility for and sustain the idea of the autonomous, disembodied, and 
decontextualized citizen. 
     As such it should come as little surprise that this sense of “autonomy–of isolated, self-
reliant moral selves–does not adequately reflect people’s lived experience in most 
communities around the world.”75 I would only add that those who do understand 
themselves and their accomplishments along the lines of autonomy and self reliance may 
well be participating in the kind of epistemological exclusion described above, and 
thereby neglecting to consider the many things and people who make such an ‘autonomy’ 
possible.76 Still, it is this universal and abstract citizen that is the presumed participant in 
the forms of democracy discussed above; who participates in elections and therefore 
logically consents to their results; who deliberates with reason rather than passion in the 
hopes of crafting the most beautiful and convincing argument; who disrupts politics by 
participating in the political in order to break radically from the past. Instead of following 
the road from epistemology to unrealistic autonomy, greenhouse democracy might be 
better served by turning to “an ontological frame in which entities do not pre-exist their 
relationality” and where “both humans and non-humans, subjects and objects, and social 
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and physical entities mutually co-constitute the other.”77 
     To make this turn, Gabrielson and Parady outline a version of green citizenship “that 
allows for greater recognition of the diverse attachments individuals have to the natural 
world and better attends to claims of recognition and social justice.”78 Through its 
capacity to better attend to and incorporate democratic ways of responding to climate 
violence and environmental degradation more broadly, corporeal citizenship offers a 
useful path toward a more sophisticated understanding of the social and political aspects 
of the problem, and might help democratic thinkers and actors come up with new ways of 
considering the collectivities to which we belong and for which we are responsible 
beyond the merely subjective and intentionalist ones I discussed in Chapter 4. Per Dayna 
Nadine Scott et al., “corporeal citizenship has the potential to allow ecological citizens to 
expand the sphere over which they exercise ethical and political responsibility.”79 
Relevant spheres of responsibility, for example, might extend beyond (without 
necessarily leaving behind) political parties, states, and identities. By attending to the 
truth that is in some sense written on the body,80 corporeal citizens might gain more 
sophisticated understandings of themselves not only as citizens of the human institutions 
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of states and all the rest, but also as living, breathing, simultaneously fragile and 
powerful inhabitants of the earth who belong to and are responsible for various more-
than-human ecosystems. A shift toward corporeal citizenship, in other words, is the 
political-material counterpart to the political-ethical shift to responsiveness discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
Affect and Emotions 
     Leonard Ferry and Rebecca Kingston suggest that “the rational, normative vision of 
politics so prevalent today can be said to harbor an incomplete, if not manifestly false, 
concept of the human subject.”81 Against a politics built on the presumption of a rational 
subject alone, they advocate a more passionate politics that disrupts received approaches 
that rigidly separate private from public, emotions from political judgment, and affect 
from political life more broadly.82 
     Put more simply, in light of the turn to corporeal citizenship – citizenship that 
recognizes humans as permeable, relational, and more open to the world than we might 
sometimes know – it makes sense to question and revise our assessment of the place for 
emotional, affective, or psychic responses (i.e. those thought of as ‘internal’ to us or as 
impressed upon us from without). Specifically, we might ask whether such responses 
bridge the gap between private and public, individual and world, or internal and external 
given the fact that “not only are bodies embedded in social contexts and structures, but 
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the social is also embedded, literally, in material bodies.”83  
     If we answer in the affirmative, a gap in existing democratic institutions and practices 
comes into view: we have few if any ways of bringing emotions and affects out into 
public or processing them alongside fellow citizens, corporeal or otherwise. Writing on 
the history of the passions in relation to political theory, Cheryl Hall traces this back to 
enlightenment liberals who, in keeping with the ‘rational, normative’ vision of politics 
critiqued by Ferry and Kingston, “work to marginalize passion.” For Hall, many classical 
liberals marginalize passion “either through explicitly arguing that it is best kept outside 
the margins of the public sphere, or by speaking of it only marginally, if at all.”84 
     Politically, Hall raises Hamilton’s paradigmatic arguments in Federalist #15, 
according to which “the passions of “men” lead to irrational and unjust behavior.”85 And 
there are clearly dangerous ways of bringing emotions back into politics. For this 
argument we can go at least as far back as Seneca. About anger, for example, Seneca 
wrote that: 
The best course is to reject straightway the initial prickings of anger, to fight 
against its first sparks, and to struggle not to succumb to it. Once it has begun to 
carry us off course it’s difficult to sail back to safety, since not a jot of reason 
remains once the passion has been let in and some sovereign right has been 
granted to it by our own will: it will thereafter do not what you allow but what it 
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wants.86 
Here, a cautionary tale emerges: visceral emotions like anger can – and for Seneca almost 
certainly will – take us in directions we would not otherwise go. From Seneca to 
Hamilton to Habermas a primary response has often been to exclude such emotion. 
     Yet while including emotion might bring dangers, it remains unclear whether 
excluding it is possible. Per Ferry and Kingston, a rational subject devoid of emotion is 
unrealistic. Nor is it clear that excluding emotion is entirely desirable. If, per Taylor, we 
know by feeling, to exclude or circumscribe feeling is to exclude knowledge. Perhaps it is 
unwise to rush into a public sphere overcome with anger; it is at least also unwise to 
neglect the anger of peoples who have long suffered injustice, or to refuse to attend to 
one’s own angry responses to injustice. 
     Yet coming back to the climate, what if we have been neglecting opportunities to 
engage affective and emotional responses there, too? The argument against engaging 
emotions and passions as public or political things seems to have been that they can be 
arbitrary whereas reason is steady. Here Hall rightly asks us to consider whether passions 
and reason are really all that different: 
There are two main problems with these presumptions. The first is precisely that 
they treat passion … as if it were an alien force that operates independently of the 
psyche. While passions may sometimes be experienced this way, there is no 
reason to believe that our feelings are any more imposed on us than our thoughts. 
What about the times when thoughts come into our heads unbidden, as if from 
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nowhere? Or when our minds wander from the topic we intended to think 
about? Or when we find it difficult to stop thinking about something, despite our 
best attempts? In all of these cases, the workings of reason can be seen as both 
anarchic and commanding, in tension with personal agency and self-control. And 
yet few have concluded that reason is a strange power that overmasters the self 
…. Passion and reason are both “us.” They are both native to the self, both parts 
of the workings of the psyche. Neither is a foreign power poised to take over the 
self. 
I largely agree with Hall here, insofar as she highlights the similarities between ways that 
the passions and reason operate, and to bridge the gap between the two. Yet I take partial 
issue with the idea that the passions and reason alike are simply ‘native to the self’ rather 
than ‘foreign powers.’ Insofar as “reason” and “passions” are ways of responding to the 
world, they are at once “native” and “foreign,” “external” and “internal.” The point is that 
the dominant climate imaginary and prevalent understandings of democracy alike have 
ignored our corporeal permeability – the extent to which the outside world impresses 
upon our selves and our selves emanate out into the world. As such, we have given 
inadequate attention to connections between the above binaries, and to working toward 
envisioning institutions and practices that help us process such connections both privately 
and politically. Given that climate violence unfolds slowly and impacts many in ways 
subtle and overt, much of the response to it is going to be affective and emotional. The 
dominant imaginary cannot offer the kinds of resources we would need to recognize such 
reactions, much less to leverage them in order to support constructive and reparative 
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political projects, to build slow but widespread and sustained resistance to the fossil 
fuel era and the harms it brings about, etc. 
     In lieu of such work, there should be no surprise when, for example, passive climate 
deniers (who deny not out of ideological or organized interests but out of an 
overwhelming sense of helplessness) seem to retrench further into their denial as they are 
buried in what they experience as abstract facts. In other words, we should not be 
surprised when people opt to remain unresponsive, especially since we have little by way 
of institutions or practices through which to grapple with overwhelming topics. Likewise, 
consider those who feel good about their attempts at ethical consumption yet decline to 
make moves toward activism even though any response lacking the latter is likely to be 
insufficient. Those responses, too, start to make sense when understood as involving not 
only reason strictly defined, but affect and emotion as well. In each of these cases, we 
often treat affective, emotional, or passionate responses – whether they take the form of 
denial or that of self-congratulation – as end points: places that people end up after 
rationally processing and assessing relevant arguments, data, etc. Yet seeing such 
responses as having public relevance – or having the potential to be made public – would 
mean seeing them as starting points: reactions that one has before confronting or 
processing much of anything. I am not certain of what such institutions or practices might 
look like, but I am fairly convinced that the vast problem of climate violence presents an 
unwelcome opportunity to start to settle such questions. 
Edging Slowly Outward 
     In Worldly Ethics, Ella Myers distinguishes between models of public ethics that focus 
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on the self, the other, and the world at large.87 Associating such models, broadly, with 
Foucault, Levinas, and Arendt, Myers concludes that the third offers the best starting 
point for a particularly democratic ethos, centered on democratic care that is 
“collaborative, expressed in joint action by plural participants” and where “the 
practitioner of such care is never a self but always an association of selves” and “the 
recipient of care is not another person or even persons, but the world, understood as the 
array of material and immaterial conditions under which human beings live – both with 
one another and with a rich variety of nonhumans, organic and technological.”88  
     The purpose of ‘bringing the passions back in,’ or giving greater attention to affective 
responses to the world, or trying to learn from what we feel, is neither confined to nor 
primarily concerned with therapeutic or charity-based models that Myers finds in 
Foucault and Levinas. While therapeutic benefits might come along the way and in the 
act of caring for the world, associations of individuals will likely care for others (as they 
would given an ethic of charity), the overwhelming worldliness of climate violence 
paired with the corporeal citizen and its attention to shared affective and emotional 
responses to climate violence, draws our attention to Myers’s care for the world: to the 
potential that paying attention to the mediating qualities of the world might help expand 
democratic potentials and projects. 
     For Myers, an ethics based in a care for the world leads us toward associative 
democratic projects, in which associations are not between worldless individuals: 
“democratic relations are not simply intersubjective, if by that we mean they involve two 
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or more subjects.”89 Instead, “democratic politics involves relations among plural 
individuals which are mediated by shared, yet also disputed, objects of attention … 
citizens are simultaneously brought together and separated from one another by specific, 
worldly matters of concern, which “inter-est” or lie between them.”90 What is climate 
violence if not a ‘shared yet disputed’ object of attention and a ‘worldly matter of 
concern’ that lies between us? 
     The third component of greenhouse democracy, then, is an acknowledgment that 
coming to grips with the intricacies of climate violence means focusing political attention 
not only on ourselves and others, but on the world that connects, surrounds, and in some 
sense infiltrates us. To do so requires taking stock and reflecting but it also means 
reaching out, edging slowly outward from where we have been and from where the 
dominant climate imaginary inclines us to stay. Centering the world makes it more likely 
that we will be able to see where we are in the greenhouse and where we are in relation to 
its other inhabitants, to see ourselves belonging in multiple ways to a climate-changed 
world: as sometimes victim, sometimes perpetrator, sometimes beneficiary and as always 
capable of being more responsive rather than less. 
V. Conclusion 
     A more democratic climate imaginary – and greenhouse democracy itself – challenges 
us to recognize and enact at least three interrelated shifts: toward corporeal citizenship, 
toward a more sustained and potentially public attention to affect and emotion, and 
toward re-centering the world as a place for democratic care and horizontal exploration. 
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     Clearly, shifting attention to these endeavors breaks with much of what we know 
‘liberal’ or ‘aggregative’ democracy to be. These last projects might take electoral or 
deliberative forms: a method of gauging the will of a nationally circumscribed ‘people’ 
and forming representative governments accordingly or the form of creating public 
spaces where the marketplace of ideas might set up shop. 
     On the surface, greenhouse democracy has more in common with disruptive forms of 
democracy, in which democratic publics contest and disrupt the routine order, along with 
the institutions and forms of power that create that order. Yet corporeal citizenship, 
attention to affect, and caring for the world are longer-term projects. 
     Yet some things are common to the forms of democracy surveyed above. First, and at 
best, they all aim to provide or generate something that is available to all. At best, 
electoral democracy aims at universal suffrage; deliberative democracy builds measures 
and practices into its institutions that allow all to participate if they are willing to do so 
appropriately; and opportunities for disruptive democracy appear everywhere power 
goes. Likewise, in the greenhouse, all are able to reflect on, assign, and accept political 
responsibility – for change, for repair, and beyond. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
I. The Argument in Brief 
     Taken together, my dissertation can be read as an attempt to describe, critically assess, 
and propose alternatives to shortfalls that inhere in mainstream political responses to 
climate change. Broadly, two lessons arise: 
• A dominant climate imaginary – animated by logics of neoliberalism and 
managerialism – places practical limits on mainstream climate discourse and 
action. In turn, the ideological effect of such an imaginary is to depoliticize 
climate change and obscure alternative ways of responding to it. Such an 
imaginary is produced by and in turn directs many well-intentioned 
understandings of and responses to climate change. In this imaginary, the same 
structures out of which climate change emerged can be marshaled and made use 
of to respond to climate change, and they are indeed deemed largely sufficient for 
doing so. According to this view, “the solution to the unintended consequences of 
modernity is, and has always been, more modernity–just as the solution to the 
unintended consequences of our technologies has always been more technology.”1 
Maybe so, though I have doubts. What matters most about those who profess this 
view is not what they say. Rather, it is what their words imply without clearly 
stating: the ‘modernity’ and ‘technology’ at play here stem from and reinscribe 
the theories and ideologies, power relations and attitudes toward the ‘natural’ 
world, that led to anthropogenic climate change in the first place. According to 
                                                
1 Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, “Technological Salvation,” Global Environmental 
Politics: From Person to Planet, Simon Nicholson and Paul Wapner, eds. (New York: Routledge, 
2016), 325-6. 
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the dominant climate imaginary, nothing fundamental has to change. 
• In order to counter the depoliticizing tendencies of the dominant climate 
imaginary, it is useful to think more concretely about the problem and to render 
its social and political impact more tangible. I suggest reconceptualizing “climate 
change” as “climate violence,” and dramatizing that violence as two ways of 
thinking more concretely about the problem at hand. Whether it deems the 
problem to be one of “global warming” or “climate change,” the dominant climate 
imaginary supports an abstract and at times overly innocent conceptualization of 
the problem at hand. Timothy Morton highlights this when he declares that he 
does not “subscribe to calling it climate change,” and reminds us of the clear 
increase rather than mere change in global average temperatures.2 I have 
proposed the concept of “climate violence” in order to shift the discussion further 
from abstraction and neutrality and indeed to help contribute to attempts by 
feminists and other thinkers to “bridge the distance of abstraction by bringing 
climate change home.”3 
     Likewise, along with these two broad lessons, I have implied that the problem of 
climate violence catalyzes a series of “climatic inversions” – changes in the world and in 
how we can approach and understand the world. Recall, for example, the following 
inversions: 
• From climate ‘solutions’ to a responsiveness to climate violence. The 
                                                
2 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 3. 
3 Astride Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker, “Weathering: Climate Change and the “Thick 
Time: of Transcorporeality,” Hypatia 29, no. 3 (2014): 559. 
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problem of climate violence is a multifaceted, expansive, and expanding one, 
and thus a problem for which even the most well-intentioned top-down solutions 
are intrinsically dubious. Attempts to create carbon markets, for example, can 
devolve into moneymaking schemes in which the world’s historically wealthy 
accrue further wealth by constructing and engaging in carbon markets, whereas 
the world’s historically poor see their lands turned over to management agencies 
at the behest of corporate/state/international institutional hybrids and partnerships. 
Likewise, proposals to geoengineer can quickly lose sight of the most basic 
commitments to a precautionary principle according to which “the existence of 
uncertainty will, in certain important cases, lead to a reduction in net benefits 
from an activity with environmental costs.”4 Rather than turning to solutions from 
within the dominant climate imaginary, including the “solution” of leaning too 
heavily on liberal, liability, and individual constructions of responsibility, I have 
suggested a prior need to foster a collective yet differentiated sense of 
responsiveness to climate violence that takes centrally into account our position(s) 
in relation to the violence of climate change. 
• From individual to collective responsibility. Likewise, a turn to 
responsiveness to climate violence is at least potentially at odds with 
commonsense ideas about individual responsibility for climate change. Rather 
than starting by finding ways to clarify and codify the latter, we need ways to 
think about collective responsibility that takes individuality and one’s particular 
                                                
4 Kenneth J. Arrow and Anthony C. Fisher, “Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and 
Irreversibility,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, no. 2 (1974): 312. 
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position(s) into account without reducing climate change to a problem of 
individual agency or guilt. To lose track of the former would mean letting go of 
opportunities for collective processing, organizing, resistance, and decision 
making; to do the latter would be to lose track of the conceptualization of climate 
violence which is structural and slow, and thus beyond the reach of individuals 
alone. 
• From formal, institutional understandings of democracy toward democratic 
projects that acknowledge and engage more closely with lived experience. This 
latter project, I suggest, is a starting point from which to depart on several 
necessary democratic endeavors, including the need to collectively expand 
responsiveness, embrace and account for our positions in climatic collectivities, 
and to accept and allocate responsibility and care for the world. The dominant 
climate imaginary’s penchant for working through existing ‘institutions’ extends 
to many existing democratic approaches to climate change. Such approaches rely 
on existing accounts of electoral, deliberative, and very occasionally disruptive 
democracy – accounts that view democracy as first and foremost an institutional 
and rational endeavor or else one that prioritizes active disruption at the expense 
of sustained engagement – in order to correct the ecological failures of global 
capitalism. The proximity, homeliness, and worldliness of climate violence invert 
our attention from institutional democracy alone to democratic and feminist 
perspectives that are themselves closer to lived experience: to felt (if often 
psychically disavowed) impacts, to democratic identities, practices, and projects 
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capable of directing responsive actors toward a more responsible path and, 
indeed of allocating responsibility in a more democratic fashion. 
• From a liberal individualist to a relational ontology. Given broader global 
forces that re-make the world in the image of classical- and neo-liberal capitalism, 
the ontological assumption of the dominant climate imaginary is usually, if 
implicitly, one of individualism. Generally, the path of critiquing one or another 
liberal phenomena or practice as inflating individualism is well worn. Yet doing 
so here remains important: far from an abstract philosophical point, individualist 
ontological assumptions have real consequences with regard to how we think, 
what questions we ask and what answers we give. When pushed to think about the 
causes of climate change, we tend to think about what we personally have done: 
maybe I have been eating too much meat, maybe I have been driving too much, 
etc. Likewise, when we think of solutions, our reflex is likewise toward the 
individual I: how can I reduce my carbon footprint, etc. The basic component is 
the individual. Alternatively, we scale up the same basic framework to arrive at 
the idea of individual states responsible for their own emissions, strictly defined. 
A shift to a more relational ontology, brings about political shifts from received 
understandings of citizenship to “corporeal” citizenship,5 from strictly or 
primarily rational approaches to ones that included affective and emotional states 
as well, and from top-down projects to ones that move horizontally. 
~ 
                                                
5 Gabrielson and Parady, “Corporeal Citizenship.” 
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     In what practical political directions might this dissertation point us? A few, I 
hope: one fairly proximate and already available and one more distant, blurry, and yet to 
be conceived. I end by posing preliminary answers to questions about what all of this 
might look like in practice, how it might work, and what kind of politics it might invite. 
     One option, already available, is to make use of cultural politics. In recent and not so 
recent years television shows (The Wire, The Man in the High Castle, The Handmaid’s 
Tale), films (13th, An Inconvenient Truth, This Changes Everything) and music (Nina 
Simone, Bob Dylan, Woodie Guthrie, the driving forces between the genres of hip hop 
and punk) have invited and mediated engagement with social and political questions of 
race, gender, planetary awareness, and far beyond. Such cultural productions ask their 
observers to confront social and political questions rather than simply learn about them – 
to struggle, process, and eventually act. 
     Likewise, an emerging genre of Cli-Fi – climate fiction – invites readers to think about 
what unchecked climate violence will look like, how it will feel, what it will mean for our 
ability to ‘protect our selves a bit.’ We might prepare the way for greenhouse democracy 
by creating various democratically organized associations around political artifacts: 
reading groups around Cli-Fi, incorporation of such works into curricula, organizing 
screenings and discussions of relevant documentaries and artistic exhibits. In a sense this 
is already happening - such groups took form around the film version of Naomi Klein’s 
This Changes Everything; it could continue to do so with clearer ends in mind and with 
increasing attempts at co-ordination. 
  
224 
     And maybe a somewhat modest cultural engagement is all that could follow. Yet 
there is an argument to be made that the planetary problem of climate violence, if it does 
not eclipse politics entirely, will contribute to the conditions of possibility for greenhouse 
democracy. As climate violence continues to unfold, we will be exposed more and more 
to our own vulnerability. In light of such vulnerability, we can imagine at least three 
political responses. 
     First, a non-response: we might collectively decline to be responsive. In this case, 
each sovereign nation would be left to deal as best it can with the impacts of climate 
violence. Like uneven levels of causal responsibility, political and ethical responsibility 
for countering and repairing the violence of climate change would be distributed 
unequally, the already-rich will endure as the rest of the world bears the brunt of the 
violence, and so on. 
     Second, we might continue to pursue top-down responses organized by a dominant 
imaginary. Such responses may further depoliticize global environmental politics. At 
worst, they may vault models of technocratic or authoritarian politics into the limelight, 
ideologically legitimating anti-democratic politics and bolstering corporate and state 
structures of power. 
     Taken together, the first and second approaches would reflect the continued 
dominance of mainstream climate politics that I have tried to critique throughout. 
     Finally, we might devote greater attention to the ways in which climate violence alters 
some of our most fundamental understandings of the world, and invites slow, 
decentralized resistance, imagination, responsibility, and institutional design. 
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In this case, those impacted by climate violence might marshal the fleeting power of 
disruptive democracy with the dual goal of creating enduring institutions through which 
to respond to a climate changed world, and figuring out what it would look like to 
embrace one’s role as a corporeal citizen of the greenhouse. 
     This last option is necessarily collaborative and requires no official qualifications for 
participation. It is thus an essentially democratic option. It is also – like so many 
developments that have and others that have not managed to expand past imaginations to 
encompass our infinitely complex world – fragile, uncertain, unlikely, and tremendously 
important. 
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